State v. Linarducci
| Decision Date | 24 January 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 2.,2. |
| Citation | 3 A.2d 796 |
| Parties | STATE v. LINARDUCCI. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted mateiral omitted.]
Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Essex County.
Joseph Linarducci, Jr., was convicted of causing death with an automobile, and he brings error.
Judgment affirmed.
Argued May term, 1938, before BROGAN, C. J., and BODINE and HEHER, JJ.
J. Henry Harrison and Samuel I. Kessler, both of Newark, for plaintiff-inerror.
Anthony M. Hauck, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Plaintiff-inerror was convicted upon an indictment charging that, on September 8, 1937, at the City of East Orange, in the County of Essex, he "did cause the death of Douglas Strowe and Winnie De Voe by driving a motor vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others," contrary to section 2:138-9 of the Revised Statutes of 1937; and he sued out this writ of error to review the judgment entered thereon. The entire record of the proceedings had upon the trial has been returned with the bill of exceptions, under section 2:195-16 of the Revised Statutes, supra.
Point I. The first question raised by the assignments of error and the specification of causes for reversal concerns the propriety of an instruction.
After the jury had deliberated upon the case, they requested further instructions. This colloquy occurred:
It is said that this instruction was "not responsive to the juror's question;" that it was "definitely misleading;" that it "completely ignored the theory of the defense and that portion of the testimony to which the juror's question was directed;" that it placed "a lesser burden of proof upon the State than the law requires, and that it is an incorrect statement of the law as contemplated by the juror's question." Defendant had testified that he was blinded by the headlights of an automobile that turned into Central Avenue from an intersecting street, and therefore did not observe the presence of the victims upon the roadway; and the argument is made that what the trial judge said was "tantamount to an instruction that if the defendant did not see the pedestrians—regardless of what reason prevented him—he was guilty."
We do not regard the criticism thus made as well founded.
The trial judge did not say that guilt could be predicated upon a mere failure to "see the pedestrians." Rather, he charged the duty laid by the Traffic Act (Pamph.L. 1928, pp. 721, 728, Rev. Stat. 1937, 39:4-35, 39:4-36) upon the driver of an automobile approaching an intersection; and so he laid down a standard that plainly excluded the circumstance of mere failure to see the victims as conclusive of guilt.
Evidently, the point of the juror's inquiry was the effect of defendant's failure to see the pedestrians on the crosswalk as regards the right of way provision of the Traffic Act, supra; and the trial judge, without more, stated what it is conceded was the duty imposed by the Traffic Act, supra, upon the vehicular operator approaching such a crossing. He did not express the view, nor was it reasonably to be implied, that defendant's failure to see the victims of the fatality conclusively demonstrated that he disregarded his duty under the Traffic Act, supra, and was therefore guilty of the offense charged. The juror seemed to be satisfied with the answer thus given. As pointed out, it is conceded that it correctly stated the duty which the law imposed upon the defendant; and if defendant deemed elaboration necessary to include a point not covered, an appropriate request for further instructions could have been interposed.
This instruction must of necessity be viewed in the light of the whole charge; and, so considered, we find it to be unexceptionable. We have read the charge and the colloquy between the court and the jurors, following the jury's request for further instructions; and we find the charge, viewed in its entirety, to be a clear exposition of the issues and the applicable legal principles, with due observance of defendant's rights and all the safeguards of his liberty set up by the law.
The jury were instructed, in language plain and unambiguous, that the evidence must satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant "was guilty of gross or criminal negligence so as to amount to a wilful intent on the part of the defendant to do injury, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others;" that mere carelessness or negligence "is not enough;" that driving the vehicle in violation of the Traffic Act, supra, "does not mean that he drives his car carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others to the extent that because he is guilty of such a violation of the law he would be guilty of the charge laid in this indictment;" and that the operation of the vehicle in violation of that act may be considered "in determining whether or not his driving was in the careless and heedless manner prohibited by the statute under which this indictment is drawn."
Moreover, in answer to a question interposed by another juror shortly before, the trial judge said: "These (regulations laid down by the Traffic Act) are merely rules to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of driving in the careless and heedless manner described in the indictment." A reading of the entire colloquy between the court and the jurors (several questions were directed to the court) reveals a careful statement of the pertinent principles, and leaves no doubt that the instructions so given were entirely consistent with the main charge, and not reasonably open to misunderstanding. See State v. Dugan, 84 N.J.L. 603, 89 A. 691.
Point II. Another juror inquired as to the duty of a motor vehicle operator confronted with "some special hazard" as he approached a highway intersection. The juror did not specify the "special hazard" he had in mind—in fact, he said in answer to the court's interrogation, "I don't care to state it"—and the trial judge properly, as we conceive it, repeated the instruction dealt with under Point I.
It is contended that the "blinding lights" referred to constituted a "special hazard", and the instruction therefore was "a wholly inadequate response to the question in the mind of the juror, and was misleading to the jury."
The juror refused to state the hazard he had in view, and, in such circumstances, the trial judge could not do more than he did. It is not contended that the main charge was deficient as regards the evidence relating to "blinding lights." The judge could not deal with an undisclosed situation that, in the juror's mind, constituted a "special hazard."
Point III. It is said that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in refusing to charge the following request made by defendant: "The denial by the court of motions made by counsel in this case, is not to be taken as prejudicing the defendant but is based solely on matters of law addressed to the court, and should not enter into your consideration of the case."
This request was denied on the ground that "neither of the motions for a directed verdict was...
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