State v. Legg

• Decision Date: 27 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 20160810,20160810
• Citation: 417 P.3d 592
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Respondent, v. John L. LEGG, Jr., Petitioner.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

417 P.3d 592

STATE of Utah, Respondent,
v.
John L. LEGG, Jr., Petitioner.

No. 20160810

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed March 27, 2018

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent

Diana Pierson, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Judge Johnson joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 While Mr. Legg’s appeal of the revocation of his probation was in process, he completed the sentence the revocation required and was released from prison. Despite the presence of two of its prior decisions with contradictory holdings, the court of appeals then dismissed Mr. Legg’s case as moot because of his release. This case presents two issues for our review. First, we must determine whether the court of appeals acted appropriately when it overturned these prior decisions. Second, we must decide whether collateral legal consequences are presumed when an appeal from a probation revocation has otherwise become moot or whether a defendant will be required to show actual collateral legal consequences.

¶2 We conclude that the court of appeals has the same authority to overturn its own precedent as this court and, moreover, acted appropriately in overturning its prior precedent in this case. Additionally, in a well-reasoned and thoughtful opinion, the court of appeals concluded that collateral legal consequences won't be presumed when an appeal from a probation revocation has otherwise become moot. State v. Legg (Legg II ), 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 25, 380 P.3d 360. We agree with the court of appeals on both issues and therefore affirm their decision to dismiss Mr. Legg’s appeal as moot.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Mr. Legg pled guilty in two separate cases¹ to one count each of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, both third-degree felonies. The district court

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sentenced Mr. Legg in both cases to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of zero to five years. The court then suspended the prison sentences and placed Mr. Legg on probation for a period of twenty-four months. The court ordered the prison commitments and the periods of probation to run concurrently to one another. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Legg’s probation was revoked in both cases for three probation violations, requiring him to serve out his prison sentences. Mr. Legg appealed the district court’s decision to revoke his probation in both cases.² The court of appeals upheld the district court’s findings on one of the probation violations but found that the district court had insufficient evidence in the record to support the other two findings of probation violations. The court of appeals then remanded the cases to the district court to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support the other two probation violations and to "reassess whether, under all of the circumstances, [Mr.] Legg’s probation should be revoked."

¶4 On remand, the state dropped the two probation violations that the court of appeals said were not yet supported by sufficient evidence. The district court determined that the single probation violation upheld by the court of appeals was sufficient to warrant revoking Mr. Legg’s probation. The district court therefore upheld the probation revocations in both of Mr. Legg’s cases. Mr. Legg then filed an appeal in one case³ arguing that the district court erred by not making evidentiary determinations on the two probation revocations, as mandated by the court of appeals. During the pendency of the second appeal, Mr. Legg completed his sentence and was released from prison.

¶5 The court of appeals determined that Mr. Legg’s appeal was moot and dismissed his case. Legg II , 2016 UT App 168, ¶ 46, 380 P.3d 360. To reach this conclusion, the court of appeals overturned two of its prior cases ( State v. Warner , 2015 UT App 81, 347 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen , 2015 UT App 163, 353 P.3d 1266 ), and concluded that adverse legal consequences aren't presumed in probation revocation cases. Legg II , 2016 UT App 168, ¶¶ 41–42, 380 P.3d 360. Additionally, the court of appeals found that Mr. Legg had been unable to set forth any actual adverse legal consequences he suffers as a result of his probation revocation. Id. ¶ 46.

¶6 Mr. Legg appeals this decision, arguing that the court of appeals erred in two respects. First, Mr. Legg contends that the court of appeals was incorrect in overturning its prior precedent under horizontal stare decisis . Second, Mr. Legg asserts that the court of appeals was incorrect in dismissing his case as moot because he was able to assert both presumed and actual collateral legal consequences. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(5).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. White , 2011 UT 21, ¶ 14, 251 P.3d 820. "[A]ppellate courts review the issue of mootness de novo." Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele Cty. ex rel. Tooele Cty. Comm'n , 2009 UT 48, ¶ 7, 214 P.3d 95 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN OVERTURN ITS PRIOR DECISIONS USING THE ELDRIDGE FACTORS

¶8 In Legg II , 2016 UT App 168, 380 P.3d 360, the court of appeals overruled two of its prior decisions: State v. Warner , 2015 UT App 81, 347 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen , 2015 UT App 163, 353 P.3d 1266. Mr. Legg argues that the decision to overrule these cases should be reversed because it violated horizontal stare decisis .

¶9 "Stare decisis is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence because it is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication." Eldridge v. Johndrow , 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 553 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

417 P.3d 596

omitted). Under the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis , "the first decision by a court on a particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court." State v. Menzies , 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted), superseded on other grounds by constitutional amendment , UTAH CONST . art. I, § 12, as recognized in State v. Goins , 2017 UT 61, ––– P.3d ––––. "Although the doctrine is typically thought of when a single-panel appellate court is faced with a prior decision from the same court, stare decisis has equal application when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a prior decision of a different panel." State v. Thurman , 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). Therefore, one panel on the court of appeals owes great deference to the precedent established by a different panel on the court of appeals. The doctrine of horizontal stare decisis "applies as between different panels of the court of appeals." Menzies , 889 P.2d at 399.

¶10 In Eldridge , we recognized that "our presumption against overruling precedent is not equally strong in all cases." 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553. Where horizontal stare decisis is concerned, Eldridge established "two broad factors" that appellate courts must use to "distinguish between weighty precedents and less weighty ones: (1) the persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent was originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established in the law since it was handed down." Id. "The second factor encompasses a variety of considerations, including the age of the precedent, how well it has worked in practice, its consistency with other legal principles, and the extent to which people’s reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were overturned." Id. We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89, ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553, and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62, ¶¶ 16–17, 275 P.3d 208 ).

¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . Stare decisis mandates that one panel of the court of appeals defer to the decision of a prior panel. Thurman , 846 P.2d at 1269. But a panel still retains the right to overrule another panel’s decision if the appropriate standard is met. Menzies , 889 P.2d at 399 n.3. Here, the court of appeals did an excellent job of setting forth its basis for reversing Warner and Allen . As the court of appeals noted, the panels in Warner and Allen simply presumed that collateral legal consequences existed in probation revocation cases without analyzing whether such an extension of the law would be appropriate and despite prior contrary authority. Legg II , 2016 UT App 168, ¶¶ 28, 31, 35, 380 P.3d 360. Additionally, the court of appeals found that the cases (both barely one year old at the time) had yet to be cited by another appellate...