State v. Lecompte
Decision Date | 13 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 62117,62117 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey Joseph LECOMPTE. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Willis & Hardy, Paul J. deMahy, St. Martinville, for defendant-appellant.
William A. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Knowles M. Tucker, Dist. Atty., George W. McHugh, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
The State charged the defendant, Aubrey Joseph Lecompte, with four counts of attempted forcible rape, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:43.1. A jury returned guilty verdicts. The court sentenced him to five-year terms of imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively.
The defendant appeals, relying on eleven assignments of error for reversal of his convictions and sentences.
We adduce the following context facts:
While on Interstate-10, the defendant motioned to women driving alone that something was wrong with their right rear tires. Upon stopping, the defendant offered to tighten the lugs on the wheels but stated that he could only do it safely at the next exit. They left the Interstate at the Butte LaRose exit. In three instances, the defendant escorted the women to a nearby shell yard, and in the other instance, he followed the victim until she pulled off the exit road. After tightening the lugs, he attempted to forcibly rape each woman.
These offenses occurred over a two-month period.
Prior to and during trial, the defendant filed motions to quash and sever the four counts of attempted forcible rape. The court denied them.
In challenging these rulings, the defendant asserts that the joinder prevented the jury from giving a fair determination of his guilt or innocence on each offense. He contends that trial on the four counts confused the jury because each count had a separate victim, time and date, because there was an alibi for three counts, and because the State presented the evidence in a different order than the counts appear in the Bill of Information. He supports this contention by pointing to the fact that the jury asked the court for the specific time each offense occurred.
When the State charges the defendant in the same Bill of Information with two or more offenses pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 493, he may apply for a severance of offenses under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 495.1, which provides:
In State v. Mitchell, La., 356 So.2d 974 (1978), we set forth the guidelines for severance, as follows:
This Court concludes that the trial judge properly denied the motions to quash and sever. Severance was neither appropriate nor necessary "to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense." LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1. Under the circumstances here, we think the jury could distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense. Several factors bolster our conclusion: the relatively small number of offenses joined and the uncomplicated nature of the offenses did not handicap the defendant in his defense; each offense was for the same crime committed in the same manner; there was no confusion in the application of the law because the law was the same for each offense; the statutes violated have few elements; the State presented its evidence in a compartmentalized, logical, and understandable manner; the State's evidence consisted primarily of the victims' testimony which was simple and largely identical in nature; and the court's instructions clearly explained the jury's duty to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence on each offense. Most importantly, the court gave the jurors a list of each charge, the victim, and the date of the offenses to aid in their deliberations.
The jury initially returned two verdicts of not guilty and two verdicts of guilty. One of the not guilty verdicts was improper because it was not the verdict of ten jurors. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 782. The judge instructed them that ten must concur in each verdict and ordered them to deliberate further. Thereafter, they returned four guilty verdicts. The fact that the jurors initially rendered different verdicts for each count indicates that they separated the evidence and law for each count.
And finally, because the jurors asked for the specific times on each offense, does not indicate that the joinder of offenses confused them. The times were critical for evaluation of the alibis.
Secondly, we find these joined offenses which are of the "same or similar character" admissible as similar acts under LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 446. In the instant case, the forcible rapes occurred over a two-month period and exhibited almost identical modus operandi. The modus operandi is so distinctive that it supports a finding that the crimes were the action of the same person, i. e., they are "signature crimes."
Evidence of other crimes is relevant to prove a fact of consequence of the defendant's innocence or guilt. He placed his identity at issue when he presented alibis to three of the charges. The identification of the defendant as the assailant in the offense in which the defense failed to offer an alibi strengthens the identifications in the other three rape charges. In addition, the defense contested the specific intent. He unsuccessfully attempted to introduce expert evidence to prove that he did not have the specific intent to commit any crime and he testified that he did not intend to rape one of the victims. The fact that the defendant inserted his finger into one of the victims vagina strengthens the proof of the defendant's specific intent to forcibly rape the other three victims. Hence, the evidence of the other offenses was relevant to his identity and intent.
Lastly, the probative value of the evidence of each attempted forcible rape, relating to the proof of identity and intent, clearly outweighs its prejudicial effect.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court properly denied the motions to quash and sever.
These assignments of error are without merit.
The defense alleges that there is no evidence that the victims were prevented from resisting his acts by force or threats of physical violence wherein the victims reasonably believed such resistance would...
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State Of La. v. Dressner
...State v. Nelson, 459 So.2d 510, 513 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985); State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239, 243 (La. 1978). Evidence of a mental defect, which does not meet the M'Naughten definition of insanity, therefore, cannot negate a specific i......
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State of La. v. DRESSNER
...State v. Nelson, 459 So.2d 510, 513 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985); State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239, 243 (La.1978). Evidence of a mental defect, which does not meet the M'Naughten definition of insanity, therefore, cannot negate a specific int......
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State v. Holmes
...disallowing defense questions to psychiatrist designed to show the accused's mental defect falling short of M'Naughten); State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239, 245 (La. 1979) (on reh'g) ("The real danger in permitting psychiatric evidence of mental or emotional disorders short of insanity to neg......
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State v. McCoy
...; State v. Nelson, 459 So.2d 510, 513 (La. 1984), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 322 (1985) ; State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239, 243 (La. 1978). Evidence of a mental defect, which does not meet the M'Naughten definition of insanity, therefore, cannot negate a specif......