State v. Lindsey.
Decision Date | 08 January 1921 |
Docket Number | No. 2501.,2501. |
Citation | 194 P. 877,26 N.M. 526 |
Parties | STATEv.LINDSEY. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
Section 1775, Code 1915, which provides for the punishment of any person convicted of bigamy or polygamy, is sufficient to authorize the conviction of one of the crime of bigamy, as the statute provides the punishment for the doing of an act which has in all English–speaking countries a well–understood meaning.
Under the statute, the good faith or honest purpose of the defendant is not a defense, if in fact he or she had a wife or husband living at the time and presumption of death had not arisen by reason of absence for the necessary length of time.
A confession, in a legal sense, is restricted to an acknowledgment of guilt made by a person after an offense has been committed, and does not apply to a mere statement or declaration of an independent fact from which such guilt may be inferred. A statement by a defendant in a bigamy case that he had been married at a certain time and place and to a person named, all being before the marriage for which he was prosecuted, is an admission and not a confession (citing Words and Phrases, Confession).
Objections to the admissibility of evidence, not raised in the trial court, will not be considered on appeal.
Appeal from District Court, McKinley County; Ryan, Judge.
Jacob A. Lindsey was convicted of bigamy, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Where no objection is made at the trial to the admission of evidence nor exception saved thereto, we will not consider the same on appeal.
A. T. Hannett, of Gallup, for appellant.
Harry S. Bowman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of bigamy, and appeals. The first ground upon which he relies for a reversal is that the indictment failed to charge facts sufficient to constitute a crime, for two reasons: (a) There is no such offense under the laws of the state of New Mexico as bigamy; and (b) the indictment failed to allege knowledge or intent on the part of the appellant.
[1] The statute, it is true, does not define the crime of bigamy. It simply provides (section 1775, Code 1915):
“Every person who shall be convicted of bigamy or polygamy shall be imprisoned not more than seven years nor less than two years.”
It provides the punishment for the doing of an act which has in all English–speaking countries a well–understood meaning. The commonly understood meaning of the term “bigamy” is the having of two or more wives or husbands at the same time. In the case of State v. Hayes, 105 La. 352, 29 South. 937, the court dealt with an identical situation. The statute there simply provided for the punishment of any person convicted of the crime of bigamy, without defining the crime, and the judgment of conviction was attacked on the same grounds as here. The court said:
The meaning of the word “bigamy” used in the statute is universally understood, and no language could have been employed which would have made clearer the intention of the Legislature. There is no merit in the objection that there is no such crime under the laws of this state.
[2] Was it necessary to allege in the indictment that the defendant knew at the time of the second marriage that the prior marriage was in full force and effect; or, in other words, was it essential to allege knowledge and intention? The Legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer. 16 C. J., Criminal Law, § 42. There are many such offenses denounced in the statutes in various states. Under the ordinarily accepted meaning of the word “bigamy,” given above, it will be observed that the knowledge or intention of the party is not an element of the definition of the offense or act. It might be, and doubtless is, in many states where the offense is defined by statute, essential to criminal bigamy or to a punishable offense that the second marriage should be contracted knowingly and intentionally, the party at the time knowing that the first marriage still...
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State v. Victorian, 9473
...the length of time he had owned a gun. This was at most an admission. State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837 (1962); State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526, 194 P. 877 (1921); 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 337 at 10 (12th Ed. 1955). A preliminary hearing out of the presence of the jury as to ......
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...Woods' statement is a confession or an admission. Certainly it is not a confession; that is, a declaration of guilt. State v. Lindsey. 26 N.M. 526, 194 P. 877 (1921); Shellman v. State, 157 Ga. 788, 122 S.E. 205 (1924). The statement makes declarations as to Woods' whereabouts on the night ......
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...(195 P. 211); Knecht v. Kenyon, 179 Wis. 523 (192 N.W. 82); Wess v. South Dakota P. & S. Co., 43 S.D. 467 (180 N.W. 510); State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526 (194 P. 877); State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443 (204 P. State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580 (207 P. 1071); State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480 (22 S.W. 4......
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State v. Dunn
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