State v. Lewin

Decision Date06 July 1894
Citation53 Kan. 679,37 P. 168
PartiesSTATE v. LEWIN
CourtKansas Supreme Court
Syllabus

Section 28, c. 152, of the Laws of 1891, entitled “An act in relation to the state penitentiary,” is void being in violation, not only of section 16, art. 2, of the constitution, but of other constitutional provisions as well.

Appeal from district court, Leavenworth county;

Charles Lewin was indicated for an unlawful escape from the penitentiary. An information was quashed, and the state appeals. Affirmed.

John T. Little, Atty. Gen., and S.E. Wheat, for the State.

N.E. Van Tuyl, for appellee.

OPINION

ALLEN, J. Louis A. Myers, Judge.

The appellee was taken before the district court of Leavenworth county on an information signed by S.W. Chase, warden of the penitentiary, charging that on the 3d day of July, 1893, the defendant was lawfully confined in the state penitentiary upon a sentence of six years from the 11th day of October, 1892, by the district court of Summer county, for the crime of burglary and larceny, and that on the 3d day of July he unlawfully escaped from the penitentiary. This information is filed under section 28, c. 152, of the Laws of 1891, entitled "An act in relation to the state penitentiary." The section reads as follows: "Sec. 28. That in case any convict shall escape from the penitentiary, or from the custody of any officer, or to make an attempt to so escape, or shall join in any mutiny, or shall make an attempt at mutiny, or in any manner do any act to cause others to mutiny, while in confinement in the state penitentiary, or while in the custody of any officer, the said convict shall be taken by the warden before the district court of Leavenworth county, on information filed by the warden; and if the charge be sustained, the time said convict had served in the penitentiary prior to such act as charged shall not be counted as any part of the term of his sentence, but the said convict shall be sentenced by the court to confinement in the state penitentiary for the full term for which he or she was sentenced by the court before whom he or she was convicted and undergoing sentence at the time of the violating the provisions of this section: provided, that no limitation shall bar proceedings under this section." A motion was made to quash the information, and this motion was sustained by the district court.

The question presented is as to the constitutionality of the provisions of section 28. And, first, do they come fairly within the scope of the title to the act? The title appears to be broad enough to cover any matter directly relating to the penitentiary, and the management thereof. Under it the legislature might: undoubtedly provide rules and regulations governing the conduct of the inmates, and punishment for an infraction of them. But this section goes further, and provides, not merely punishment for escapes, mutinies, etc but undertakes to establish a special procedure, by which jurisdiction is given to the district court of Leavenworth county alone, to proceed on an information filed by the warden of the penitentiary, instead of the county attorney, to hear complaints of violations of this section, and thereupon, if the charge be sustained, to pass sentence on the defendant. It is urged that the section does not authorize nor contemplate a trial by jury, and that it is therefore violative of another provision of the constitution. The section is entirely silent as to the mode of trial. It simply says, "If the charge be sustained the time said convict had served in the penitentiary prior to such act as charged, shall not be...

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8 cases
  • Estelle v. Dorrough 8212 479
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 17 de março de 1975
    ...prison." The court concluded that the statute at issue was unconstitutional. Similarly the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 P. 168 (1894), held unconstitutional a statute providing that upon escape a convict was to be punished by imposition of the full term of the ......
  • In re Application of H. F. Mallon
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 12 de junho de 1909
    ...or circumstances of the act sought to be characterized as a public offense. (Ex parte Irwin, 88 Cal. 169, 25 P. 1118; State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 P. 168.) In connection we call attention to sec. 13, art. 1, constitution of Idaho, and we also rely on the provisions of the fourteenth amen......
  • People v. Nicholson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 18 de novembro de 1948
    ...the violating the provisions of this section’. This statute was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 P. 168, which held it attempted to establish a system of special criminal procedure in Leavenworth County, for a special class of offen......
  • Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Sullivan v. Ashe
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 8 de novembro de 1937
    ...discharged the rule. 325 Pa. 305, 188 A. 841. The petition for writ of certiorari asserts that this decision conflicts with State v. Lewin, 53 Kan. 679, 37 P. 168; In re Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 P. 374, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123, and State v. Johnsey, 46 Okl.Cr. 233, 287 P. 729. The statutes co......
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