State v. Letourneau

Decision Date17 April 2000
Docket Number No. 42760-1-I, No. 43461-6-I.
Citation997 P.2d 436,100 Wash.App. 424
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mary K. LETOURNEAU, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

James E. Lobsenz, Carney Badley Smith & Spellman, P.S., Seattle, Susan K. Howard Ph.D., Brookline, MA, for Appellant.

Ann Marie Summers, King County Prosecutor's Office-Appellate Unit, Seattle, for Respondent.

Mark T. Aoki-Fordham, MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae.

KENNEDY, C.J.

Mary K. Letourneau pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree rape of a child. Her request for a Special Sexual Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) was granted and the trial court sentenced her to 89 months of total confinement suspended on various conditions, including 3 years of specialized treatment for sexual deviancy. The court ordered that Letourneau have no contact for the maximum term of life with the victim or with any minors without the supervision of a responsible adult having knowledge of the convictions. Letourneau was additionally sentenced to community custody for 2 years, to commence upon completion of the term of confinement, with a condition that she not receive any tangible or intangible property as defined by RCW 7.68.310 that is a direct or indirect result of her commission of the crimes—in other words, she was ordered not to profit from publishing or otherwise commercializing the story of her crimes.

The SSOSA was revoked some 3 months later, after Letourneau was discovered in the company of the victim in violation of the no-contact order contained in the judgment and sentence. Letourneau was sent to prison to serve the 89 months of total confinement. Subsequently, the trial court entered two orders modifying and clarifying the judgment and sentence. In the first such order, the trial court directed that in-person contact with minor children, including Letourneau's own biological minor children, be supervised by a responsible adult having knowledge of the convictions who is approved by the Department of Corrections or by the court, but that Letourneau would be permitted to receive mail from and send mail to her children, and to have telephone contact with her children, subject to routine Department of Corrections policy and procedures relating to inmate mail and telephone communications. In the second clarifying order, the trial court ruled that the prohibition against profiting from commercialization related to the offenses was a condition of the judgment and sentence, effective as of the date of sentencing, rather than merely a condition of community custody following Letourneau's release from total confinement.

Letourneau appeals those provisions of her judgment and sentence that require her in-person contact with her own minor children to be supervised (she does not appeal those provisions that restrict her contact with the victim and with minors other than her own biological children) and that prohibit her from profiting from commercialization related to the offenses. We strike the provision that requires Letourneau's in-person contact with her own minor children to be supervised because there is insufficient evidence in the record that such a restriction is reasonably necessary to prevent Letourneau from sexually molesting her children. Moreover, in this particular case, the best interests of Letourneau's minor children with respect to any restrictions to be placed on her contact with them is best determined by the family court, which has jurisdiction over Letourneau and her children in the action for dissolution of the Letourneau marriage, and by the juvenile court in the course of dependency proceedings relating to the children born outside the Letourneau marriage.

We also strike the provision that prohibits Letourneau from profiting directly or indirectly from any commercialization related to her crimes because this is not a "crime-related prohibition" as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(12) and is not otherwise authorized by the statutes governing community custody or supervision applicable to Letourneau's conviction. In crafting the financial gain prohibition, the trial court referenced RCW 7.68, the so-called "Son of Sam" statute, for its definitions of tangible and intangible property. RCW 7.68.310. As a result of this reference, Letourneau challenges the statute as violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Washington constitution article 1, sections 5 and 15. We need not address this challenge because our ruling grants Letourneau the specific relief she requested, i.e., vacation of the financial gain prohibition in her judgment and sentence. See also Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. D.S.H.S., 133 Wash.2d 894, 932, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997) (explaining that courts will decline to decide issues on constitutional grounds when they can be resolved on other grounds).

Moreover, the issue of the constitutionality of the statute is collateral to this appeal given the limited reference to it by the trial court. Letourneau did not seek declaratory relief with regard to her allegations that the statute is facially unconstitutional, nor would an appeal of a sentence in a criminal case provide the best means for such relief. There is nothing to prevent Letourneau or any other person potentially subject to the proscription of RCW 7.68 from seeking declaratory relief under RCW 7.24. And so proceeding assures the presence of all parties with an interest in the issues, particularly the Attorney General on behalf of the State. RCW 7.24.110. In the meantime, striking the restriction from her judgment and sentence ensures that Letourneau will not risk sanctions under her judgment and sentence if she should choose to profit from telling the story of her crimes.

In sum, we strike the following provisions from Letourneau's judgment and sentence: the requirement that her in-person contact with her own minor children be supervised, and the prohibition on her profiting directly or indirectly from any commercialization related to her crimes.

FACTS

In early 1997, the King County Department of Public Safety Special Assault Unit received information that Mary K. Letourneau—a 35 year-old sixth grade teacher and mother of four children—was having sexual intercourse with V.F., a 13-year-old student at the school where she taught. After further investigation, the State charged Letourneau with two counts of second degree rape of a child under RCW 9A.44.076. On August 7, 1997, she pleaded guilty to the charges. On November 14, 1997, the trial court imposed a standard-range 89-month sentence, ordering Letourneau to confinement in the county jail for 180 days and suspending the remainder of the confinement, conditioned upon her compliance with the SSOSA terms of her judgment and sentence—including 3 years of specialized sexual deviancy treatment.

The judgment and sentence ordered Letourneau to have no contact for the maximum term of life with her victim, V.F., or with any minors without the supervision of a responsible adult having knowledge of the convictions. In addition, it imposed various conditions during her community custody term.1 One of these conditions stated: "Do not profit directly or indirectly from any commercialization related to the offense. Shall not receive any tangible or intangible property as defined by RCW 7.68.310, including any right or interest in such property, which is a direct or indirect result of the defendant's commission of these crimes." Clerk's Papers at 31. Another condition of community custody ordered her to "[h]ave no contact with the victim or any minor-age children without the approval of [her] Community Corrections Officer and mental health counselor." Id. at 30.

On February 3, 1998, less than 2 weeks after Letourneau's release from the county jail, Seattle Police Officer Tod Harris discovered Letourneau alone in her car with V.F. On February 6, 1998, the trial court found that Letourneau had violated the terms of her judgment and sentence by having unsupervised contact with the victim. Consequently, the trial court revoked Letourneau's suspended sentence and ordered her to serve 89 months in the Department of Corrections with credit for the confinement time served during the period of community supervision.

On September 22, 1998, the trial court entered two orders to clarify Letourneau's judgment and sentence. One order stated that the prohibition from profiting directly or indirectly from any commercialization related to the offense of second degree rape of a child was a condition imposed by her judgment and sentence, and was not merely a provision of community custody following her release from total confinement. The other order stated: "In-person contact with minor children including defendant's natural children shall be supervised by a responsible adult who is aware of the defendant's conviction and is approved by the Department of Corrections or this Court." Id. at 249.2

Meanwhile, in May of 1997, Letourneau had given birth to her fifth child. In October of 1998, Letourneau gave birth to her sixth child. Each of these children was fathered by the victim, V.F.

Letourneau appeals the provisions in her judgment and sentence ordering her to have no unsupervised in-person contact with her biological children during their minorities, and prohibiting her from financial gain as defined by RCW 7.68.310.

DISCUSSION

I. Crime-Related Prohibitions

RCW 9.94A.120(9)(c)(v) authorizes the trial court to order persons convicted of felony sex offenses to comply with "any crime-related prohibitions" during the period of community custody following release from total confinement. "Crime-related prohibition" is defined as "[a]n order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted, and shall not be construed to mean orders directing an...

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