State v. Long
| Decision Date | 05 January 1922 |
| Docket Number | No. 340.,340. |
| Citation | 115 A. 734 |
| Parties | STATE v. LONG. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Washington County Court; Fred M. Butler, Judge.
George Long was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Argued before WATSON, C. J., and POWERS, TAYLOR, MILES, and SLACK, JJ.
Frank C. Archibald, Atty. Gen., and Fred B. Thomas, State's Atty., of Montpelier, for the State.
J. Ward Carver and Alland G. Fay, both of Barre, for respondent.
On the night of May 3, 1919, Lucinda Broadwell, of Barre, was murdered by strangulation, and her unclad body was found the next morning in a garden just off from Main street in that city. The respondent was indicted and tried for the crime, and was convicted of murder of the second degree. He seasonably filed exceptions, and brings his case here for review.
James R. Wood, a detective employed by the state, was a witness for the prosecution, and gave evidence tending to connect the respondent with the crime. It appeared from his testimony that he and several of his assistants had been at work on the case for a considerable time before the respondent's arrest, and he gave some of the details of this work. In cross-examination he was asked if he received pay from the state, and replied in the affirmative. He was then asked how much he was paid, and, objection being made, the question was excluded, and the respondent excepted.
It is always permissible to show the interest, bias, or prejudice of one who testifies in court. But the cause or particulars thereof are not proper subjects of inquiry (State v. Glynn, 51 Vt. 577; Bertoli v. Smith, 69 Vt. 425, 38 Atl. 76) except so far as the trial court, in its discretion, may allow (State v. Baird, 79 Vt. 257, 65 Atl. 101; Dionne v. American Express CO., 91 Vt. 521, 101 Atl. 209). It was held in Taylor v. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. E. 303, that, a witness having testified that he was an employee of the murdered man, the terms of his employment were irrelevant and inadmissible. In Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299, the respondent in a murder case was allowed to show that the son and widow of the deceased had employed counsel to assist the prosecuting attorney; but it was held that the question whether this contract was on a contingent fee or not was properly excluded.
In Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662, 16 Sup. Ct. 1192, 41 L. Ed. 300, the court permitted counsel for the defendants below, in cross-examination of material witnesses for the prosecution, to ask if they had employed counsel to assist the district attorney, and they admitted that they had, but the court refused to allow them to inquire how much they paid such counsel, and this ruling was sustained. State v. Carroll, 85 Iowa, 1, 51 N. W. 1159, supports the respondent's contention. There were in that case, however, special circumstances casting suspicion on the character and reliability of the detective, and we do not regard the case as a safe precedent to follow. It was said in White v. State, 121 Ga. 191, 48 S. E. 941, that, when parties charged with crime are confronted with paid detectives as witnesses for the prosecution, they should be allowed the greatest liberality of cross-examination that the law permits. If this statement was intended to mean anything more than that the discretion of the trial court should be liberally exercised in such cases, we cannot approve it. The law does not classify witnesses according to their occupations, nor put detectives or other employees in a class by themselves. They are to be treated in court just as other witnesses are, and the rules applicable to their examination and cross-examination are the same as those applying to persons in other occupations. That the case cited was not intended to mean any more than is above indicated is shown by the result. There, the witness had testified that he was a detective, and was to receive compensation for his services, and that his pay did not depend upon a conviction in the case. It was held that it was not error to refuse to allow the witness to be examined as to the amount of his salary. There was no showing in the case in hand, nor offer to show, that Wood's pay depended upon a conviction, and the exclusion in question was within the trial court's discretion. The exception thereto is not sustained. There being no error to the exclusion, we have no occasion to consider the effect of the subsequent withdrawal of the objection and the full cross-examination of the witness on the subject involved.
When the body of the murdered woman was found a white shirt waist was wound tightly around the neck and firmly tied in front in a square knot, which pressed into the neck just above the "Adam's apple." Over this was a very tightly drawn man's handkerchief, tied in the back in a square knot. The hands were securely bound behind the back with a piece of cloth torn from the shirt waist, tied in a square knot. These knots were untied by Dr. Stone when he made the autopsy, and so could not be produced in court. But the doctor, when on the witness stand, tied a square knot in a piece of cord, explaining that it differed from a similar knot known as a "granny knot" in that the latter would slip, while a square one would not. And he testified that the square knot he exhibited was such a knot as he found on the body. On the Sunday following that on which the dead body was found, the respondent was in Wood's room at Hotel Barre, and Wood's testimony tended to show that he asked the respondent if he could tie a square knot, and he replied that a square knot was about the only knot he could tie; that at Wood's request the respondent then tied knots in three handkerchiefs furnished him for that purpose, describing them as be tied them; that the respondent called one a "square knot," another, "just a knot," and the third as a "slip knot." Thereupon these knots, being identified, were admitted in evidence, subject to the respondent's exception. The only objection made below, and the only argument here advanced in support of this exception, is that, the knots found upon the body not having been preserved, there was nothing with which the knots tied by the respondent could be compared. But this is not so, for Dr. Stone not only described the knots found as square knots, but he tied such a knot in the presence of the jury. It does not appear that Dr. Stone's knot was admitted as an exhibit, but the jury saw it, and had at least a mental standard with which to compare the respondent's knots. The only significance there was in this evidence lies in the fact that a knot tied by the respondent was the same kind of a knot as was found on the body. No peculiarity in the making of square knots was claimed or sought to be shown. The jury could easily tell whether the respondent's knot was like Dr. Stone's, and, if so, it was like those on the body. In principle, the question is like one involved in Town of Barnet v. Town of Norton, 90 Vt. 544, 99 Atl. 238, where we held that, if there was evidence tending to show that a paper offered was like the paper in question, it was admissible. The exception is without merit.
On the occasion just referred to, at Wood's request, officers hunted up the respondent and brought him to the hotel. He was not arrested, but was kept there under constant observation of the officers for three days and nights. Wood then told the respondent that he was convinced of his guilt and had decided to recommend his arrest for the crime. The evidence tended to show that the respondent was told by Wood and the officers that anything he said might be used against him and that no threats were made or inducements held out to him to get him to make any admissions. He finally made a statement which was taken by a stenographer, a transcript of which was offered in evidence in connection with the testimony of the stenographer. This was objected to, on the ground that the respondent was practically under arrest at the time, and therefore the statement was not voluntary.
The objection was overruled, the statement was admitted, and the respondent excepted.
The general proposition that admissions and statements which, in connection with other evidence, warrant an inference of guilt are admissible in evidence, though they do not amount to a confession, is not, and cannot be, disputed. But it is argued that it must first be shown that they were voluntary. As the case is presented, we are not called upon to consider the plain distinction in the law of criminal evidence between admissions and confessions. Nor need we inquire whether or not the respondent has invoked rules which apply to the latter, but not to the former. We may assume, as counsel have, that to make this statement admissible it was necessary for the state to show that it was voluntarily made. This was a preliminary question addressed to the trial court, and, unless it can be said as a matter of law that its decision thereon was wrong, it must stand. State v. Walker, 34 Vt. 296; State v. Carr, 53 Vt. 37; State v. Day, 55 Vt. 510; State v. Gorham, 67 Vt 365, 31 Atl. 845. The mere fact that the person making the admission is under arrest charged with the crime does not make it inadmissible. Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500; Franklin v. State, 28 Ala. 9; People v. Abbott, 66 Cal. xviii, 4 Pac. 769; Com. v. Pierce, 140 Mass. 276, 5 N. E. 494. And so are our own cases. In State v. Gorham, supra, the confession admitted was made while the respondent was not only under arrest, but in chains. While in State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483, it was in effect held that a confession procured from a respondent then in solitary confinement, and chained to the floor, under a promise by his jailer that if he confessed he would be unchained and allowed to associate with the other prisoners, was not to be excluded on account of the circumstances stated.
One Eddie Barron was an important witness for the state. As...
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