State v. LINDSKOG, 04-1222-CR.
Decision Date | 12 January 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 04-1222-CR.,04-1222-CR. |
Citation | 279 Wis.2d 519,2005 WI App 38,693 NW 2d 146 |
Parties | State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marc A. Lindskog, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Marc A. Lindskog contends that a "DUI" in Illinois cannot be counted as a prior offense in Wisconsin because it was resolved with a "supervision agreement" without the entry of a judgment of conviction. We reject his contention and affirm.
¶ 2 When Lindskog was arrested for drunk driving in Walworth county, he had a similar charge pending in Illinois. By the time he appeared for sentencing in Walworth county, the Illinois charge had been disposed of with the entry of a "supervision agreement." Under Illinois law, disposition of a "DUI" by a "supervision agreement" does not require the entry of a judgment of conviction. Lindskog argued to the circuit court that the Illinois "DUI" could not be counted as a prior conviction under Wisconsin's drunk driving law because it was not a conviction. The court rejected his argument, reasoning that under WIS. STAT. § 343.307(1)(d), the Illinois law permitting disposition of a "DUI" by court supervision was sufficiently similar to Wisconsin's drunk driving laws. The court proceeded to sentence Lindskog for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of WIS. STAT . §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65(2). Lindskog appeals.
¶ 3 Lindskog frames the question on appeal as In State v. List, 2004 WI App 230, ¶ 10, No. 03-3149-CR, we affirmatively answered the same question. Because officially published opinions of the court of appeals have statewide precedential effect, Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), and we are not at liberty to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a published opinion, id. at 189-90, we will apply List to the facts of this case and affirm.
¶ 4 Lindskog does make an argument not addressed in List. He contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. He asserts that "[a] person of common intelligence could not be expected to gather from the language of the statute that even though he had no prior [operating while intoxicated (OWI)] cases resulting in conviction, he could still be charged criminally for an OWI committed in Wisconsin."
¶ 5 The "void for vagueness" doctrine rests upon the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 701-02, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972). The test for vagueness of a criminal statute is whether it gives reasonable notice of the...
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