State v. Long
| Decision Date | 27 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16899). |
| Citation | 847 A.2d 862,268 Conn. 508 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CALVIN LONG. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, Vicki Melchiorre, senior assistant state's attorney, and Proloy K. Das, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Monte P. Radler, public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Richard J. Lynch and Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorneys general, filed briefs for the psychiatric security review board et al. as amici curiae.
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of Connecticut's statutory procedures governing the recommitment of insanity acquittees (acquittees), as set forth in General Statutes § 17a-593 (c),1 which permits a court to extend the commitment of an acquittee past his initial term of commitment if his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others. The state appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court after it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the state's petition for an order of continued commitment of the defendant, Calvin Long. We conclude that the trial court improperly determined that § 17a-593 (c) violated the defendant's due process rights under the state constitution and his equal protection rights under the state and federal constitutions, and, therefore, improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In March, 1986, the defendant was charged by information with assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-60,2 a class D felony, after striking a person in the head several times with a hammer. After a trial to the court, the defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13 (a).3 Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (a),4 the trial court then committed the defendant to the jurisdiction of the commissioner of mental health and addiction services (commissioner) for initial confinement and examination.5 After the defendant submitted to a mandatory psychiatric examination, and the commissioner issued a report concerning the defendant's mental health, the court held a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (d)6 and (e)7 to "make a finding as to the mental condition of the [defendant]. . . ." Thereafter, the trial court found that the defendant "is a person who should be confined" and ordered the defendant committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board) for five years, the maximum period to which the defendant could have been sentenced had he been convicted of the underlying offense.8
Prior to the expiration of the defendant's five year commitment, the state's attorney, in accordance with § 17a-593 (c), petitioned the Superior Court to extend the defendant's commitment beyond the five year maximum term on the ground that the defendant remained mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others. After a hearing, the trial court granted the state's petition and recommitted the defendant for an additional three years. After this initial recommitment, the state successfully petitioned the Superior Court for recommitment of the defendant on three additional occasions. As a result, at the time of filing this appeal, the defendant had been in the custody of the board for more than sixteen years.
In March, 2001, the state filed its most recent petition to recommit the defendant. In response, the board filed a report with the court recommending continued commitment.9 The defendant then moved to strike the board's report and to dismiss the state's petition for recommitment, claiming, among other things, that "[o]nce an acquittee reaches his/her maximum term of recommitment, the reasoning of Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 (1977), State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400 (1994), and related cases, by extension, renders a state's petition for recommitment pursuant to . . . [§] 17a-593 (c) unconstitutional in both procedure and effect." Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motions and granted the state's petition, thereby extending the commitment of the defendant pending the filing of a memorandum of decision.
Thereafter, the trial court, sua sponte, reconsidered its earlier rulings, vacated its order of commitment, and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the state's petition for recommitment based on its conclusion that § 17a-593 (c) is unconstitutional. Specifically, the court concluded that § 17a-593 (c) violated the defendant's due process rights under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution10 because the statute failed to provide an acquittee with mandatory periodic judicial review of confinement as required by Fasulo v. Arafeh, supra, 173 Conn. 479. The court also determined that § 17a-593 (c) violated the defendant's equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution11 because it treats acquittees, like the defendant, differently from convicted prisoners who subsequently are civilly committed to a mental hospital at some point after they have been incarcerated (civilly committed inmates). The trial court interpreted this court's decision in State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400, to preclude differential treatment between the two classes, and it therefore found § 17a-593 (c) to be unconstitutional. See id.
Lastly, the trial court concluded that § 17a-593 (c) violated the defendant's equal protection rights under article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments.12 Specifically, the trial court determined that, under article first, § 20, a statute that discriminates on the basis of mental disability, such as § 17a-593 (c), is subject to strict scrutiny review, and because § 17a-593 (c) fails under rational basis review under the federal constitution, it necessarily fails under the more stringent strict scrutiny standard.
Although the trial court declared § 17a-593 (c) unconstitutional, it nevertheless expressly found that the state had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant "has a mental illness and would be a danger to others were he discharged from confinement."13 The trial court found that "the [defendant] suffers from a form of mental illness diagnosed as schizoaffective disorder, is currently unstable (even with medication), has intermittent paranoia, significant mood swings, is easily provoked, frequently threatening, and threatens serious violence." The court dismissed the state's petition for recommitment, but ordered that the defendant "be held for a period of sixty days from the date of the filing of [its] memorandum to allow the state, if it so elects, to pursue a petition for civil commitment before the Probate Court." The trial court then rendered judgment dismissing the state's petition for recommitment.14
Rather than pursue a civil commitment in the Probate Court, the state appealed from the trial court's judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court. We thereafter granted the state's motion to transfer the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
In this appeal, the state challenges all three grounds on which the trial court found § 17a-593 (c) unconstitutional. The state first claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because § 17a-593 (c), as applied to the defendant, provided him with periodic judicial review sufficient to satisfy his state procedural due process rights. The state also claims that the defendant lacked standing to bring either a state or federal equal protection claim because he was not aggrieved by the alleged differences in recommitment procedures between acquittees and civilly committed inmates. The state further argues that, if this court were to conclude that the defendant had standing to bring his equal protection challenges, § 17a-593 (c) does not violate the defendant's federal equal protection rights because there is a rational basis for the disparate treatment in periodic review accorded acquittees and civilly committed inmates. Similarly, the state argues that § 17a-593 (c) does not violate the defendant's state equal protection rights because the statute discriminates among psychiatrically disabled individuals on the basis of their proven criminal acts, not their mental disability, thereby requiring rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny examination.
We conclude that § 17a-593 (c), as applied to the defendant, provided him with periodic judicial review sufficient to satisfy his state procedural due process rights. We also conclude that the defendant had standing to bring both equal protection challenges, and that his federal equal protection rights were not violated because a rational basis exists for the disparate treatment15 accorded an acquittee and a civilly committed inmate. Finally, we conclude that, because § 17a-593 (c) discriminates among, rather than between, the protected class of psychiatrically disabled individuals, our prior decisions require us to review the statute under a rational basis standard, rather than apply strict scrutiny review. Thus, because we conclude that a rational basis exists for the disparate treatment under the federal equal protection clause, the defendant's state equal protection guarantees also are necessarily satisfied.
The state's first claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly concluded that § 17a-593 (c) violated the...
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