State v. Linarte

Decision Date15 April 2008
Docket NumberNo. 25607.,25607.
Citation944 A.2d 369,107 Conn.App. 93
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Francisco LINARTE.

Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and Richard Colangelo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BISHOP, DiPENTIMA and LAVINE, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Francisco Linarte, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a)(2)1 and five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2).2 On appeal, he claims that the trial court improperly denied (1) his motion to suppress his confession, (2) his motion for disclosure of certain medical records, (3) his motion in limine to preclude prior misconduct, (4) his request to recall a state's witness after the close of the state's evidence, and (5) his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Beginning in 1993, from the time they were two years old, twin sisters K and E3 spent three to four nights a week in the care of the defendant's mother, who operated a day care business in her home. In August, 2002, when the girls were eleven, K disclosed to her mother that the defendant had been sexually assaulting her from around the time she was five years old. According to K, it was her fear that the defendant would begin to abuse a five year old girl who recently had started to attend the day care that compelled her to divulge the abuse to her mother.

K's mother took her to Norwalk Hospital, where K told Officer Susan Holland of the Norwalk police department that the defendant had sexually assaulted her over a period of years, most recently during the past two weeks. E subsequently told Holland that the defendant also had abused her over a period of years. The girls were examined by a pediatric nurse at Yale-New Haven Hospital. Their ensuing interview at the Children's Connection in Norwalk was observed by Sergeant Kenneth Riley of the Norwalk police department and investigator Yezenia Molina of the department of children and families. From the interview, Riley, who led the investigation, identified the defendant as a suspect.

On August 30, 2002, Riley and police Officer Carlton Giles drove to the defendant's home and requested that he speak with them. Giles, a youth officer, was familiar with the defendant through his involvement with the DARE program at the defendant's school. The defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station. When Riley asked the defendant's mother if she wanted to accompany them, she indicated that she would drive herself to the police station later.

At the police station, the officers ascertained that the defendant was an eighteen year old high school graduate. In keeping with departmental procedure, Riley advised the defendant of his Miranda4 rights, provided him with a Miranda waiver form listing his Miranda rights and asked him to read the form aloud. When the defendant had difficulty reading the text back to Riley, Riley read to the defendant, asking him if he understood each paragraph of the waiver form. The defendant said that he understood and indicated as much by signing his initials after each paragraph. The defendant then signed the waiver form.

After Riley questioned the defendant about his interactions with K and E, the defendant admitted to having had sexual contact with K and E over a period of years. The defendant confessed that two to three times per week, while his mother was sleeping, "I would grind K from behind. . . . We started kissing, rubbing and started placing my penis in her vagina and she began placing my penis in her vagina." He also stated: "When I was about thirteen years old, I used to rub against [K] with my clothes on. I probably put my penis in E's butt, but I'm not sure. About a month ago was the last time K placed my penis inside her vagina. . . ." Joining the interview between Riley and the defendant, Molina heard the defendant say that "he had sexual intercourse with . . . both girls." Riley typed and printed the defendant's confession, after which Giles read it back to the defendant. Identifying the statement as his own, the defendant signed it. Riley would later testify that the defendant appeared relieved after telling his story.

The defendant was arrested in November, 2002. At trial in March, 2004, K testified that during June, July and August, 2002, the defendant entered the room where she slept at night, got on her bed, removed her underwear and penetrated her vagina with his penis. E testified that in July and August, 2002, the defendant touched and penetrated her vagina and her anus with his hands and penis. K testified that the assaults happened approximately 75 percent of the time she stayed at the day care and that she could not remember any time period during which the defendant was not sexually assaulting her. E testified that the sexual assaults happened "pretty much all [the] time" she was at the day care.

In diametric contradiction to his confession, the defendant denied at trial that he had ever touched K or E sexually. He testified that he had confessed because Riley and Giles told him he could not leave the interview at the police station until he admitted that he had molested the girls. On March 16, 2004, the jury found the defendant guilty of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a)(2) and five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a)(2). He was sentenced to forty years of imprisonment. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress his confession. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court should have granted his motion to suppress the confession because (1) the state failed to prove, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that his waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, (2) the court improperly shifted to him the burden of proving that the Miranda waiver was valid, and (3) his confession was coerced in violation of his federal and state due process rights. We agree with none of these contentions.

"On appeal, we apply a familiar standard of review to a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record. . . . The conclusions drawn by the trial court will be upheld unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the evidence. . . . [W]e engage in a careful examination of the record to ensure that the court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. . . . We give great deference to the findings of the trial court because it weighs the evidence before it and assesses the credibility of witnesses." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 70 Conn. App. 29, 49, 797 A.2d 1, rev'd on other grounds, 269 Conn. 563, 849 A.2d 626 (2004), after remand, 85 Conn.App. 811, 858 A.2d 876 (2004).

A

The defendant alleges that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that his waiver of rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court's conclusion that he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights was improper because his intellectual limitations render him incapable of effecting a valid waiver.

"[T]o show that the defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent. . . . The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. . . . [T]he question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. . . . The issue of waiver is factual, but our usual deference to the finding of the trial court on questions of this nature is qualified by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a finding is supported by substantial evidence. . . .

"Whether the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda depends in part on the competency of the defendant, or, in other words, on his ability to understand and act upon his constitutional rights. . . . Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant's experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings . . . his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation. . . . The burden upon the state to prove a valid waiver of Miranda rights is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In considering the validity of this waiver, we look, as did the trial court, to the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 76 Conn.App. 91, 99-100, 818 A.2d 824 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 911, 840 A.2d 1175 (2004)...

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  • State v. Houghtaling, AC 35720
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 17 Marzo 2015
    ...whether the trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linarte, 107 Conn. App. 93, 106, 944 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).Advisement of Miranda Rights We first consider the defendant's challenge to t......
  • In re Emerald C., (AC 28573) (Conn. App. 7/1/2008)
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 1 Julio 2008
    ...long, and the respondent has analyzed his claim and provided case law in support of such claim. See generally State v. Linarte, 107 Conn. App. 93, 118, 944 A.2d 369 (2008). 4. During the reunification process, however, the respondent, when he had custody of E, was involved in a domestic vio......
  • State v. Houghtaling
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 17 Marzo 2015
    ...whether the trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 106, 944 A.2d 369, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 901, 957 A.2d 873 (2008).Advisement of Miranda Rights We first consider the defendant's challenge to th......
  • In re Emerald C.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 1 Julio 2008
    ...long, and the respondent has analyzed his claim and provided case law in support of such claim. See generally State v. Linarte, 107 Conn.App. 93, 118, 944 A.2d 369 (2008). 4. During the reunification process, however, the respondent, when he had custody of E, was involved in a domestic viol......
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