State v. Long

Decision Date25 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. 142, Sept. Term, 2007.,142, Sept. Term, 2007.
Citation954 A.2d 1083,405 Md. 527
PartiesSTATE of Maryland v. Colonel Preston LONG.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen., (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Arthur M. Reynolds, Jr., on brief, Riverdale, MD, for appellee.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, specially assigned), IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

HARRELL, J.

I.

On the afternoon of 28 December 2006, Colonel Preston Long, Appellee, was a passenger in an automobile driven by his fiancé, Iretha Spriggs. In addition to Long and Spriggs, the vehicle was occupied by their son and daughter. Long and Spriggs were returning to their residence after shopping. A Prince George's County police officer, Officer McEntyre, spied the vehicle making an illegal U-turn and pursued the car with the intention of conducting a traffic stop.1 Before he could effect this intention, Spriggs and Long arrived at the home, located in Landover, Maryland. After parking the car in front of their home, Long, Spriggs, and their children exited the car and entered the house, all before the police arrived.

Shortly thereafter, Officers McEntyre and Nichols (another Prince George's County police officer who joined the pursuit) parked in front of the home and approached the now unoccupied vehicle. Officers Nichols and McEntyre later testified that they smelled marijuana emanating from the interior of the car through its open windows. Officer McEntyre searched the unlocked vehicle. During the search of the vehicle, a vial of Phencyclidine (PCP) was discovered underneath or near one of the car's rear seats, where the children had been sitting.

As the police were searching the car, Long came out of the house and, according to Officer Nichols, was "upset" and "angry." Long was arrested by the police in the yard of the residence. Soon thereafter, Spriggs also was arrested after she came to the door of the house. The police, from the vantage point of the porch of the residence and through an open front door, observed, in an aquarium inside of the house, two alligators and a turtle. The reptiles appeared to the police to be malnourished and neglected. A search warrant for the residence was obtained and executed.2 Two hand guns, a sawed-off shot gun, ammunition for the weapons, a flack jacket, and drug paraphernalia were seized.

On 5 April 2007, Long was tried in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George's County, based on a statement of charges (Case No. E00324177) enumerating two counts of possession of PCP with the intent to distribute,3 one count of possession of drugs (not marijuana),4 one count of disorderly conduct,5 and three neglect and cruelty to animals charges.6 The State dismissed the abuse and cruelty to animals charges at the beginning of the trial. Subsequently, Long was acquitted of the remaining charges.7

In a second case brought in the District Court (Case No. E00324184), the State, by a statement of charges, charged Long with crimes related to the items seized in the execution of the search warrant of the residence. Those charges ultimately were nol prossed by the State.

On 12 April 2007, after the nolle prosequi was entered in the second District Court case, the State obtained an indictment in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County charging Long with three counts of possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime,8 possession of a short-barreled shotgun,9 possession of bulletproof body armor having previously been convicted of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,10 and possession of drug paraphernalia.11 Long responded with a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the residence, and a motion to dismiss the indictment, as violative of the prohibition against "double jeopardy."12

The Circuit Court granted Long's motion to dismiss the indictment and indicated that it was unnecessary, therefore, for the court to address the suppression motion. The hearing judge concluded that the State violated double jeopardy principles because the State's Attorney could have consolidated all of the charges arising from the events of 28 December 2006 in the first District Court case, but failed to do so. He stated that he believed that the State could not separate the charges, remarking that the State gets "one trial" in which to bring all of the charges against Long. He further explained that all of the facts and circumstances stemmed from the "same continuum of . . . event[s]" and that the police never left the scene; therefore, dismissal of the indictment was appropriate.

The State filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We, on our initiative, issued a writ of certiorari before the intermediate appellate court could hear and decide the appeal. 404 Md. 151, 945 A.2d 1270 (2008). We shall consider whether the Circuit Court correctly dismissed the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings.

II.

According to § 12-302(c)(1) of Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceeding Article, in a criminal case, the State "may appeal from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition." State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 24, 575 A.2d 1227, 1230 (1990). This Court decides purely legal questions. Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000).

III.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 716 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against making a defendant twice accountable for the same offense is a provision applicable to the States. Double Jeopardy, under both the Fifth Amendment and at common law, bars multiple punishments and trials for the same offense. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1021, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, 241 (1975); see also Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 388, 354 A.2d 825, 828 (1976). Despite the fact that the Maryland Constitution lacks an explicit double jeopardy clause, Maryland common law provides well-established protections for individuals against being twice put in jeopardy. Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 610, 851 A.2d 551, 555 (2004).

The State contends that the hearing judge misapplied the law in determining whether there was a constitutional violation of Long's right not to be put in jeopardy twice. The State argues that application of the well-established "same evidence" test does not result in the preclusion of prosecution of the charges in the indictment in the Circuit Court.

Long contends that, because all of the alleged offenses in the District Court action where he was acquitted and the charges in the Circuit Court indictment occurred effectively at the same time, on the same date, at the same place, and were committed by the same person, the events constituted a "single event." Thus, he should not be required to defend "piecemeal," in successive prosecutions, the charges arising from the single event. We reject Long's argument and agree with the State. Long and the hearing judge appear to have applied the "same transaction" test with regard to the analysis of the double jeopardy challenge. This is an incorrect application.

"Maryland has never recognized a common law right to have joined at one trial all offenses arising from the same transaction." Cousins, 277 Md. at 395, 354 A.2d at 832. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have adopted the "same evidence" test for resolving sameness of law questions and have declined to accept the same transaction test. Cousins, 277 Md. at 393, 394, 354 A.2d at 831, 832. The same evidence test "focuses upon the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are included in the other offense, so that only the latter offense contains a distinct element or distinct elements, the former merges into the latter." State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 517, 515 A.2d 465, 473 (1986). Described differently, the same evidence test is when "each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, [then] neither multiple prosecutions nor multiple punishments are barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy even though each offense may arise from the same act or criminal episode." Cousins, 277 Md. at 388-89, 354 A.2d at 829. The same evidence test "focuses on the relationship between the offenses, rather than on whether the multiple offenses arise from the same conduct or incident. . . ." Anderson v. State, 385 Md. 123, 132, 867 A.2d 1040, 1045 (2005).

In re Michael W, 367 Md. 181, 182-84, 786 A.2d 684, 685-86 (2001), a case relied on by Long, involved a juvenile who previously was convicted in the District Court of violating a license restriction that prohibited a licensee from driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .02 or more. Based on the same incident that gave rise to the District Court case, Michael W. was subjected later to a juvenile delinquency proceeding in the Circuit Court for Howard County for an alleged violation of § 21-902 of the Md. Code, Transportation Article (among other charges), which provided that an individual may not drive "under the influence" of alcohol or "while intoxicated." In re Michael W., 367 Md. at 184, 183, 786 A.2d at 686. This Court held that the defendant could be prosecuted separately for the two charges flowing from the same incident because the later Circuit Court charge had a distinct element that was not present in the previous District Court charge. In re Michael W., 367 Md. at 187, 786...

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