State v. Letterman, 10725.
Decision Date | 22 August 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 10725.,10725. |
Citation | 603 S.W.2d 951 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Carol Jean LETTERMAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Theodore A. Strecker, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Eric Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
This appeal involves the infanticide reported in State v. Morris, 564 S.W.2d 303 (Mo.App.1978). A jury has now found defendant Carol Jean Letterman guilty of second-degree murder in causing the death of her child and has assessed her punishment at imprisonment for a term of 20 years. Defendant appeals.
In this court, the defendant has briefed eight or nine assignments of error, depending on how one subdivides them. Four of the assignments of error demand analysis and consideration. The others reflect admirable compliance with State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo.1971), but raise no meritorious issue.
The assignment of error which requires the most careful scrutiny is defendant's contention that her motion for judgment of acquittal, made at the close of all the evidence, should have been sustained. We now know that a criminal defendant has a due-process right to have the State present evidence from which any reasonable trier of fact can find the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979). And, contrary to the State's assumption, the defendant is entitled to have this appeal considered without reference to the disposition of her coperpetrator's appeal. State v. Swearingin, 564 S.W.2d 351, 353-3551-3 4 (Mo.App.1978). Nevertheless, the State is entitled to the most favorable construction of all the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, even though the proof of guilt is circumstantial. State v. Lee, 556 S.W.2d 25, 3213 (Mo.banc 1977); State v. Cobb, 444 S.W.2d 408, 4123 (Mo.banc 1969); State v. Sykes, 372 S.W.2d 24, 263 (Mo.1963). Nothing in Jackson alters that principle and the evidence will be summarized in the light most favorable to the result reached.
At the end of her short, miserable life, the infant female victim was almost 1 year old, measured 26 inches from heel to crown and weighed about 16 or 17 pounds. She was brought to the emergency room of a Springfield hospital about 4 p. m. on March 18, 1975, by the defendant and defendant's paramour, Robert Morris. Upon admission, the victim had no vital signs. Heroic measures were instituted and the victim was put in intensive care. The victim did not respond, and about 4:15 p. m. on March 19 she was pronounced dead.
The evidence is not the "same evidence" presented in State v. Morris, supra; consequently the proof must be reviewed in some detail.
The injury of which the victim died was described by her pediatrician as a "profound brain injury." A pathologist, who performed an autopsy on the victim, testified that his external examination of the skull revealed a bruise on the left jaw and another bruise just behind the right ear. When the pathologist incised the victim's scalp to pull the scalp away from the bony part of the skull, he observed fresh blood beneath the unossified anterior part of the skull, which is called a fontanelle. When the skull was opened to permit examination of the brain and the tissues surrounding it, ". . . it was obvious that there was hemorrhage and blood clot over the entire left side of the brain and on the . . . back part of the right side of the brain." Microscopic examination of the brain tissues indicated the victim's brain substance had been bruised on both sides, and the pathologist gave as his opinion that on March 19, when he performed the autopsy, the brain hemorrhage was "acute" which meant it "was of age three or four days or less." He also explained there was no necessary correlation between the external bruises and the points of injury to the brain.
The victim's pediatrician had seen the infant at his office on February 18, 1975, about 1 month prior to her death. At that time, the pediatrician made a physical examination of the child by listening to her chest sounds, examining her ears, nose and throat and "looking at the child in general." It is a fair inference that the victim was then in good health, although she had a cold. The pediatrician prescribed a decongestant and made an appointment to see the victim again on March 1. The March 1 appointment was not kept but this physician did respond to an emergency call to see the victim at the hospital on March 18. When he arrived, the victim had an endotracheal tube in place, a species of gastric tube was in place and intravenous fluids were being administered by means of a "cut down." When the witness first saw the victim, she was "nonresponsive, . . . had no spontaneous movement, no reflexes present, the pupils were fixed, and were not reactive to light." The victim's appearance indicated a profound brain injury to this physician, and a spinal tap was made. The results indicated "central nervous system hemorrhage." Asked "What are we talking about?", this witness answered "We're talking about blood, other than just a subdural hemorrhage, blood in the subarachnoid space, blood from possibly somewhere else in the brain as well." The nature of the injury was such as ". . . would have to be produced by diffuse brain injury, more than just a subdural hematoma, bleeding into the material substance of the brain, in other words bleeding diffusely through the surface of the brain." The fatal hemorrhage was caused, in this witness' opinion, by external trauma. So, from the evidence we have just recited, a jury could reasonably conclude that the infant victim had been beaten or battered by or against some hard object—literally "brained"—shortly before her death.
The State presented evidence that the victim was suffering from several long-bone fractures.1 A radiologist had taken x-rays of the victim's lower extremities after her death. These x-ray plates are before us as State's Exhibits 12 and 13. Exhibit 12 was identified as an x-ray of the victim's pelvis and lower extremities. The radiologist identified four distinct fractures. On both the right and left side there were fractures at the junction between the neck of the hip bone and the hip bone itself. This witness testified that he had, in the course of his professional career, interpreted 40,000 to 50,000 x-ray series, and had never before seen such simultaneous fractures in a child the victim's age. His opinion was that the hip fractures were caused by the application of a twisting or shearing force, and he considered it "very unlikely" that these fractures were sustained in a fall. The presence of callus at the site of the hip fractures led this physician to believe they were more than 7 days old. The hip fractures would be very painful, and the victim would probably not be able to walk. The radiologist also pointed out two other distinct fractures shown by the x-rays. One was an incomplete fracture of the left femur or long upper leg bone just above the knee; the other was a complete fracture of the left tibia or shin bone. The witness' opinion was that the two fractures below the hip were sustained less than 7 to 10 days before the victim's death.
The prosecution also called a Mrs. McClary as a witness. On March 17, 1975, this witness had kept the infant victim at her home. She had noticed extensive burns on the victim's legs and had observed that the victim cried and seemed to be in pain if she was moved. Mrs. McClary repeated this testimony several times.
For convenience, we shall use the same method of analysis as was used in State v. Morris, supra, 564 S.W.2d at 308-309. In any homicide prosecution, the State must prove both the corpus delicti and the criminal agency of the defendant. The corpus delicti in a homicide case consists of two elements: 1) the death of a human being, and 2) the criminal agency of another. The elements of the corpus delicti cannot be said to be established until it has been proved that the death was not self-inflicted nor due to natural causes or accident. The State must further prove, as an additional element, a criminal act of the defendant (his agency) as a cause of the victim's death. State v. Meidle, 202 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. 1947); State v. Joy, 315 Mo. 7, 19-22, 285 S.W. 489, 494-4968 (Blair, J., concurring) (1926); State v. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642, 650, 71 S.W. 127, 129 (1902). Nevertheless, all the elements of a homicide case may be proved circumstantially, State v. Ross, 371 S.W.2d 224, 2251 (Mo.1963), and although the State has the burden to prove the defendant's criminal agency beyond a reasonable doubt, that burden does not apply to every link in the chain of circumstances, but only to the whole issue. State v. Tettamble, 431 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.1968); State v. Ashbrook, 11 S.W.2d 1037, 10395 (Mo. 1928).
The evidence recited is manifestly sufficient to permit any rational trier of fact to find the first two of the three necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's evidence concerning the cause of the victim's death on this trial was considerably different from its evidence concerning the cause of death in State v. Morris, supra. In the Morris case, the fatal hemorrhage was depicted as the result of a subdural hematoma, which may, on rare occasions, occur spontaneously; here, there is convincing medical evidence indicating that the victim died of extravasation from the substance of the brain itself, traumatic hemorrhage directly from the substance of the brain tissue. The fact that the pathologist found both sides of the brain had been bruised strongly suggests more than one blow had been struck. The numerous long-bone fractures speak eloquently against the possibility that the victim's injuries were either self-inflicted or the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Tison
...See State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 613 P.2d 938 (1980); People v. McDonald, 409 Mich. 110, 293 N.W.2d 588 (1980); State v. Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951 (Mo.App.1980); State v. Hardy, 419 A.2d 398 (N.H.1980); State v. Harris, 288 Or. 703, 609 P.2d 798 (1980); Young v. State, 407 A.2d 517 (Del.......
-
State v. Kimball, 11546
...the rule that the State is entitled to that construction of the evidence most favorable to the result reached. State v. Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951, 952-953(3) (Mo.App.1980). On October 31, 1978 Halloween Michael Dodd was working at the MFA Oil Company, a service station in the south part of ......
-
State v. Coleman
...view the evidence in the light "most favorable to the state," State v. Greathouse, 627 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Mo.1982) and State v. Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Mo.App.1980), it can be stated unequivocally that herein the evidence, as submitted by the state, was sufficient to withstand appella......
-
State v. Haslett
...upon the infant's person was relevant, admissible, and had a logical tendency to prove the defendant's guilt"); State v. Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Mo.App.1980) (holding that evidence of scalding the child victim on a previous occasion "was relevant, admissible, and had a logical tende......
-
Section 9 BatteredChild
Syndrome,ShakenBabySyndrome,andChildAbuseFamilyProfile
...cases alike, expert testimony can establish that a child suffers from the battered child syndrome. See, e.g., State v. Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951, 953, 954 & n.1 (Mo. App. S.D. The “shaken baby syndrome,” which was identified in the early 1970s, is “a serious form of child maltreatment most ......