State v. Lindquist, DA 16-0538
| Decision Date | 06 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | DA 16-0538 |
| Citation | 390 Mont. 329,2018 MT 38,413 P.3d 455 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Aren Kristian LINDQUIST, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Gregory D. Birdsong, Birdsong Law Office, PC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Emily Caton, Student Intern, Helena, Montana, Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
¶1 Defendant Aren Kristjan Lindquist appeals the order from April 13, 2015, by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying his motion to dismiss for entrapment as a matter of law. We address:
Whether the District Court erred in denying Lindquist's motion to dismiss for entrapment as a matter of law.
¶2 We affirm.
¶3 On July 22, 2014, the Internet Crimes against Children Task Force of the Great Falls Police Department ("Task Force") posted an advertisement ("Ad") entitled "B$a$r$r$r$y L$e$g$a$1—18" in the "great falls escorts" subsection of the "great falls adult entertainment" section of Backpage.com. The Ad included a photograph of a scantily-clad female, with her face cropped out of the photograph. The text of the Ad read:
Shortly after the Ad posted, Lindquist responded to the number listed and initiated the following text message conversation1 with the Task Force's undercover officer ("UC"), posing as pimp:
¶4 The Task Force searched the number, identified the caller as Lindquist, and applied for a warrant to record their conversations. Lindquist and the UC arranged to meet later that night, but when Lindquist did not show up, the UC texted Lindquist that his appointment would be canceled.
¶5 The following morning, on July 23, 2014, Lindquist replied to the previous night's text message and proceeded to arrange another meeting at a motel in Great Falls for later that day:
Once in the motel room, the UC and Lindquist had the following in-person conversation:
Lindquist left the room to retrieve cash from the ATM. Once he returned and paid the UC $160, he confirmed he wanted the "older girl" with the following exchange:
The UC left the motel room as if to retrieve fifteen-year-old Kim, then another officer entered the room and arrested Lindquist.
¶6 On August 6, 2014, the State charged Lindquist with felony Attempted Prostitution, in violation of §§ 45-4-103 and 45-5-601(3), MCA. On November 7, 2014, Lindquist filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the affirmative defense of entrapment. On April 13, 2015, the District Court denied Lindquist's motion to dismiss for entrapment as a matter of law, holding that the record reflected conflicting facts as to the origination of criminal intent and Lindquist's state of mind that made submitting the issue of entrapment to a jury proper. On February 23, 2016, following two trial continuances, Lindquist reached a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty. On July 5, 2016, the District Court sentenced Lindquist to the Department of Corrections for twenty-five years with twenty years suspended and designated him as a Tier 1 sexual offender. Lindquist timely appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss on the grounds of entrapment as a matter of law.
¶7 The denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law, we review for correctness. State v. Reynolds , 2004 MT 364, ¶ 8, 324 Mont. 495, 104 P.3d 1056. When reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss based on entrapment, we review the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the State. Reynolds , ¶ 8. A court may determine that entrapment exists as a matter of law; however, if a genuine issue of material fact exists, the issue is properly submitted to a jury. Reynolds , ¶ 9 (citing State v. Kim , 239 Mont. 189, 194, 779 P.2d 512, 515 (1989) ).
¶8 Whether the District Court erred in denying Lindquist's motion to dismiss for entrapment as a matter of law.
¶9 Entrapment is an affirmative defense afforded to a defendant by statute:
A person is not guilty of an offense if the person's conduct is incited or induced by a public servant or a public servant's agent for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of the person. However, this section is inapplicable if a public servant or a public servant's agent merely affords to the person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense in furtherance of criminal purpose that the person has originated.
Section 45-2-213, MCA. A court may determine that entrapment exists as a matter of law in the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Reynolds , ¶ 9. If there are conflicting facts, the issue is properly submitted to a jury. Reynolds , ¶ 9 (citing Kim , 239 Mont. at 194, 779 P.2d at 515 ); see also Mathews v. United States , 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (). The defendant bears the burden of proof when asserting entrapment and must show: (1) criminal design originating in the mind of the police officer or informer; (2) absence of criminal intent or design originating in the mind of the accused; and (3) luring or inducing the accused into committing a crime he had no intention of committing. Reynolds , ¶¶ 9, 12 (citing State v. Canon , 212 Mont. 157, 167, 687 P.2d 705, 710 (1984) ).
¶10 A distinction exists between inducing a person to commit an unlawful act and setting a trap to catch him in the execution of a criminal design of his own conception. Reynolds...
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State v. Vallie
...to dismiss in a criminal case presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Lindquist, 2018 MT 38, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 329, 413 P.3d 455 (citing v. Reynolds, 2004 MT 364, ¶8, 324 Mont. 495, 104 P.3d 1056). We review the evidence and inferences made in a district court's ......