State v. Lollis

Citation541 S.E.2d 254,343 S.C. 580
Decision Date29 January 2001
Docket NumberNo. 25240.,25240.
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Harry Wesley LOLLIS, Petitioner.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Michael W. Barcroft, of Greenville, for petitioner.

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Bogan, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for respondent.

TOAL, Chief Justice:

On May 10, 2000, this Court granted Harry Wesley Lollis' ("Lollis") petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Lollis, Op. No. 99-UP-488 (S.C. Ct.App. filed September 29, 1999). We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 19, 1998, at 9:05 a.m.,the Liberty Fire Department responded to a fire at Lollis' mobile home. Later that day, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") Arson Hotline received an anonymous tip concerning the fire. David Tafaoa ("Agent Tafaoa"), a SLED arson investigator, investigated the tip and opined the fire was intentionally set.

Agent Tafaoa's investigation revealed there were two areas of fire origination, the kitchen stove and another unconnected fire in the hallway. At the kitchen stove origination site, some type of paper product was rolled and placed between the skillet and the electric coil of the stove, and the eye of the skillet was turned to "high." Agent Tafaoa was further convinced the fire was intentionally set because many personal items were missing from the mobile home. For example, there were nails and screws in the walls, but there was nothing hanging on them or located on the floor beneath them. Also, a gun rack and a soft gun case were found in the master bedroom, but neither contained a gun. Furthermore, there was nothing in the night stand drawers, there was only one pair of shoes in the closet, and there was no VCR, even though a VCR cable and a few tapes were found in the mobile home.

On the day of the fire, Lollis' common law wife, Tammy Burgess ("Burgess"), confessed in a statement to Agent Tafaoa that she was depressed about her husband's financial condition and intentionally started the fire by leaving a pan of grease on a hot eye of the stove. Burgess admitted Lollis was unaware of her plans to burn their home. She further confessed she took most of their valuables and placed them in a storage room they rented five days prior to the fire. According to Agent Tafaoa, Burgess burned the mobile home so the insurance company would pay the mortgage, their largest debt.

Lollis denies he had any involvement with the fire. He claims he never asked, encouraged, or aided Burgess in the burning of their home. According to Lollis, he had no reason to burn his home because it was being extensively remodeled when the fire occurred. Lollis claims he placed his personal items in the storage room on the day of the fire because he did not want his valuables ruined by drywall dust while he remodeled his home.

The State offered no evidence of Lollis' alleged financial trouble. On cross examination, the State's witness from the finance company testified Lollis was current on his mortgage payment at the time of the fire. Lollis also testified he was current on his accounts to Commercial Credit, Friendly Loans, State Farm Insurance, and Macy's Credit.

Lollis had an outstanding mortgage at the time of the fire. In October 1997, Lollis financed his home in order to pay for carpeting, delinquent taxes, and other matters. Because Lollis did not have homeowner's insurance, the finance company required that insurance be placed on the home in order to cover its mortgage. After the fire, the insurance company fully paid Lollis' mortgage. However, Lollis did not receive any money for his personalty destroyed in the fire because the items were not insured.

Agent Tafaoa was convinced Lollis conspired with his wife to commit arson because Lollis possessed the key to the storage room, which contained many of their valuable personal items, when he accompanied Burgess to the law enforcement center. Lollis was arrested a week after the fire and charged with second degree arson.

On July 23, 1998, Lollis was convicted of second degree arson and sentenced to six years incarceration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v. Lollis, Op. No. 99-UP-488 (S.C. Ct.App. filed September 29, 1999). The Court of Appeals denied Lollis' Petition for Rehearing on November 16, 1999. Lollis now seeks an order reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and vacating his sentence. The following issue is before this Court on certiorari:

I. Did the Court of Appeals err by affirming the trial court's denial of Lollis' directed verdict motion?

LAW/ANALYSIS

Lollis argues the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of his directed verdict motion because the State did not present substantial circumstantial evidence Lollis was guilty of second degree arson.1 We agree.

On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 515 S.E.2d 525 (1999); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998). A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged. State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21 (1916). If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury. State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C. 346, 529 S.E.2d 526 (2000); State v. Martin, 340 S.C. 597, 533 S.E.2d 572 (2000). Accordingly, a trial judge should grant a directed verdict motion when the evidence merely raises a suspicion the accused is guilty. State v. Martin, supra; see also State v. Muhammed,

338 S.C. 22, 524 S.E.2d 637 (Ct.App.1999). "Suspicion" implies a belief or opinion as to guilt based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to proof. State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963).

No direct evidence was adduced at trial linking Lollis to the fire. The State's case depended entirely on circumstantial evidence. When a motion for a directed verdict is made in a criminal case where the State relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence, "[t]he trial judge is required to submit the case to the jury if there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced." State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 535 S.E.2d 126 (2000); see also State v. Stokes, 299 S.C. 483, 484, 386 S.E.2d 241 (1989)

; State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888 (1989); State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955). The trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of the evidence, not with its weight. Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 406,

535 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Edwards, supra).

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the State is not substantial and merely raises a suspicion of guilt. The key pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the State are: (1) the marital relationship between Burgess and Lollis; (2) Lollis' alleged financial trouble; (3) his placement of valuables in the storage room; and (4) his possession of the storage key on the day of the fire. According to the trial judge, Lollis' possession of the storage key is the most significant piece of circumstantial evidence:

I think that there's some substantial
...

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