State v. Lloyd

• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and KOBAYASHI; PER CURIAM
• Citation: State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 606 P.2d 913 (Haw. 1980)
• Decision Date: 11 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 5956,5956
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claude Samuel LLOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 913

606 P.2d 913

61 Haw. 505

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claude Samuel LLOYD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5956.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 11, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred where the police, although not in physical possession of a box containing marijuana, prevented persons from touching the box or its contents prior to the arrival of a search warrant.

2. Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe, from facts and circumstances personally known to him, or of which he has trustworthy information, that the person arrested has committed or is committing an offense.

3. Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a constitutionally protected area without a search warrant for the purpose of effecting a seizure even where probable cause exists.

4. Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter the home of a suspect to effect his arrest, without his consent or without prior judicial authorization.

5. Exigent circumstances exist when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response; and a warrantless entry may be justified when required to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the likely escape of a suspect or the threatened removal or destruction of evidence.

6. Exigent circumstances justifying entry without a search warrant existed where the police, having probable cause to believe the defendant was in possession of contraband and after announcing their presence, heard crashing and scurrying sounds within the defendant's home, giving rise to a reasonable belief that flight was in progress and that the contraband might have been removed or destroyed.

7. Evidence was insufficient to show that seeds recovered were marijuana seeds, where the only testimony offered on the issue was by an arresting officer who was not qualified as an expert regarding the appearance and substance of marijuana seeds.

Paul Mark Clark, Hilo, for defendant-appellant.

Jon R. Ono, First Deputy Pros. Atty., Hilo, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and KOBAYASHI, Retired Justice, assigned by reason of vacancy. ^*

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was convicted on one count of promoting a detrimental drug in the second degree, under HRS § 712-1248, and one count of promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree, under HRS § 712-1249. He appeals from the judgment and sentence of the trial court. At issue is whether the marijuana seized by the police was properly admitted into evidence.

The Hawaii County police were advised by a telephone call from the San Diego, California, police department that a shipment of marijuana was due to arrive the following day on United Airlines Flight 101, in a box addressed to "Claude Lloyd, General Delivery, Hilo, Hawaii." Acting on this information, the Hawaii police contacted United Airlines freight agent Thomas Iwasaki, apprised him of the information they had received, and arranged to meet with him the next day.

Sgt. Richard Carter, together with Sgt. John DeSa and deputy prosecutor Jon Ono, met with Mr. Iwasaki at the Hilo airport on the appointed day. By then Flight 101 had already arrived. A large Italian Swiss Colony box, addressed to "Claude Lloyd" and bearing no return address, was pointed out to them by the agent. After photographing the box, the police instituted a surveillance of the area and waited until, by a pre-arranged signal, they were advised by Mr. Iwasaki that the box had been picked up by someone representing himself to be the addressee. Shortly thereafter, they saw the defendant emerge from the freight area carrying the Swiss Colony box. They took his photograph as he was carrying it towards a parked white Dodge sedan where another man was waiting.

The defendant drove off, and the police followed for several miles until he reached his residence at 128 Hale Nani Street. The police took every precaution to avoid detection, and the record indicates that neither the defendant nor any of the persons in the dwelling was aware of the police presence at the time. The defendant and his companion were then seen entering the building with the box.

Reinforcements meanwhile had arrived, and pursuant to Sgt. Carter's instructions Officers Robello and Correa repaired to the rear of the premises to stand guard. At the same time, Sgt. Carter and Sgt. DeSa, who were in plain clothes, approached the front entrance with guns drawn. Several minutes had elapsed since the defendant's entry into his residence. Sgt. Carter testified at the suppression hearing that he knocked on the door and shouted "Police!" There immediately followed a scurrying about" within the house and then a "crashing" sound toward the rear of the building. Upon hearing these sounds, Sgt. Carter immediately pushed open the unlocked front door and, followed by Sgt. DeSa, entered the premises. ¹ They found the defendant in the bathroom, placed him under arrest, and continued on toward the back of the house from where the crashing sound had emanated. As they passed the open bedroom, they saw on the floor the box which the defendant had picked up at the airport. This container was now open, and lying alongside it was another smaller box, some wrappings, an exposed brick of marijuana, and two wrapped bricks.

Officers Robello and Correa testified that shortly after they heard Sgt. Carter knock and identify himself as a police officer, they saw a male figure jump through a rear window of the house. They apprehended him as he emerged and returned with him into the building. He was later identified as one Jack Maertens and was the individual who had accompanied the defendant to the airport. Two women were also present in the home. None of the occupants were found to be armed.

The two women were taken to the police station, while the defendant and Maertens were placed under guard, and the box and its contents were kept under observation at the house until a search warrant was obtained and served approximately two hours later. It was then that the police took actual physical custody of the evidence lying on the bedroom floor. The police also recovered a small amount of seeds alleged to be marijuana from the top shelf of the closet in the defendant's bedroom. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police. The motion was denied.

I

Although the police did not take actual physical possession of the box and its contents prior to the arrival of the search warrant, the conduct of the police following the warrantless entry constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.3d 535, 106 Cal.Rptr. 452 (1973). Until the search warrant was obtained, no one was allowed to touch the box or its contents. This, in practical and legal contemplation, was a seizure of evidence prior to the issuance of a search warrant. Id.

The essential issue created by these facts is whether the police were rightfully on the premises when they observed and seized the contraband. And because it was the avowed intent of the police to arrest the defendant, the more specific question is whether they had the right to enter his residence without a warrant for the purpose of accomplishing this objective. ²

It has long been settled that "a police officer may arrest without a warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 45 S.Ct. 280, 286, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Probable cause to arrest without a warrant exists when the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe, from facts and circumstances personally known to him, or of which he has trustworthy information, that the person arrested has committed or is committing an offense. State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977).

The applicability of this rule to warrantless arrests in public places has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (arrest made in a public restaurant). The Court has even gone so far as to hold that the warrantless arrest of a suspect standing in plain view in the doorway of her home and retreating into the vestibule of her house where she was followed and arrested by law enforcement officers was not constitutionally proscribed. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). But the Court has yet to address itself squarely to the question of whether a consentless entry into a suspect's private home for the specific purpose of making a warrantless arrest is proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Santana, supra, 427 U.S. at 45, 96 S.Ct. at 2410 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Watson, supra, 423 U.S. at 418, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. at 825 n. 6 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n. 13, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863 n. 13, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480-481, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2045, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958). On the other hand, it is settled law that absent clearly exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a constitutionally protected area without a search warrant for the purpose of effecting a seizure even where probable cause exists. ³ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 587 P.2d 1224 (1978).

We do not think that the distinction between a warrantless entry of private premises for the purpose of making an arrest and a warrantless entry for the purpose of effecting a search and seizure is so significant as to justify fundamentally divergent treatment. Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v....