State v. LG Elecs., Inc.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
Citation375 P.3d 636,186 Wash.2d 1
Decision Date14 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 91263–7,91263–7
PartiesThe State of Washington, Respondent, v. LG Electronics, Inc.; LG Electronica U.S.A., Inc.; Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. a/k/a Royal Philips Electronics North America Corporation; Toshiba Corporation; Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.; Hitachi, Ltd.; Hitachi Displays, Ltd.; Hitachi Electronic Devices (USA), Inc.; and Hitachi Asia, Ltd., Petitioners, and Philips Electronics Industries (Taiwan), Ltd.; Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. f/k/a Samsung Display Device Co, Ltd.; Samsung SDI America, Inc.; Samsung SDI Mexico S.A. De C.V. ; Samsung SDI Brasil Ltda. ; Shenzhen Samsung Sdi Co, Ltd.; Tianjin Samsung SDI Co, Ltd.; Samsung SDI (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. ; Mt Picture Display Co., Ltd. ; Panasonic Corporation f/k/a Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.; Panasonic Corporation of North America; Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd.; Cptf Optronics Co. Ltd.; And Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., Defendants.

David C. Lundsgaard, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, Pier 70, 2801 Alaskan Way Suite 300, Seattle, WA, 98121–1128, Robert Douglas Stewart, Kipling Law Group PLLC, 4464 Fremont Ave N Suite 300, Seattle, WA, 98103–7291, Aaron Streett, J. Mark Little, Baker Botts, LLP, One Shell Plaza, 910 Louisiana Street, Houston, TX, 77002–4995, Bradford J. Axel, Mathew Lane Harrington, Stokes Lawrence, PS, 1420 5th Ave Suite 3000, Seattle, WA, 98101–2393, Dana E. Foster, Lucius B. Lau, Attorney At Law, 701 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Washington, DC, 20005, Molly A. Terwilliger, Yarmuth Wilsdon PLLC, 1420 5th Avenue Suite 1400, Seattle, WA, 98101–3336, Eliot A. Adelson, Kirkland & Ellis, 555 California Street, San Francisco, CA, 94104, Counsel for Petitioners.

David Michael Kerwin, Washington State Attorney General's Office, 4333 Brooklyn Avenue NE, Seattle, WA, 98195–1016, Callie Anne Castillo, Washington State Attorney General Office, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504–0100, Counsel for Respondents.

González

, J.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs must file their lawsuits before the applicable statute of limitations runs or their suits will be dismissed as untimely. Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State has consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. We are asked to decide whether our State has consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. We find it has not and affirm.

Facts

¶ 2 On May 1, 2012, the State, through the attorney general, filed suit on behalf of itself and as parens patriae1 on behalf of persons residing in the state against a number of foreign electronics manufacturers. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1–28. The State alleges that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030

, which prohibits any “contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce,” by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes), the dominant display technology used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Id. at 1, 2, 24, 27. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Id. at 14. The complaint seeks “damages, restitution, civil penalties, costs and fees, and injunctive relief.” Id. at 2, 27–28.

¶ 3 Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, provides that actions for damages under RCW 19.86.090

must be brought within four years. CP at 29–59 (citing RCW 19.86.120 ). The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. Id. at 46. The State also argued that it was exempt from the statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.160, which provides that “there shall be no limitation to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state.” Id. at 48. The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss and certified the matter for discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(4).2

Id. at 95–96, 144. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review of two questions:

(1) Whether the four-year statute of limitations under RCW 19.86.120

applies to the Washington's Attorney General's Complaint brought pursuant to its parens patriae authority under RCW 19.86.080 that seeks actual damages for violations of RCW 19.86.030 ?

(2) Whether RCW 4.16.160

should be applied to the Washington Attorney General's parens patriae antitrust lawsuit seeking actual damages and restitution for citizens of Washington?”

State v. LG Elecs., Inc. , 185 Wash.App. 123, 130, 340 P.3d 915 (2014)

(footnotes omitted).

¶ 4 The Court of Appeals concluded that the CPA's four-year statute of limitations did not apply to actions for injunctive relief and restitution brought by the attorney general under RCW 19.86.080 (.080)

because it expressly applies only to actions for damages under RCW 19.86.090. Id. at 139, 340 P.3d 915. It also concluded the State's .080 action was “brought for the benefit of the State and thus exempt from any general statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.160, and affirmed the trial court. Id. at 151, 340 P.3d 915. The defendants who moved to dismiss (collectively LG Electronics) successfully petitioned for our review.

Analysis

¶ 5 Our review is de novo. Burton v. Lehman , 153 Wash.2d 416, 422, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)

(CR 12(b)(6) rulings) (citing Tenore v. AT & T Wireless Servs. , 136 Wash.2d 322, 329–30, 962 P.2d 104 (1998) ); Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. , 151 Wash.2d 221, 224, 86 P.3d 1166 (2004) (interpretation of a statute) (citing State v. Karp , 69 Wash.App. 369, 372, 848 P.2d 1304 (1993) ).

¶ 6 The CPA authorizes both public and private enforcement of its provisions. RCW 19.86.080

, .090. Under .080, the attorney general is authorized to bring an action “in the name of the state, or as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing in the state for injunctive relief, and the court is authorized to make “additional orders ... as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or property ... which may have been acquired by means of [a prohibited] act.” RCW 19.86.080(1), (2). RCW 19.86.080 directs the court to consider consolidating .080 actions with other related actions and to exclude from the amount of monetary relief awarded any amount that duplicates amounts already awarded for the same violation. RCW 19.86.080(3)

.

¶ 7 RCW 19.86.090 (.090)

authorizes private persons to sue for injunctive relief and “actual damages,” and it provides the court with discretion to increase the award of damages up to three times the actual damages sustained. It also authorizes the State, [w]henever [it] is injured, directly or indirectly,” by a violation of the act to sue for its “actual damages.” The CPA's statute of limitations provision bars “claim[s] for damages under RCW 19.86.090

” if not commenced within four years. RCW 19.86.120.

¶ 8 LG Electronics ask us to find that the State's .080 parens patriae claim for injunctive relief and restitution is barred by RCW 19.86.120

, the CPA's statute of limitations for .090 damages claims. Alternatively, they contend that one of the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW applies: the catchall three-year statute of limitations for actions seeking recovery for “any other injury to the person or rights of another,” RCW 4.16.080(2), or the even broader catchall two-year limitations period for [a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided,” RCW 4.16.130. Suppl. Br. of Pet'rs at 13–14. We find that by its plain language, RCW 19.86.120 does not apply to .080 claims. We also find that the State's action is not subject to the general statutes of limitation because RCW 4.16.160, which codifies the common law um tempus3 doctrine, applies. Under the um tempus doctrine, statutes of limitations do not run against the State unless the State expressly consents to the limitation on its sovereign powers.4

I. The CPA's Statute of Limitations Does Not Apply to the State's .080 Claims

¶ 9 Reading the CPA as a whole, we conclude that the four-year statute of limitations of RCW 19.86.120 (.120)

does not apply to .080 actions. First, by its plain language, .120 applies only to claims for damages under .090, which are distinct from claims under .080. Under the age old rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, [w]here a statute specifically designates the things upon which it operates, there is an inference that the Legislature intended all omissions.’ In re Pers. Restraint of Hopkins , 137 Wash.2d 897, 901, 976 P.2d 616 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Queets Band of Indians v. State , 102 Wash.2d 1, 5, 682 P.2d 909 (1984) ); Wash.

Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County , 77 Wash.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).

¶ 10 Second, we note that legislative history supports the conclusion that the legislature intentionally excluded .080 claims from the limitations period in .120. In its original form, the CPA authorized the State to seek injunctive relief under .080 and authorized damages actions by both private parties and the State under .090. Laws of 1961, ch. 216, §§ 8, 9. The act provided a statute of limitations for “claim[s] for damages under [.090],” but did not reference .080 actions. Laws of 1961, ch. 216, § 12 (codified at RCW 19.86.120

). In 1970, the legislature amended .080 to provide the court discretion to award monetary restitution pursuant to a state action for injunctive relief. Laws of 1970, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 26, § 1. Again in 2007, the legislature amended .080 to add the language “or...

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