State v. Lee

• Decision Date: 18 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–KP–2374.,2014–KP–2374.
• Citation: 181 So.3d 631
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick Todd LEE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

181 So.3d 631

STATE of Louisiana

v.Derrick Todd LEE.

No. 2014–KP–2374.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 18, 2015.

PER CURIAM.

Writ denied. We find relator has not carried his post-conviction burden of proof and thus, the District Court did not err when it dismissed his claims for the reasons it assigned in denying relief. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. It is well-established that the District Court may dispose of an application for post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing, even if the application states a claim on which relief could be granted, if the issues raised can be resolved on the application, answer, and supporting documents, including relevant transcripts, depositions, and other reliable documents submitted by either party or that are available to the court. La.C.Cr.P. art. 928 ; La.C.Cr.P. art. 929(A) ; see State ex rel. Tassin v. Whitley, 602 So.2d 721, 722–23 (La.1992) (only "[w]hen there is a factual issue of significance that is sharply contested" need the court hold a hearing); see also art. 929 cmt.; Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Developments in the Law: Postconviction Relief, 41 La.L.Rev. 632, 635–37 (1981) (reporter of Court committee which drafted statute reviews judge's role in summary rulings).

After a lengthy trial in 2004, an East Baton Rouge Parish jury unanimously found relator guilty as charged of the first degree murder of Charlotte Murray Pace and, after the sentencing hearing, unanimously voted to impose a sentence of death. In addition to evidence of Pace's murder, the State presented evidence of relator's guilt in four unrelated homicides and one attempted homicide in which the surviving victim had positively identified relator. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal, State v. Lee, 05–2098 (La.1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Lee v. Louisiana, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143, 172 L.Ed.2d 39 (2008).

In 2009, relator filed a pro se "shell" application for post-conviction relief and requested counsel. Thereafter, counsel enrolled and filed three supplements, raising 42 claims. On August 19, 2014, the District Court summarily denied relief, assigning written reasons. We find no error in the District Court's thorough ruling and thus, no basis for remanding for an evidentiary hearing and no grounds for vacating his conviction or sentence. Most of relator's claims fail because they were addressed in his appeal and thus are repetitive.

First, relator has not shown he was denied a fair trial as a result of inadequate funding. He claims the District Court underestimated the cost of independently testing the DNA and forensic evidence and he was thereby unable to afford the kind of detailed inquiry that was necessary to expose the allegedly unorthodox practices of the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab (LSPCL). The record shows that, before trial, the District Court allocated the full balance of the budget for the East Baton Rouge Public Defender's Office, $37,000, for relator's defense and approved funding for a pathologist, a serial killer expert, a social worker, a tool mark expert, a psychologist, and DNA experts. Lee, 05–2098, pp. 40–41, 976 So.2d at 137–38. The adequacy of these allocations was addressed on appeal and this Court found relator failed to justify his claimed need for additional funds. Id. pp. 40–43, 976 So.2d at 137–38 (citing State v. Touchet, 93–2839 (La. 9/6/94), 642 So.2d 1213 ). In particular, this Court noted relator had been afforded funds for DNA experts and that lead counsel's caseload had consisted of only one other client.

Lee, 05–2098, pp. 42–43, 976 So.2d at 138 (citing State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La.1993) (excessive caseload may result in failure to provide effective assistance)).

In re-urging his funding complaints post-conviction, relator has alleged there existed significant doubt as to the presence of sperm on Pace's body and that only unreliable evidence linked him to the other victims. Other than mere technical allegations, relator does not assert or provide any evidence suggesting he should have been excluded as the source of the DNA recovered from Pace or the other victims. Nothing relator has offered post-conviction establishes that any amount of additional funding would have given rise to discovery of evidence excluding him as the DNA contributor or casting reasonable doubt on the State's case. Thus, relator has failed to show prejudice as a result of the allegedly insufficient funding and failed to show his similar complaints were incorrectly disposed of in the proceedings leading to trial or on appeal. We find the District Court correctly dismissed these claims.

We find relator has also not shown the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and sentence. In his view, the evidence collected from Pace's body was unreliable and the State failed to prove she was raped because his post-conviction expert found no detectable spermatozoa on her vaginal or cervical swabs. As an initial matter, although more often raised on appeal, timely free-standing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence are cognizable on collateral review. State ex rel. Montgomery v. State, 12–2116 (La.3/15/13), 109 So.3d 371. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).... [T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984).

Here, the jury found relator acted with specific intent to kill Pace while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated rape. R.S. 14:30(A)(1). To show he committed or attempted to commit aggravated rape, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt relator had or attempted to have "anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse" with Pace while she resisted to the utmost, but was overcome; that Pace was prevented from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution; or that Pace was prevented from resisting because relator was armed with a dangerous weapon. R.S. 14:42.

We find the State presented ample evidence to make the required showings. Jurors heard from forensic analyst Julia Naylor, who, with the assistance of crime scene investigators, took swabs from Pace's breasts and nipples, voided areas near her rib cage, left buttock just below her vagina, and left thigh. Lee, 05–2098, p. 3, 976 So.2d at 116. These samples were important because an Alternate Light Source test conducted at the scene revealed biological stains on those portions of her body. Id. According to Naylor's trial testimony, there was seminal fluid on Pace's left buttock, vagina, and cervix and the "most complete DNA profile" came from the left buttock sample. Lee, 05–2098, pp. 2–5, 976 So.2d at 116–17. The probability of relator being randomly matched with the genetic profile recovered from Pace's body was one in 3.6 quadrillion. Id.

The jury apparently credited this evidence, which indicated the presence of semen on or near Pace's genitals, and the presence of relator's DNA, coupled with the defensive wounds that Pace sustained, and determined relator had raped or attempted to rape her during the brutal attack in which he violently killed her. Lee, 05–2098, pp. 2–5, 976 So.2d at 116–17 ("[T]here were a number of defensive wounds on Pace's arms, forearms, hands and wrists"). The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988). Relator has not shown the jury's determinations were unreasonable and has not shown the State failed to carry its burden of proof. In urging there existed no proof of sexual intercourse, he emphasizes limited portions of his post-conviction expert's report which opined that some of the LSPCL's tests were susceptible to misinterpretation. In relying on those select portions of his expert's nuanced and technical ad hoc opinions, however, relator ignores that his expert, within the same report, acknowledged the existence of reliable proof that Pace had been raped: her vaginal, cervical, and buttock swabs tested positive for P30 fluid, which the report characterized as presumptive evidence of semen. We find this claim meritless and the District Court correctly dismissed it.

Relator has also failed to show counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial. Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), adopted by this Court in State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337, 1339 (La.1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the defendant establishes (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.

Not only has relator failed to show counsel overlooked any evidence capable of casting reasonable doubt on the State's case, see generally Jones v. Jones, 988 F.Supp. 1000, 1002–03 (E.D.La.1997) (before reviewing court will reverse for counsel's failure to investigate, inmate must show attorney has "fail[ed] to investigate a plausible line of defense or interview available witnesses."), he has also failed to show that even if counsel could have somehow more vigorously contested the State's case it would have affected the verdict in a case in which he was matched with DNA recovered from Pace's body and...