State v. Livingston Concrete Bldg. & Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1906
• Parties: STATE v. LIVINGSTON CONCRETE BLDG. & MFG. CO.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

87 P. 980

34 Mont. 570

STATE v. LIVINGSTON CONCRETE BLDG. & MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Montana

December 13, 1906

Appeal from District Court, Park County; Frank Henry, Judge.

The Livingston Concrete Building & Manufacturing Company was charged with violating the provisions of the eight-hour law. From a judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer to the information, the state appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Albert J. Galen, Atty. Gen., W. H. Poorman, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. M Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., and T. J. Walsh, for the State.

Dan Yancey, for respondent.

HOLLOWAY J.

The Livingston Concrete Building & Manufacturing Company, a domestic corporation, was charged, by an information filed in the district court of Park county, with violating the provisions of chapter 50, p. 105, Laws 1905, known as the "Eight-hour Law," in this: that the defendant having a contract with the city of Livingston for the construction of certain cement sidewalks, crosswalks, and curbs, did unlawfully and willfully cause, suffer, and permit its servants and employés engaged in such work to work for a longer period than eight hours in a day. To this information the defendant interposed a general demurrer, which was sustained. The state appeals from the judgment for the defendant on the demurrer to the information.

The information states facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, if chapter 50 above is a valid legislative enactment capable of being enforced; but on behalf of respondent it is urged (1) that the act is so indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement, and (2) that, even if sufficiently definite, the act is unconstitutional and void.

The provisions of chapter 50, above, are as follows:

"Section 1. A period of eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided by any municipal, county or state government, and on all contracts let by them, and in mills and smelters for the treatment of ores, and in underground mines."

"Sec. 2. Every person, corporation, stock company or association of persons who violate any of the provisions of section one (1) of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred ($500) dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

1. It is said that the statute is too indefinite to be enforceable, in that (1) it cannot be determined whether it intends to impose the penalty prescribed upon the man who works less than eight hours in a day, or upon the man who works more than eight hours in a day, or upon both; (2) it cannot be determined whether it is intended to punish the employer, the employé, or both; and (3) it is so indefinite that, in fact, it cannot be said to forbid the employment of a laborer for more than eight hours in a day. While it may be conceded that the intention of the lawmakers might have been expressed in plainer terms, we cannot hold a solemn legislative enactment of no force or effect because of the indefinite language in which it is couched, unless we find ourselves unable to divine the purpose or intent of the Legislature. Hochheimer, Criminal Law (2d Ed.) § 28. For, after all, the function of the court is to determine and make known, if possible, such purpose or intent; for the intention of the Legislature is the essence of the law. In Edwards v. Morton, 92 Tex. 152, 46 S.W. 792, it is said: "The intention of the Legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained." In Manhattan Co. v. Kaldenberg, 165 N.Y. 1, 58 N.E. 790, it is said: "In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature, and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the Legislature." 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 363. It is an elementary rule that effect must be given to a statute, if possible. If the statute is plain and unambiguous, so that no doubt can arise from the language employed as to its scope and meaning, then there is not any room for interpretation or construction, and the reading of the statute itself is a sufficient declaration of its meaning. "When the meaning of a statute is doubtful, the reason and purpose of its enactment, are to be taken into consideration in construing it and determining the intention of the Legislature. In other words, though a penal statute cannot be extended by construction, it should, if possible, receive such a construction as, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the evil which the Legislature intended to prohibit." Clark & Marshall on the Law of Crimes, p. 97; 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) §§ 528, 530.

(1) The history of labor legislation makes clear the evil to suppress which such statutes are enacted. It is the continuous employment of workingmen for such length of time as to imperil their lives or health that is sought to be avoided, and, in the interest of the general welfare of its citizens, the state undertakes to correct the evil as far as it may; or it may have been the purpose of the state to stamp with its approval the view now entertained by many, that, all things considered, the general welfare of workingmen, upon whom rests a portion of the burdens of government, will be best subserved if labor performed for eight hours continuously be taken as the measure of a full day's work; that the restriction of a day's work to that number of hours will so far promote the morality and improve the physical and intellectual condition of workingmen as to enable them the better to discharge the duties of citizenship. With these objects in view, it cannot be supposed that the Legislature intended to impose punishment upon every laborer engaged in any of the designated employments who fails to work for the full period of eight hours in every working day. But, on the other hand, it is apparent that the object and purpose in view were to prevent the employment of a laborer in any of such employments for more than eight hours in a day; that number of hours of continuous labor being fixed by the statute as the maximum for a day's work.

(2) As it is the purpose of the statute to conserve the health and promote the happiness of the workingman-not to curtail his capacity to earn money or to set bounds upon the greed of his employer-the statute is written in terms broad enough to include within its inhibition both the employer and the employé. The language is: "Every person, corporation, stock company or association of persons who violates any of the provisions of section one of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. In Short v. Bullion-Beck & C. M. Co., 20 Utah, 20, 57 P. 720, 45 L. R. A. 603, a similar statute of the state of Utah was considered, and it was there held that the statute applies both to the employer and employé, and that the protection which the state throws around the citizen by the enactment of such a law cannot be waived even by the employé, the person for whose benefit the statute is primarily enacted. We do not think that in this respect the statute is at all indefinite, but, on the contrary, the meaning of the language employed seems to be plain.

(3) It is said that the statute does not in terms prohibit the workingman from engaging in any of the designated employments for more than eight hours in a day, nor does it specifically prohibit the employer from hiring him to do so, and that, in fact, at most, the statute does not do more than define a working day. But the courts have not had difficulty in reaching an altogether different conclusion. The statute of Utah considered in Short v. Bullion-Beck & C. M. Co., above provides in section 1 (Sess. Laws 1896, p. 219, c. 72) that the period of employment of workingmen in underground mines shall be eight hours per day. In section 2 the same language is employed with respect to mills and smelters for the treatment of ores. Section 3 provides: "Any person, body corporate, agent, manager or employer who shall violate any of the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. Respecting this statute, the court said: "When the plaintiff [employé] voluntarily performed services at the request of the defendant [employer] in the mill, and worked 12 hours, instead of 8 hours, there was a violation of the statute. *** When the defendant [employer] requested the plaintiff to work 12 hours each day, and plaintiff complied with that request, the law was violated by the act of each party." In State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 59, 60 S.W. 1068, the Supreme Court of Missouri had under consideration a statute which requires that every electric street car, other than trail cars which are attached to motor cars, shall be provided during certain months of each year with a suitable screen which shall fully and completely protect the driver, motorman, gripman, or other person guiding or directing the car from wind and storm. The penalty clause is as follows: "Any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation violating any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. The court held that this statute is not so indefinite or uncertain in its meaning as to be inoperative, but that it imposes upon every company or association of persons operating electric cars the duty of providing the screens on their cars, and makes subject to the penalty prescribed any person who, owning or operating such cars, operates them without screens during the designated months of the...