State v. Lindsay

• Decision Date: 28 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. ED 108332,ED 108332
• Citation: State v. Lindsay, 599 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. App. 2020)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Jeffrey Randall LINDSAY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

599 S.W.3d 532

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Jeffrey Randall LINDSAY, Respondent.

No. ED 108332

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.

Filed: April 28, 2020

FOR APPELLANT: Alex G. Ellison, 115 W. Main Street, Bowling Green, Missouri 63334.

FOR RESPONDENT: Candy L. Ries, 3428 Georgia Street, Louisiana, Missouri 63353.

James M. Dowd, P.J., Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., and Robin Ransom, J.

OPINION

James M. Dowd, Presiding Judge

Introduction

The State of Missouri appeals from the trial court's order granting Respondent Lindsay's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of his vehicle, evidence which formed the basis for the State's charges against Lindsay of felony possession of over 35 grams of methamphetamine and felony intent to distribute. We reverse because while the facts articulated by the arresting officer failed to justify a search of Lindsay's vehicle for illegal drugs, the facts articulated by the officer, that he was concerned for his personal safety, justified the officer's warrantless protective search for weapons inside Lindsay's vehicle in all the same areas of the vehicle where the drugs and drug-selling paraphernalia were found.

Background

On the evening of December 19, 2018 around 10:30 p.m., Lindsay was driving his pick-up truck in Bowling Green, Missouri when Bowling Green police officer Samuel Zaerr noticed Lindsay's license plates were expired and stopped him. After Officer Zaerr approached the vehicle and made contact with Lindsay through the driver's side window, Lindsay gave Officer Zaerr his driver's license and admitted that his plates and his insurance were expired. Officer Zaerr returned to his patrol vehicle to "run his license." Lindsay remained in his vehicle.

After the report came back that Lindsay was classified as a "Caution 1" which Officer Zaerr understood to mean that Lindsay was known to be armed and dangerous, Officer Zaerr "started recalling all the clutter he had inside of his truck and actually on the bed of the truck" and the "safety hazard for [him] not being able to see what's inside the vehicle, if there's any weapons ..." Officer Zaerr testified that while he did not see any contraband, weapons, or evidence of any illegal activity inside the vehicle, he did not feel safe in not being able to see what was actually there.

Then, Officer Zaerr approached Lindsay's vehicle a second time and asked him for consent to search it. Lindsay declined and, according to Officer Zaerr, he became agitated and impatient with the request to search the vehicle and the length of the stop. Officer Zaerr asked Lindsay to exit the vehicle and radioed for assistance to search the vehicle.

Officer Zaerr escorted Lindsay back to his patrol vehicle and did a pat-down search of Lindsay's person. He testified the pat-down search was for his safety in light of the Caution 1 report received from dispatch. Officer Zaerr found a utility knife in Lindsay's pocket. Also, during the search, Lindsay became angry and repeatedly turned around to face Officer Zaerr asking why he "was doing this," so Officer Zaerr placed Lindsay in restraints.

Then, Sergeant Hipes and the K-9 unit arrived on scene and the K-9 "positive alerted" to the driver's and passenger's side for some kind of controlled substance. Officer Zaerr then searched the vehicle and found in the "driver's side compartment" an empty pill bottle with a white powdery substance inside. He found a pipe with residue in the front center console and in the back seat on the driver's side, Officer Zaerr "noticed a black Pelican case sitting in plain site" inside of which were two bags containing a crystal-like substance and a black scale with what appeared to be powder residue on it. The crystal-like substance tested positive for methamphetamine. Officer Zaerr also found a large amount of cash on Lindsay's person and in the vehicle.

The trial court granted Lindsay's motion to suppress and explained its reasoning on the record. For the court, the issue was whether Officer Zaerr had articulated sufficient facts to demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were present in Lindsay's vehicle. And since Officer Zaerr had not articulated any facts that supported a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were in Lindsay's vehicle, the search was not justified. The court emphasized that Officer Zaerr did not smell drugs, had no prior information that Lindsay was engaged in drug transactions, and did not suspect that Lindsay was under the influence of illegal drugs at the time such as having glassy eyes or slurred speech or drug-induced agitation. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress may be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous." State v. Shaon , 145 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court limits its review to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's decision and deference is given to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations. State v Whitaker , 101 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003). "If the trial court's ruling ‘is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,’ this court ‘may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.’ "

State v. Kovach , 839 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (quoting State v. Milliorn , 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990) ). Nevertheless, whether the Fourth Amendment was violated is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Holman , 502 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Mo. banc 2016).

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution preserves the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Franklin , 841 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. banc 1992). A routine traffic stop based upon an officer's observation of a violation of state traffic laws is a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sund , 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing State v. Barks , 128 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Mo. banc 2004) ). "Miranda warnings are not necessary during questioning pursuant to a routine traffic stop because traffic stops are analogous to a ‘Terry stop.¹ ’ " State v. Schroeder , 330 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ). "A reasonable investigation may include ‘asking for the driver's license, requesting the driver to sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose.’ " Id. at 473-74 (quoting Barks , 128 S.W.3d at 517 ).

1. Fourth Amendment principles applicable to warrantless search of vehicle during routine traffic stop based on objectively reasonable suspicion the individual is involved in criminal activity.

Once a traffic stop is complete, the law enforcement officer is required to allow the person to "proceed without further questioning unless specific, articulable facts created an objectively reasonable suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal activity." Sund , 215 S.W.3d at 723. The existence of reasonable suspicion is determined objectively. State v. Pike , 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. banc 2005). The question is whether the facts available to the officer at that moment would "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate[.]" Id. "Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause" and "may be established with information that is different in amount or content, or that is less reliable, than the evidence required to establish probable cause." Id. at 473. "The quantity and quality of the information must be considered in the context of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ ..." Id. "A suspicion is reasonable when the officer is ‘able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ " State v. Hawkins , 137 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ). Nervousness, evasive and furtive actions, and the officer's knowledge of the subject's recent relevant criminal conduct are generally permissible components of articulable suspicion. Id. at 558.

2. Fourth Amendment implications in warrantless search of vehicle during routine traffic stop based on officer's reasonable suspicion driver poses danger to officer.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), the Court held that police may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they may be armed and dangerous. The Court rested its decision in part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330.

In Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Court addressed the limitations on police authority when conducting a search incident to a valid arrest. Relying on Terry , the Court held that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search "the arrestee's person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The Court reasoned that "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested." Id. The Court later held, in New York v....