State v. Lindsay
Decision Date | 06 August 1945 |
Docket Number | 3433. |
Citation | 161 P.2d 351,63 Nev. 40 |
Parties | STATE v. LINDSAY et al. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Second District, Washoe County; A. J Maestretti, Judge.
Edmund George Lindsay, alias George Edward Lindsay, alias Tommy Marino, was convicted of robbery, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Sidney W. Robinson, of Reno, for appellant.
Alan Bible, Atty. Gen., George P. Annand and Homer Mooney, Deputy Attys. Gen., and Melvin E. Jepson, Dist. Atty., and Harold O Taber, Deputy Dist. Atty., both of Reno, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of robbery, and in his appeal to this court seeks a reversal of the judgment of conviction solely upon the ground of alleged misconduct of the district attorney. The misconduct charged consists in the asking by the district attorney, of one McDonald, a witness for appellant, during cross-examination, of the following question: 'Isn't it a fact that you told Mr. Gily that you and Lindsay did time together in Walla Walla Washington? ' It is appellant's position that in asking the said question the district attorney violated the rule of law that evidence tending to connect accused with the commission of a crime independent of and unconnected with the one with which he is on trial is incompetent. Such is the general rule. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 682, p. 1084; 20 Am.Jur. p. 287, sec. 309, et seq. There are exceptions to this general rule, but the question here complained of does not come within ay of such exceptions. The exceptions are clearly set out in the cases of State v. McFarlin, 41 Nev. 486, 172 P. 371, and State v. Hall, 54 Nev. 213, at page 237, 13 P.2d 624.
The asking of the question complained of came after the witness McDonald denied on direct examination that he knew appellant or had at any time seen him prior to his (the witness') appearance in court. The district attorney argues, in justification of the asking of said question, that he had a right to show prior inconsistent statements. The witness gave a rather indefinite answer to the question. The district attorney moved to strike the answer; the motion was denied; appellant objected to the question on the ground that it tended to show that the appellant was guilty of an independent crime; the objection was overruled, and the witness answered: 'I don't remember ever making such a statement.'
We think the asking of this question was erroneous and the objection thereto should have been sustained, but we take the same view as did the court in the case of People v. Doetschman, Cal.App., 159 P.2d 418, at page 423, wherein it is said: 'While the district attorney erred in asking the questions, no such intentional misconduct appears as would justify a reversal on that ground.' In People v. Doetschman, supra, it will be noted that a number of questions relating to other crimes were asked by the district attorney.
We reach the conclusion that the error complained of would not justify a reversal particularly in view of our statute, Sec. 11266, N.C.L., and the construction placed thereon by this court to the effect that in Nevada before a judgment be reversed it must affirmatively appear that there has been a miscarriage of justice or that the defendant has been actually prejudiced. State v. Ramage, 51 Nev. 82, at page 87, 269 P. 489; State v. Williams, 47 Nev. 279, at page 285, 220 P. 555; State v. Willberg, 45 Nev. 183, at page 188, 200 P. 475.
The evidence in this case clearly established the guilt of the appellant. We not only have his confession to participation in the crime, but also the testimony of a young woman who admitted her participation therein and positively identified the appellant as the third member of the trio who staged the hold-up. The confession was made to one John H. Polkinhorn, special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; it was received in evidence without objection and recognized to have been freely and voluntarily made. We quote the testimony given by the witness Polkinhorn, because we think it establishes, beyond question, that no miscarriage of justice occurred in this case:
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