State v. Lindquist, A12–0599.

Decision Date19 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. A12–0599.,A12–0599.
Citation869 N.W.2d 863
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross–Appellant, v. Bonnie Ann LINDQUIST, Appellant/Cross–Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and James P. Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Nicholas B. Wanka, Assistant County Attorney, Aitkin, MN, for respondent/cross-appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant/cross-respondent.


ANDERSON, Justice.

The question presented by this case is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), should apply in Minnesota. Appellant/cross-respondent Bonnie Ann Lindquist was convicted of third-degree driving while impaired (DWI). At trial, the district court admitted test results showing Lindquist's alcohol concentration that were based on a warrantless blood draw. While Lindquist's case was on direct appeal, the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), which held that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood does not create a single-factor exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw of suspected drunk drivers. Lindquist now challenges her blood draw as unconstitutional under McNeely. Although we hold that McNeely applies to cases on direct review at the time of decision, we also hold that the test results from Lindquist's warrantless blood draw, even if unconstitutionally obtained, do not need to be suppressed because the officer who facilitated the blood draw acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. We therefore affirm the conviction.

On February 19, 2011, officers responded to a single-vehicle accident on a rural road in Aitkin County. A witness told the officers that one of the passengers sustained a head injury and that the occupants of the vehicle had fled. One officer learned that the vehicle involved in the accident belonged to Lindquist and her husband. Two officers drove to the Lindquist residence and entered the home to locate the injured passenger. They found the Lindquists hiding in a closet. Lindquist's husband, who initially claimed to be the driver, had facial bleeding but declined medical attention. The officers later determined that Lindquist, not her husband, was the driver.

The officers observed that Lindquist had slurred speech, an unsteady gait, and red eyes. She also failed field sobriety tests. After declining a preliminary breath test, Lindquist was placed under arrest and transported to a hospital for a blood draw. The officer who facilitated the blood draw did not read the Minnesota implied consent advisory, see Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2(a)-(b) (2014), and sought neither consent nor a warrant for the blood draw. He testified that it was “procedure” at the time to “go straight to the blood” when responding to an accident involving injury. Lindquist's alcohol concentration was measured at .23 approximately 2 hours after driving.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Lindquist with two counts of criminal vehicular operation, Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1(3)-(4), subd. 1a(d) (2012) ;1 and two counts of third-degree DWI, Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), 1(5), 169A.26 (2014). Lindquist did not move to suppress the blood sample or the results of the alcohol-concentration test before the trial. A jury acquitted Lindquist of the criminal-vehicular-operation counts but found her guilty of both counts of third-degree DWI. Lindquist appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Lindquist, No. A12–0599, 2013 WL 1392437, at *2–3 (Minn.App. Apr. 8, 2013), vacated and remanded, No. A12–0599, Order at 2–3 (Minn. filed Nov. 26, 2013).

Nine days after the release of the court of appeals opinion, the Supreme Court decided McNeely. Lindquist petitioned for review to determine whether, in light of McNeely, her blood draw was an unconstitutional search. We stayed proceedings pending final disposition in State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1799, 188 L.Ed.2d 759 (2014). After deciding Brooks, we vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded for further proceedings in light of McNeely and Brooks.

On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed. State v. Lindquist, No. A12–0599, 2014 WL 996470, at *3 (Minn.App. Mar. 17, 2014). The court declined to consider Lindquist's constitutional argument because she did not raise it in the district court or in her first appeal prior to our remand. Id. at *2. The State also urged the court of appeals to adopt the federal good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), but the court declined to do so. Lindquist, 2014 WL 996470, at *2. We granted Lindquist's petition for review of (1) whether she forfeited her constitutional challenge based on McNeely by not raising the issue in the district court, and (2) whether the warrantless blood draw was constitutional under McNeely. We also granted review of the State's request to adopt the good-faith exception articulated in Davis.


First, we must determine whether Lindquist may properly assert a challenge based on Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), which is a legal question that we review de novo. State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn.2005). In McNeely, the Supreme Court held that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the body did not, by itself, establish that there were exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw from a suspected drunk driver. ––– U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. Instead, the Court recognized that exigent circumstances, based in part on the rapid dissipation of alcohol in a suspect's body, may allow police to obtain a blood sample without a warrant, but that courts must determine whether an exigency exists based on the totality of the circumstances in each case. Id. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 1565–66. McNeely overruled our precedent holding that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the body creates a single-factor exigency that supports a warrantless search of a suspected drunk driver. See State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212–14 (Minn.2009), abrogated in part by McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552 ; State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn.2008), abrogated by McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552.

Although the State acknowledges that McNeely applies to this case because Lindquist's direct appeal was pending when McNeely was decided, it argues that Lindquist forfeited her McNeely challenge by not raising it in a motion to suppress at the district court. “As a general rule, district court errors—even those affecting constitutional rights—can be forfeited for purposes of appeal by the failure to make a timely objection in the district court.” State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Minn.2006). Strict application of the forfeiture rule, however, can result in criminal defendants being unable to benefit from a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure because defendants cannot predict changes in the law and often have little incentive to contest settled rules of law that have not been decided in favor of defendants in the past. See id. at 442.

We examined the effect of forfeiture on a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure in Osborne. After conviction of 28 drug-related offenses, Osborne was given an upward-durational sentencing departure. Id. at 439. Although Osborne argued against the upward departure, he did not argue that the imposed sentence was unconstitutional. See id. While Osborne's case was on direct appeal, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which held that facts, other than a prior conviction, used to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 440. We rejected the State's argument that Osborne forfeited a constitutional challenge to his sentence based on Blakely because previously we had “consistently rejected any Blakely -type claim,” and a criminal defendant should not bear the risk of “failing to raise a new principle of law, then unknown to the parties and contrary to the well-established precedent of this court.” Id. at 442 ; see also id. (noting that a contrary result would “expect defendants to continue, formalistically, to make motions or objections based on arguments that we have repeatedly rejected as being without legal merit”).

Like Blakely, McNeely is a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure that overruled our well-established precedent. As in Osborne, Lindquist's case was on direct appeal when McNeely was announced, and the district court would have summarily rejected a suppression challenge to the warrantless blood draw under Netland and Shriner. Many—likely most and perhaps nearly all—defendants in Lindquist's position will fail to bring a constitutional claim, either because similar claims have consistently been rejected in other cases, or because of the novelty of the new rule of law.

The State urges us to limit Osborne to Blakely -type challenges because a defendant must personally and affirmatively waive the right to a jury trial, see Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 442–43, whereas a defendant may forfeit a constitutional challenge to evidence through silence. But, our recent decisions demonstrate that the Osborne forfeiture exception is not so narrow. In State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 253 (Minn.2014), we permitted a juvenile to challenge his sentence based on Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which was decided while Ali's case was on direct review. Ali based his challenge on the Eighth Amendment prohibition...

To continue reading

Request your trial
57 cases
  • State v. McElrath
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • March 12, 2019
    ...Davis good-faith exception, which ‘represents a small fragment of federal good-faith jurisprudence.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Lindquist , 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015) ).This Court next considered, in three separate cases, the good-faith exception as it pertained to technical flaws in oth......
  • State v. Henry
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 14, 2017
    ...officers to ‘extend the law to areas in which no precedent exists or the law is unsettled.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876–77 (Minn. 2015) ). The court viewed its decision to adopt the Davis good faith exception as "adequately preserving the protections provided by o......
  • State v. Reynolds
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • November 3, 2016
    ...articulated in Davis. Like the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, we wish to "note the narrowness of our holding." State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015). We adopt only the Davis good-faith exception, which "represents a small fragment of federal good-faith jurisprudence." Id. ......
  • People v. Harrison
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 18, 2016
    ...applied Davis in the wake of McNeely. See People v. Rossetti, 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 148 (2014) ; State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn.2015) ; State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, 360 Wis.2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847. ¶ 26 On appeal, the defendant argues that for the State to invoke th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT