State v. Life
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-5005-18 |
| Decision Date | 07 July 2022 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SUPREME LIFE, a/k/a Charles E. Hoskins, III, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Alison Gifford, of counsel and on the briefs).
Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; Alexis R. Agre, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Messano, Rose and Marczyk.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MESSANO, P.J.A.D.
A Burlington County grand jury indicted defendant, Supreme Life a/k/a Charles E. Hoskins, III, and his son, Antoine L. Ketler, for the first-degree murder of Moriah Walker, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), and 2C:11-3(a)(2) ; first-degree attempted murder of Raheem Williams, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3) and 2C:11-3(a)(1) ; and defendant alone for two counts of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) ; and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). The jury acquitted Ketler of all charges but convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter, the attempted murder of Williams, and the weapons offenses.1 After appropriate mergers, the judge sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of seven years' imprisonment on the manslaughter conviction and thirteen years' imprisonment on the attempted murder conviction, both subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Before us, defendant raises the following arguments:
Having considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal standards, we reverse.
On February 4, 2018, Raheem Williams, his girlfriend, Niani Skinner, and his roommate, Moriah Walker, rented a car and drove from their residence in New York City to Lumberton to attend a Super Bowl party at the home of Vera VanKline, Williams' aunt. After the game, the trio intended to drive into Philadelphia to celebrate the Eagles' victory, but they soon realized their cell phones needed to be charged to access their GPS. As they tried to find their way back to VanKline's house, they passed defendant's home, which was just around the corner. Defendant, his wife, and other Eagles fans were outside celebrating. Ketler, a Dallas Cowboys fan, was also outside.
The testimony at trial diverged as to what happened next. Undisputedly, Williams, Walker, Ketler, and defendant got into a physical altercation. The State's witnesses painted defendant and his son as the aggressors, continuing the altercation after Williams and Walker tried to leave, and following them back toward the VanKline house. When eventually Williams and Walker returned to safety inside VanKline's residence, everyone saw Williams and Walker had both been stabbed.
VanKline called 9-1-1, and both men were taken to the hospital for emergency surgery. Williams survived, but despite medical attention, Walker did not. The medical examiner testified Walker died from multiple stab wounds to the chest. The autopsy revealed that in addition to being stabbed twice in the chest, Walker was stabbed once in the back of the leg, and once in the arm. The medical examiner characterized the wound to Walker's arm as a defensive wound.
Defendant testified at trial. He said he was inside his house after the game when he saw Ketler being assaulted by two men. He ran across the street to defend his son and break up the altercation. Defendant claimed he carried a knife on his belt every day for work as a landscaper. When defendant heard his wife say one of the men had a gun, defendant took his knife from his belt.
Defendant testified he was only defending himself from Walker as the two wrestled on the ground. He never intended to stab Walker, but Walker's own body weight caused the knife to penetrate his chest. Defendant said that Williams, who was assaulting Ketler, soon came at him, and defendant held out his knife to ward off Williams. Defendant never intended to stab Williams either.
Defendant provided a statement to police on the night of the stabbings, which the prosecutor used during cross-examination.4 Defendant admitted he lied to police, telling them he had not seen his son since noontime on the day of the Super Bowl, and he never told police that Ketler was at the scene. Defendant also never told police that he heard his wife mention a gun, nor did he admit in his statement to stabbing Williams or Walker.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's repeated statements during summation accusing defendant of lying in his testimony and calling him a liar, combined with a passing reference to the prosecutor's personal belief in defendant's guilt, denied defendant a fair trial. It is axiomatic that "[t]he duty of the prosecutor ‘is as much ... to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.’ " State v. Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 607, 243 A.3d 647 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 403, 54 A.3d 772 (2012) ). "While ‘prosecutors in criminal cases are expected to make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries’ and are ‘afforded considerable leeway,’ ‘their comments [should be] reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented.’ " Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82, 727 A.2d 1 (1999) ).
"In deciding whether prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial, ‘an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred.’ " Williams, 244 N.J. at 608, 243 A.3d 647 (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 83, 727 A.2d 1 ). "To warrant the remedy of a new trial, there must have been ‘some degree of possibility that [the prosecutor's comments] led to an unjust result.’ " McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. at 276, 209 A.3d 845 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330, 873 A.2d 511 (2005) ). Defense counsel never objected during the prosecutor's summation, so we review the alleged impropriety for plain error. R. 2:10-2.
Defendant admitted lying to police in his statement after the stabbings — the prosecutor's opening salvo early in summation was defendant "lied his rear end off" — but the prosecutor did not limit his characterization of defendant as a liar to the falsity of that version of events. Instead, the prosecutor used defendant's admission that he lied to police as a cudgel to explicitly argue defendant's testimony at trial was more lies told by an admitted liar.
In addition to simply calling defendant a "liar" numerous times, the prosecutor wove the accusation into an attack on defendant's claims of self-defense and defense of another, seemingly blurring which party had the burden of proof:
At another point, early in the summation, the prosecutor told jurors his personal opinion that defendant "is definitely guilty of the murder of Moriah Walker."
"It is improper for a prosecutor to express his personal opinion on the veracity of any witness." State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super. 434, 463, 99 A.3d 847 (App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 154, 586 A.2d 85 (1991...
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