State v. Lee, s. 52076 and 52190

Citation356 So.2d 276
Decision Date23 February 1978
Docket NumberNos. 52076 and 52190,s. 52076 and 52190
PartiesSTATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Larry LEE, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Illanos G. JULIO, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender and James A. Cornelius, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for Larry Lee.

Catherine L. Dickson and Ed L. Harvey, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Illanos G. Julio.

Robert Berner Lester, III, Tallahassee, for Bill Gunter, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer, amicus curiae.

Marion R. Shepard and Vincent J. Rio, III of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for John E. Mathews, Jr., amicus curiae.

D. Stephen Kahn and Paul W. Lambert, Tallahassee, for Legislators Brantley, Barron, Forbes, Gallen, Glisson, MacKay, McClain, Poston, J. Thomas, P. Thomas, Ware and Zinkil, amici curiae.

Paul B. Steinberg and Bruce M. Singer of Steinberg & Sorota, Miami Beach, for Insurance Underwriters Unlimited, Inc., a Florida Corporation, amicus curiae.

Louis de la Parte, Jr., Tampa, for AAA Motor Clubs of Florida, amici curiae.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review consolidated appeals from orders of the county courts of Polk and Gadsden Counties, holding Section 42 of the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, unconstitutional. On September 7, 1977, we rendered a decision in this cause affirming the judgments of the trial courts and holding Section 42 unconstitutional. We retained jurisdiction to fully articulate the reasons for its unconstitutionality and invited the parties and amicus curiae to submit briefs on the question of whether the unconstitutionality of Section 42 required a holding that the entire Act was unconstitutional.

We now hold that Section 42 is unconstitutional on the grounds that (i) it improperly uses the police power to take private property from one group of individuals solely for the benefit of another limited class of individuals; and (ii) it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions in that it constitutes an irrational classification. We reject the contention that the entire Act is unconstitutional because it violates Article III, Section 6, of the Constitution which mandates that a law must embrace one subject matter. We further find that Section 42 is properly severable from the other provisions of the Act.

We first must articulate the reasoning behind our holding Section 42 unconstitutional. Section 42 provides for the establishment of a "Good Drivers' Incentive Fund" with the stated legislative purposes of encouraging safe driving and discouraging the abuse of driving privileges. Under this section, additional civil penalties are assessed for certain traffic violations. These additional penalties are collected by county clerks and remitted to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for deposit into the fund. The fund then operates in the following manner:

Section 42. Good Drivers' Incentive Fund.

(5) Beginning July 1, 1978, and at the beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, all money in the fund after deduction of the costs of administration of the fund shall be distributed to persons who have:

(a) Been licensed to drive in Florida;

(b) Received no convictions as specified in subsection (4) or convictions arising out of a motor vehicle accident during the preceding 12 months; and

(c) 1. Purchased and maintained continuously for 12 months on a voluntary basis bodily injury liability insurance of at least $10,000 because of bodily injury to, or death of, one person in any one accident, and, subject to said limits for one person, in the amount of $20,000 because of bodily injury, or death of, two or more persons in any one accident; or

2. Established voluntarily with the department financial responsibility by one of the alternative methods set forth in s. 324.031(2), (3), or (4). (The three alternative methods are (1) posting a surety bond with the Department of Insurance; (2) furnishing a certificate from the Department of Insurance showing a cash deposit of $25,000, or a deposit of securities of like market value; or (3) furnishing a certificate of self insurance issued by the Department of Insurance.) Chapter 77-468, Section 42(5), Laws of Florida.

Unquestionably, the legislature, through the exercise of the state's police powers, has the right to establish fines or penalties to be paid by those individuals who violate the state's traffic laws. The state's police powers, however, are not absolute and any legislation resting on the police power, to be valid, must serve the public welfare as distinguished from the welfare of a particular group or class. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560 (Fla.1976); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corporation, 40 So.2d 371 (Fla.1949).

Appellant contends that Section 42 serves the public welfare by providing an incentive for those persons operating motor vehicles in this state to utilize the privilege in a safe and financially responsible manner, and, at the same time, by providing a disincentive to those who would abuse such privilege. Appellant argues that this public purpose protects Section 42 from a successful constitutional attack. We disagree.

Our analysis of Section 42 reflects that, no matter how beneficial the public purpose behind its enactment, the distribution of a portion of the fines to a limited group of private persons makes it an improper use of the police power of the state. Section 42 has potential benefit for only a very limited class of private individuals. The class of persons who are entitled to receive a distribution from the fund does not even include all "good" drivers within the state, but includes only those operators of motor vehicles who meet the restrictive qualifications of Section 42(5).

We recognize that legislation is not always invalid because it benefits a limited group. We further recognize that the state does have the power to levy fines against those who violate the state's traffic laws to the extent necessary to protect the public welfare. Section 42, however, does not fall within the category of valid legislation benefiting a limited group, and it is not saved by any public purpose which may have prompted its enactment. The state's police power cannot be invoked to distribute collected funds arbitrarily and discriminatorily to a special limited class of private individuals. For the reasons expressed, Section 42 is in itself unconstitutional.

Somewhat akin to the foregoing impediment in the law is its deficiency under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitutions of Florida and the United States. The classic criterion for assessing the validity of a statutory classification is whether that classification rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 50 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed. 775 (1929). Stated another way "in order for a statutory classification not to deny equal protection, it must rest on some difference that bears a just and reasonable relation to the statute in respect to which the classification is proposed." Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So.2d 261, 264 (Fla.1976). Accord Rollins v. State, 354 So.2d 61 (Fla.1978). The question, then, is whether the classification made by the legislature in Section 42 is reasonable. We conclude that it is not.

The purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 42 is easily determined for it is stated concisely within the body of the law. Its purpose is to provide "an incentive for those persons operating motor vehicles in this state to utilize the privilege of operating such motor vehicles in a safe and financially responsible fashion and at the same time to provide a disincentive to those who would abuse such privilege." To accomplish this purpose, the legislature elected to amend Chapter 316, Florida Statutes, which sets forth the fines and penalties prescribed for violation of the state's traffic code, by increasing the amount of the fines and penalties, and to create a "Good Drivers' Incentive Fund" to reward safe drivers.

An examination of Section 42 will reveal that the legislature has divided the licensed drivers of automobiles in Florida into two classes. One class consists of licensed drivers who have received no convictions for moving traffic violations and who maintain bodily injury liability insurance or an acceptable substitute. These drivers are the "good drivers" and receive benefits from the "Fund." The second class is comprised of licensed drivers who have received as few as one single conviction for a moving traffic violation but who have also maintained bodily injury liability insurance or an acceptable substitute. These drivers are the "bad drivers" and they are prohibited from receiving the benefits to be dispensed from the "Fund." Are those classified as "bad drivers," in fact, unsafe drivers simply because they have violated one of the enumerated sections of Chapter 316, Florida Statutes? If so, then to separate them into a class apart from "good drivers" and to deny them the benefits of the "Good Drivers' Incentive Fund" would reasonably relate to the purpose of Section 42 to encourage the operation of motor vehicles in a safe fashion and to provide a disincentive to those who would abuse their driving privilege. Accordingly, is a single violation by a licensed driver of one of the many sections of the traffic code listed in Section 42 a reasonable basis for showing that such driver has abused his privilege to drive? We think not. Furthermore, virtually all of the traffic violations set out in Section 42 are minor violations which have been decriminalized by the enactment of Chapter 318, Florida Statutes...

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