State v. Lesnick

Decision Date07 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 43141,43141
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Charles Edward LESNICK, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Henry R. Dunn, Pros. Atty., James E. Warme, Deputy Pros. Atty., Cowlitz County, Kelso, for petitioner.

Walstead, Mertsching, Husemoen, Donaldson & Barlow, Barry J. Dahl, Longview, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

The defendant appeals from his conviction of the crime of possession of gambling devices. Defendant sought suppression of certain punchboards and other gambling paraphernalia as being the product of an unlawful search of his vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's admission of those items into evidence but affirmed the trial court's order of destruction of the gambling devices, as will be more fully explored later. State v. Lesnick, 10 Wash.App. 281, 518 P.2d 199 (1973). We affirm the Court of Appeals, but do so with one major additional point of emphasis in order to meet contentions which the state presented in its petition for review.

The following facts are essentially adopted from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The Kelso police department received a telephone call advising that there was in the city a described van pulling a trailer, the driver of which was attempting to sell 'punchboards' in the city. The caller also supplied a license plate number. The caller remained completely anonymous, refusing to identify himself and not providing any information as to the source of his knowledge.

The police chief and a sergeant participated in a search and soon located the described van and trailer in a private club parking lot. They drove to within a short distance of the subject vehicle, and observed that its license number was similar to that given by the informer, though some numerals were transposed. The officers parked their car on an adjacent city street and remained to observe the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the van was driven from the parking lot onto the street. The officers followed the vehicle for a block and a half, then pulled it over with siren and lights. Up to that time, they observed neither traffic violations nor any other indications of criminal activity on the part of the driver.

The driver produced his driver's license and the chief then walked to the front of the van to check the license plate, and observed gambling paraphernalia through the driver's window. Defendant was then placed under arrest for possession of gambling devices pursuant to RCW 9.47.030, repealed Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 280 § 23. Defendant's vehicle was towed to the police station and searched pursuant to a warrant. A large number of gambling devices, plus certain merchandise, were seized.

The state makes two main contentions: (1) that discovery of the contraband gambling paraphernalia falls within the 'plain view' doctrine and (2) that the initial stop of defendant's automobile was a permissible 'investigative detention' within the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, (1968).

The plain view doctrine comes into play only when the officer 'has a right to be in a position to have that view.' State v. Cagle, 5 Wash.App. 644, 490 P.2d 123 (1971). Hence the determinative issue is whether the police had a right to stop defendant's automobile and, thereby, put themselves in a position to view the contraband.

The United States Supreme Court, and this Court, have acknowledged that it is necessary to make a delicate balancing of the interest of society in the enforcement of its laws against the individual's right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, Supra; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, (1972); State v. Gluck, 83 Wash.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974).

As a threshold premise, Terry confirms that something short of placing a person under arrest may constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 'It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.' Terry v. Ohio, Supra, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. Indeed, the chief of police here admitted that after defendant was stopped, he was not free to leave until the officers' investigation and interrogation were completed.

The second step in our reasoning is the holding of Terry that any intrusion upon this constitutionally protected interest must be evaluated as to the reasonableness of the particular seizure in light of the particular circumstances. The 'stop and frisk' in Terry was based on the police officers' personal observations of suspicious activities which suggested possible criminal activity and justified further investigation.

Terry standing alone would not justify the investigative stop in this case since here the police made no personal observations of any activity of the defendant justifying the stop. However, as pointed out in the Court of Appeals opinion, the United States Supreme Court has gone a step further and authorized an investigative stop on information supplied by another person. This is the holding of Adams v. Williams, Supra. But Adams is very explicit in requiring that the informer's tip must demonstrate some indicia of reliability. This harkens back to the objective standard of reasonableness imposed by Terry. In the words of the Adams opinion:

Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.

Adams v. Williams, Supra, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1924. Obviously, we are bound by the holdings in both Terry and Adams.

Our own case of State v. Gluck, Supra, is consistent with the approach of the United States Supreme Court since it requires a well founded suspicion to justify an investigative stop.

The fact that the anonymous tipster accurately described the defendant's vehicle is not such corroboration or indicia of reliability as to make reasonable the officers' action. This is the direct holding of Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). Nor is the fact that contraband was discovered after the stop constitutionally sufficient. A seizure is not justified by what a subsequent search discloses. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).

The Court of Appeals aptly summarized the controlling principle and conclusion:

It is difficult to conceive of a tip more 'completely lacking in indicia of reliability' than one provided by a completely anonymous and unidentifiable informer, containing no more than a conclusionary assertion that a certain individual is engaged in criminal activity. While the police may have a duty to investigate tips which sound reasonable, absent circumstances suggesting the informant's reliability, or some corroborative observation which suggests either the presence of criminal activity or that the informer's information was obtained in a reliable fashion, a forcible, stop based solely upon such information is not permissible.

State v. Lesnick, Supra, 10 Wash.App. at 285, 518 P.2d at 202.

To this point our opinion has essentially followed the analysis and rationale of the Court of Appeals. We now emphasize a matter of some importance. The state, in its petition for review, alleges that law enforcement will no longer be able to make even reasonable and limited inquiries into possible criminal conduct based upon the tips of informants. Such is not at all the result of this holding. Both Terry and Adams emphasize that no single rule can be fashioned to meet every conceivable confrontation between the police and citizen. Evaluating the reasonableness of the police action and the extent of the intrusion, each case must be considered in light of the particular circumstances facing the law enforcement officer. In this case, the suspected crime was a gross misdemeanor. It posed no threat of physical violence or harm to society or the officers. Indeed it involved only an activity which was so openly tolerated in some areas that taxes were collected on the business of persons such as the defendant. This is quite a different matter from the hypothetical tips involving murder or threatened school bombings which were used by the state in its argument to illustrate the purported result of the holding of the Court of Appeals. While we are obviously not passing upon such matters, we do emphasize that it and when other cases arise they will necessarily be judged in light of their particular facts, which is the very clear, basic premise of Terry and Adams.

On the state's cross-appeal, we adopt the holding and language of the Court of Appeals, State v. Lesnick, Supra at 285, 518 P.2d at 202:

The state cross-appeals from the order of the trial court directing the return to defendant of certain merchandise seized along with the gambling devices from his vehicle. The position of the state is that this merchandise could be used as prizes or awards in gambling activities, and thus that it should be destroyed under the authority of former RCW 9.47.110, which provides:

Seizure and disposition of gambling devices. It shall be the duty of all peace officers to search for and seize all tables, slot machines, or other article, machine, device or apparatus of the kind commonly used for gambling, or operated for the winning or losing of money or property, or any representative of either, upon any chance or uncertain or contingent event, and all property useful in the operation or maintenance of a bucket shop, and take the same before a magistrate. If in the judgment of such magistrate any of such articles may be useful as evidence in the trial of any case, he may order the same held for such trial or delivered to the prosecuting attorney;...

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