State v. Lodzinski
| Decision Date | 06 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | M-1224-2020 |
| Parties | State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michelle Lodzinski, Defendant-Movant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for reconsideration of the Court's opinion, filed on May 26 2021.
The background to the motion is as follows.
On July 31, 2014, a Middlesex County grand jury indicted defendant on a single count of first-degree murder of her five-year-old son, Timothy Wiltsey, more than twenty-three years after his disappearance. At the close of the State's case defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 3:18-1. That motion was denied, and the jury proceeded to convict defendant of first-degree murder. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 3:18-2 and sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment without parole eligibility.
Defendant appealed her conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing, in relevant part, that the trial court had erred in denying her motion for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction, explaining that it had assessed the sufficiency of the evidence by looking only to the State's proofs. While the Appellate Division observed that the defendant had offered "substantial" evidence at trial that "in many ways directly rebutted the State's proofs," this evidence went unreviewed and unconsidered. Defendant sought this Court's review and we granted certification. 241 N.J. 81 (2020).
All six members of the Court agreed that the Appellate Division applied an incorrect standard that limited "the scope of the evidence that should be considered in reviewing a post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal." State v. Lodzinski, 246 N.J. 331, 339 (2021); accord id. at 359-60 (Patterson, J., concurring). The concurring opinion stated the unanimous view of the Court that "[w]hen a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal after all the proofs, . . . the court considers not only the evidence presented by the State, but 'the entirety of the evidence.'" Id. at 358 (quoting State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 594 (2014)). We also characterized our statement in State v. Samuels that "a court 'may not consider any evidence adduced by the defense in determining if the State had met its burden, '" 189 N.J. 236, 245 (2007) (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 3:18 (2006)), as "a departure from our law," Lodzinski, 246 N.J. at 358 n.6 (Patterson, J., concurring). The concurring and dissenting opinions then applied this corrected standard, reaching opposite conclusions as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Both opinions earned the support of three Justices.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the per curiam opinion of the Court stated that the "judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court." Id. at 339.
Following this Court's decision, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 2:11-6(a). Defendant argues that this Court erred in determining that the Appellate Division's decision could be affirmed by an equally divided Court given our unanimous determination that the Appellate Division had applied the incorrect standard. Defendant further argues that she has never received judicial review of her insufficient-evidence claim under the correct standard, as this Court could not take an affirmative act without a majority vote for that action. Defendant contends that this is an error in the handling of her appeal that works a violation of her due process rights.[1]
Motions for reconsideration in our appellate courts are governed by Rule 2:11-6. Under Rule 2:11-6(b), "[a] motion for reconsideration will be granted only if it is moved by a justice or judge who concurred in the judgment or decision, and a majority of the court so determines." Therefore, two requirements must be met for this Court to grant a motion for reconsideration: the support of a single justice who joined the judgment or decision on which reconsideration is sought, and, separately, the support of a majority of the Court. In this instance, because both requirements are met, the motion for reconsideration will be granted and the matter reargued for the following reasons.
Any member of this Court who joined the per curiam portion of our earlier decision in this matter may serve as the justice "who concurred in the judgment or decision" on which reconsideration is sought, for purposes of Rule 2:11-6(b). This Court "unanimously modif[ied] the Appellate Division's holding with respect to its characterization of the scope of the evidence that should be considered in reviewing a post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal" and unanimously agreed that the effect of that determination was an affirmance of the Appellate Division's decision. Lodzinski, 246 N.J. at 339; see also id. at 385 (Albin, J., dissenting) (). Because it is that aspect of our decision, and only that aspect, on which defendant requests reconsideration, any of the six Justices joining that per curiam decision may be the requisite justice who "move[s]" a motion to reconsider that portion of the decision. And because at least one Justice who joined our per curiam decision in this matter has voted in favor of granting reconsideration, that requirement of Rule 2:11-6(b) does not erect a barrier to our review.
Moreover, on the merits, defendant rightfully asserts that adjudicating her guilt or innocence by using a concededly erroneous ruling as a tiebreaker denies meaningful judicial review. Though there are countless instances of this Court resolving appeals with an equally divided affirmance, there are no such examples of the Court doing so where the decision to be affirmed is unanimously judged to apply incorrect legal standards. Our Court's split on the application of the correct standard of review to defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument did not resolve the appeal from the trial court's denial of her Rule 3:18-2 motion. The split requires correction by the appellate body. Cf. R. 2:13-2(b); see Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 2:13-2 (2021). Under Rule 2:13-2(b), when a two-judge panel "cannot agree as to the determination" of the issue on appeal, the panel "shall" "call a third judge to participate in the decision." The rationale for Rule 2:13-2(b) is quite simple: a third judge is required to participate because "the rule does not intend an affirmance of the order or judgment appealed from by reason of an equally split appellate panel." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 2:13-2 (2021).
Criminal defendants in New Jersey have a constitutionally protected "automatic right of appeal" of a final judgment of appeal. N.J. Const. art VI, § 5, ¶ 2; see also R. 2:2-3(a); R. 2:3-2. Where "a State has created appellate courts as 'an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,' the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (omission in original) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)); accord State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 279-80 (2015). "In order to satisfy the Due Process Clause, defendants must be given a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" State v. Bianco, 103 N.J. 383, 391 (1986) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
Defendant has brought to this Court's attention a failing in its prior handling of this matter, which requires correction. She rightfully claims that the unique procedural posture of this Court's decision left her appeal unconsidered under the proper legal standard, which, left uncorrected, works a violation of her due process rights. Defendant does not challenge an evidentiary ruling, the construction of a statute, or the meaning of an insurance policy provision. She challenges the very process by which this evenly divided Court addressed her conviction for first-degree murder. One searches in vain to find a more "important issue," Motor Club Fire & Cas. Co. v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 73 N.J. 425, 428 (1977), that would justify rehearing. Defendant must be provided her right to be heard on appeal by an appellate body using the correct standard of review.
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is granted.
Defendant and the State shall appear before the Court for reargument on the appeal on the session of October 25-26, 2021, at a time to be scheduled by the Clerk of the Court. The Court shall reconsider the matter on the existing record, and no further briefs or submissions shall be accepted. Nor will the Court accept additional applications for leave to participate.
WITNESS, the Honorable Jaynee LaVecchia, Presiding Justice, at Trenton, this 6th day of October, 2021.
JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and PIERRE-LOUIS, and JUDGE FUENTES (temporarily assigned), join in the Order. JUSTICE ALBIN concurs in the Order. JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, AND SOLOMON dissent from the Order. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER did not participate.
Rule 2:11-6 allowed this Court to grant the motion for reconsideration when it became evident that the Court, through oversight or inadvertence, made a fundamental mistake in rendering its decision. Though rarely invoked, the Rule permits the Court to correct its own errors. Admitting a procedural error of constitutional magnitude, as the Court does today, keeps faith with the purpose of that Rule.
As the Order states, the per curiam...
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