State v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 01 May 1903
• Docket Number: 1472
• Citation: 72 P. 388,26 Utah 120
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE OF UTAH ex relatione M. A. BREEDEN, Attorney-General, Relator, v. THOMAS D. LEWIS, Respondent

72 P. 388

26 Utah 120

THE STATE OF UTAH ex relatione M. A. BREEDEN, Attorney-General, Relator, v. THOMAS D. LEWIS, Respondent

No. 1472

Supreme Court of Utah

May 1, 1903

Original action in quo warranto instituted by the Attorney-General, on behalf of the State, to oust the defendant from the office of district judge of the Third Judicial District.

OUSTER DENIED.

Hon. M A. Breeden, Attorney-General, and Hon. W. R. White, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.

Messrs Frick & Edwards, Messrs. Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette Messrs. Young & Moyle and Messrs. Sutherland, Van Cott & Allison for respondent.

BARTCH, J. BASKIN, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

BARTCH, J.

--In this case the Attorney-General filed an information in the nature of quo warranto, demanding that the defendant be ousted from the office of district judge of the Third Judicial District. This is an original proceeding in this court. The information states that the defendant was, on April 7, 1903, appointed to the office, by the Governor, in pursuance of an act entitled "An act to increase the number of judges for the Third Judicial District and for the appointment of one judge, pending the next general election," which was approved March 12, 1903 (Sess. Laws 1903, p. 50,c. 55); that such appointee qualified, is in possession and attempting to discharge the duties of the office, and claims the emoluments thereof; that his appointment was unlawful; and that he has no legal authority to exercise the functions of the office, unlawfully holds the same, and will continue to do so, if not ousted. The defendant filed an answer admitting his appointment to the office and qualification, and that he has possession and is discharging the duties thereof. It is averred that he holds the office lawfully, exercises its functions, and is entitled to the emoluments thereof, by virtue of the act of the Legislature referred to in the information, and of his appointment thereunder. The plaintiff demurred to the answer upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

The contention on behalf of the State is that the act of the Legislature, above referred to, and under which the appointment was made, is ultra vires, being in conflict, as is urged with sections 5 and 6, article 8, of the Constitution. That act is found in Sess. Laws 1903, c. 55, p. 50, and, so far as material here, reads as follows:

"Section 1. That from and after the passage and approval of this act, there shall be four District Judges in and for the District Court of the Third Judicial District of this State.

"Sec. 2. That the Governor be and is hereby authorized and required to appoint one District Judge, in and for the Third Judicial District, within thirty days after the passage and approval of this act, whose term of office shall be, until the first Monday in January, 1905, and until his successor is elected and qualified, as provided by law."

As will be observed the first section increases the number of judges in the Third Judicial District to four, and the second empowers the Governor to appoint one judge, and fixes the first term of office. It is claimed that the Constitution limits the number of district judges in the Third Judicial District to three, and that, therefore, the act, which increases the number to four, violates the fundamental law, and is void. It must be conceded that, if such a limitation exists, the act is void, and must be declared so. The question, then, is whether the Legislature transcended its power in this enactment. In determining this it must not be forgotten that that body exercises the functions of a co-ordinate branch of the state government. It is within its province to make laws. Its power to legislate upon all subjects and for all purposes of civil government is absolute, inherent, and plenary, except as limited or controlled by the Constitution of this State or of the United States. Being invested with such power, unless it acts in violation of constitutional restraint, the courts have no authority to declare its enactments void, however unnecessary or unwise they may be. "It is wholly within the discretion of the Legislature to determine whether, concerning any subject, such conditions or such facts and circumstances exist as to warrant it to act. It is the sole judge as to whether an exigency, or such cause exists as requires the enactment of a law, and, in the absence of any constitutional restriction, if it makes a law, there is no authority in the government which can declare it void. Independently of any repugnance between a legislative act and any constitutional limitation or restriction, a court has no power to arrest its execution, however unwise or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it may be, or whatever motives may have led to its enactment." Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 383-384, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628. So, an enactment of the Legislature embraces within itself, by implication, a construction by a co-ordinate branch of the government, of the constitutional provisions relating to the subject of the legislation. Therefore a court, in construing the enactment, where the question of its constitutionality is involved in difficulty and doubt, will be strongly inclined to resolve such doubt in favor of its validity, and out of respect to the wisdom and integrity, loyalty and patriotism of the Legislature, its enactment will be presumed to be valid, until the contrary is shown beyond all reasonable doubt. In State v. Tingey, 24 Utah 225, 230, 67 P. 33, Mr. Justice Baskin, speaking for the court, said: "When the Legislature, by enactments, either impliedly or expressly construes a provision of a statute or a constitution, in doubtful cases the courts will accept the legislative construction, and enforce the provision in accordance therewith, if the ambiguous language of the provision is such as admits of such construction." Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 270, 6 L.Ed. 606; Grenada County Supervisors v. Brown, 112 U.S. 261, 268, 5 S.Ct. 125, 28 L.Ed. 704.

It now becomes important to determine whether, in the light of these principles, the present enactment was made in violation of constitutional limitation. The provisions of the Constitution material to this decision, the same being found in article 8 thereof, read as follows: "The State shall be divided into seven judicial districts, for each of which, at least one, and not exceeding three judges, shall be chosen by the qualified electors thereof." Section 5. "The Legislature may change the limits of any judicial district or increase or decrease the number of districts, or the judges thereof." Section 6. "Until otherwise provided by law, the Judicial Districts of the State shall be constituted as follows: . . . Third District:--The counties of Summit, Salt Lake and Tooele, in which there shall be elected three district judges." Section 16. Was the Legislature inhibited by these provisions of the paramount law, from passing an act increasing the number of district judges to four in the Third Judicial District? The Attorney-General says it was, and, if this be true, then the act in question is void, and the construction which the Legislature put upon the constitutional provisions, is erroneous and must be discarded. If the provision in section 5 were to be considered independently of the others, and given general effect, without considering the conditions under which it was adopted, it would be clear that the number of judges of that district could never be increased, except by constitutional amendment. The several provisions, however, are in pari materia, and, under well-known rules of interpretation, must be construed together, and each given effect and operation, if possible; and in construing them the court should be mindful of the circumstances and conditions under which they were drafted and adopted by the framers of the Constitution. The interpretation...