State v. Locklear

• Decision Date: 07 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 92A87,92A87
• Citation: 320 N.C. 754,360 S.E.2d 682
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Eric Glenn LOCKLEAR.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 682

360 S.E.2d 682

320 N.C. 754

STATE of North Carolina v.Eric Glenn LOCKLEAR.

No. 92A87.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 7, 1987.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Marilyn R. Mudge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Arnold Locklear, Pembroke, for defendant-appellant.

EXUM, Chief Justice.

In this appeal defendant's assignments of error pertain to the sufficiency of the state's evidence and to rulings by the trial court on various evidentiary matters.We find no reversible error in defendant's trial.

At trial the state's evidence tended to show that Michelle Oxendine, the prosecuting witness, was staying overnight at the home of her brother and sister-in-law in Robeson County.Ms. Oxendine had dated the defendant for approximately nine months, but had ended the relationship two weeks before the morning of 13 August 1986.On that morning at approximately 7:30 a.m., Ms. Oxendine awoke to find the defendant standing in the doorway of her bedroom.He ordered Ms. Oxendine to get out of bed; and, clad only in her undergarments, she walked to the adjacent bedroom to get dressed.

According to Ms. Oxendine's testimony, the defendant tore her clothes off, threw her to the bed, pinned her hands down and struck her repeatedly in the face.She testified that although she attempted to resist, he forced her to have vaginal and oral intercourse with him and that she was bleeding and in pain.

Afterward, she followed defendant's order that she gather some clothes and go with him.The defendant then drove Ms. Oxendine to the hospital.They arrived there approximately three hours after the incident had occurred, and Ms. Oxendine was taken to the trauma room for treatment.During the ensuing twenty-four hours, she received stitches for an injury to her lip and underwent surgery for a broken jaw.

The defendant presented evidence tending to show that, although he struck Ms. Oxendine with his fist, he carried her to a living room couch when he realized she was injured.Further, he testified that after a short discussion and his apology they returned to the bedroom and had consensual intercourse.

By his first assignment of error defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the first degree rape charge for insufficiency of the evidence.

N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2(1986) defines first degree rape in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse:

....

(2) With another person by force and against the will of the other person, and:

....

b. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person....

Defendant correctly asserts that in order to convict of first degree rape under the evidence in this case, the state must rely on proof that defendant inflicted a serious personal injury upon the victim.Defendant argues there is no evidence that the injury relied upon by the state, the fracture of Ms. Oxendine's jaw, was inflicted to overcome her resistance to his sexual advances.

There is clearly no merit to defendant's argument.The state's evidence, through the testimony of Ms. Oxendine, is that defendant fractured her jaw while she was resisting his sexual advances.This evidence is ample to support the state's theory of the case that the fractured jaw was inflicted for the purpose of overcoming Ms. Oxendine's resistance.

Furthermore, there is no requirement under N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2(a)(2)(b) that the serious personal injury be inflicted upon a rape victim during the period of time when the victim's resistance is being overcome.State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 333 S.E.2d 245(1985).In Blackstock, we held that the legislature intended that "the element of infliction of serious bodily injury would no longer be limited to the period of time when the victim's resistance was being overcome or her submission procured...."Id. at 241, 333 S.E.2d at 251.We concluded that the element of infliction of serious injury upon the victim was satisfied when there was a series of incidents "forming one continuous transaction between the rape and the infliction of the serious personal injury."Id. at 242, 333 S.E.2d at 252.

Clearly the evidence here supports the serious injury element under the rationale of Blackstock.The state's evidence is that defendant repeatedly struck Ms. Oxendine in the face immediately before he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.Even if the blows were not intended by the defendant to overcome Ms. Oxendine's resistance, they were still one link in a continuous chain of events which culminated in the act of intercourse.Thus, the blows formed "one continuous transaction between the rape and the infliction of the serious personal injury."Id.

Accordingly, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

By his next assignment of error defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the felonious breaking or entering charge for insufficiency of the evidence.

N.C.G.S. § 14-54(1986) defines both felonious and nonfelonious breaking or entering in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Any person who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H felon.

(b) Any person who wrongfully breaks or enters any building is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable under G.S. 14-3(a)....

The trial judge instructed the jury that if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had entered the Oxendine home without consent, intending to commit rape, then they should find him guilty of felonious breaking or entering.He also submitted the lesser included charge of nonfelonious breaking or entering and instructed the jury that, as to this charge, there was no requirement that the state prove that defendant entered the Oxendine home with intent to commit rape.The jury found the defendant guilty of nonfelonious breaking or entering as provided in N.C.G.S. § 14-54(b).

In order to convict under this sectionthe state must show that defendant did break or enter a building unlawfully.State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 141 S.E.2d 27(1965).Where defendant enters a building with the consent of the owner or anyone empowered to give effective consent to enter, such entry cannot be the basis for a conviction of breaking or entering.State v. Boone, 297 N.C. 652, 256 S.E.2d 683(1979).Conversely, a wrongful entry, i.e. without consent, will be punishable under this section.Id. at 655, 256 S.E.2d at 686.

Defendant contends all the evidence shows he had Ms. Oxendine's permission to enter the home on 13 August 1986.We disagree.

Although defendant presented evidence that permission to enter the home on 13 August 1986 was inferable because Ms. Oxendine expected him to return a pocketbook that she had left in his car, the state presented evidence to the contrary.The state's evidence showed no arrangements were made for the return of the pocketbook and defendant did not in fact have the pocketbook with him on the morning of the incident.Defendant admitted in a pretrial statement, offered against him by the state, that when he entered the Oxendine home that morning he"was not invited inside the house by anyone."

On a motion to dismiss the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the state and the state must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference deducible therefrom.State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711(1980).Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's entry into the home was nonconsensual and, therefore, wrongful.We overrule this assignment of error.

Defendant complains further that the trial judge committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of medical personnel who were present when Ms. Oxendine was admitted to the hospital.

Frances Prevatte, assistant director of nursing, testified that on the morning of 13 August 1986 Ms. Oxendine told her that she was afraid of the defendant and requested that the defendant not be allowed near her.Wanda Burns, a registered nurse, also testified that on 13 August 1986 Ms. Oxendine had stated that she was "scared," but that she would not say why she was frightened.Defendant's objection to the testimony was overruled.

Defendant asserts that the statements made to the medical personnel were inadmissible as hearsay.We disagree.

N.C.R.Evid. 803 contains what is commonly known as the "stateof mind" exception to the hearsay rule and provides as follows:

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