State v. Lopez, Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Writing for the CourtANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
Citation389 Wis.2d 156,2019 WI 101,936 N.W.2d 125
Decision Date27 November 2019
Docket NumberNos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR
Parties STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Autumn Marie Love LOPEZ, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Amy J. Rodriguez, Defendant-Respondent.

389 Wis.2d 156
936 N.W.2d 125
2019 WI 101

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Autumn Marie Love LOPEZ, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.


State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Amy J. Rodriguez, Defendant-Respondent.

Nos. 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: September 9, 2019
Opinion Filed: November 27, 2019


For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kelsey Loshaw and Susan E. Alesia, assistant state public defenders. There was an oral argument by Kelsey Loshaw.

For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.

389 Wis.2d 159

¶1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals in two consolidated cases, State v. Lopez and State v. Rodriguez, 2019 WI App 2, 385 Wis. 2d 482, 922 N.W.2d 855, reversing the Green County circuit court's order.1 The circuit court order dismissed without prejudice the criminal complaints against Autumn Marie Love Lopez ("Lopez") and Amy J. Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), which charged them with a single count of retail theft of items valued at more than $500 and less than $5,000, as parties to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.50(1m)(c) and (4)(bf), and 939.05 (2015-16).2 The circuit court concluded that the State may not charge multiple acts of misdemeanor retail theft as a single felony. The court of appeals reversed and concluded that the State may charge multiple acts of retail theft as one continuous offense pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3)(a). We affirm the court of appeals.

¶2 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3), "[i]n any case of theft involving more than one theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime" provided certain criteria are satisfied. This court must decide whether the statutory term "theft" includes the statutory charge of retail theft. Lopez argues that it does not. She argues that "theft" includes only the five modes of

936 N.W.2d 127

theft described in Wis. Stat. § 943.20, not retail theft. The State argues that "theft" means any type of theft, including retail theft.

¶3 We conclude that "theft" under Wis. Stat. § 971.36 includes retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50. We therefore conclude that the State has authority to

389 Wis.2d 160

charge multiple retail thefts under § 943.50 as one continuous offense pursuant to § 971.36(3). Thus, we affirm the court of appeals.3

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

¶4 On February 16, 2017, the State filed criminal complaints against Lopez and Rodriguez. The complaints allege that the two women committed a series of retail thefts from Wal-Mart in Monroe, Wisconsin. Specifically, the complaints allege that between January 10 and January 25, 2017, Lopez and Rodriguez together committed seven retail thefts. Lopez was an employee at Wal-Mart. The State alleges that Lopez pretended to assist Rodriguez at a self-check-out register. Lopez allegedly pretended to scan merchandise for Rodriguez, but in reality she either did not scan it or voided the scan. Rodriguez would then exit Wal-Mart with her stolen merchandise. The seven retail thefts ranged in individual value from $126.33 to $313.95. The total value of all the stolen merchandise was $1,452.12.

¶5 The State could have charged Lopez and Rodriguez each with seven separate class A misdemeanor retail thefts, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m)(c) and (4)(a).4 Instead, pursuant to

389 Wis.2d 161

Wis. Stat. §§ 971.36(3)(a)5 and 943.50(4)(bf),6 the State charged Lopez and Rodriguez with, as parties to the crime, a single class I felony count of retail theft of items valued at more than $500 and less then $5,000. Lopez and Rodriguez each separately moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the State could only charge them with seven misdemeanors.

¶6 The circuit court held a hearing on both motions to dismiss. The circuit court granted both motions to dismiss without prejudice. It concluded that "theft" did not include retail theft, and the State could not

936 N.W.2d 128

aggregate retail thefts under Wis. Stat. § 971.36(3). The State appealed.

¶7 The court of appeals reversed. Lopez, 385 Wis. 2d 482, ¶15, 922 N.W.2d 855. It concluded that "the State has authority under § 971.36(3)(a) to charge the multiple

389 Wis.2d 162

alleged acts of retail theft as one continuous offense." Id., ¶5. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the statute "refers generally to ‘theft,’ " is not limited to theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.20, and applies to retail theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.50. Id., ¶12.

¶8 Lopez7 filed a petition for review in this court. We granted the petition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 This case requires this court to interpret Wis. Stat. § 971.36 to determine whether the statutory term "theft" includes the charge of retail theft. "The interpretation and application of a statute present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court." State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citing State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238 ). Thus, we review de novo whether "theft" includes retail theft.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Interpretation

¶10 We begin our analysis with the language of the relevant statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.36.

389 Wis.2d 163

State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give the statute "its full, proper, and intended effect." Id., ¶44. If the statutory language is plain, we end the inquiry and give the language its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except [we give] technical or specially-defined words or phrases ... their technical or special definitional meaning." Id., ¶45.

¶11 This court also analyzes the context and structure of a statute to determine its meaning. Statutory language "is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes ...." Id., ¶46. "A statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutes—that is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole." Id., ¶49.

¶12 If analyzing a statute's language in context "yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity" and we end the inquiry. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656 ) (internal quotations omitted). We conclude that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.36 is unambiguous. We base that conclusion on the language of the statute and confirm that conclusion using traditional tools of statutory construction.

1. Wisconsin Statute § 971.36

¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.36, which is found in the criminal procedure chapter of the statutes, is

389 Wis.2d 164

entitled "Theft; pleading

936 N.W.2d 129

and evidence; subsequent prosecutions." It provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) In any criminal pleading for theft, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant did steal the property (describing it) of the owner (naming the owner) of the value of (stating the value in money).

...

(3) In any case of theft involving more than one theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime if:

(a) The property belonged to the same owner and the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent and design or in execution of a single deceptive scheme; ....

¶14 Subsection (1) addresses how to properly draft a criminal pleading for theft. Subsection (3) addresses the State's authority to charge multiple thefts as a single crime. Put simply, the State may charge multiple thefts as one theft if they are all from the same owner and committed together with the same intent and design, or in the same scheme. Section 971.36 does not define "theft," but the word "theft" appears elsewhere in the Wisconsin Statutes.

2. Theft-related statutes

¶15 The word "theft" appears in ten criminal statute titles in Chapter 943 "Crimes Against Property." The chapter sets forth multiple criminal theft offenses. First is the general theft statute. Then the chapter sets forth other fact-specific theft offenses, one being retail theft. See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.20 ("Theft"); 943.205 ("Theft of trade secrets"); 943.45 ("Theft of telecommunications service"); 943.455 ("Theft of commercial mobile service"); 943.46 ("Theft of video service");

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7 practice notes
  • Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Company, No. 2017AP2361
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 9 Enero 2020
    ...called "legislative intent."6 "An interpretation based on what the legislature intended a statute to mean is improper." State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 Wis.2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). Aside from the impossibility of assigning a collective "intent" ......
  • Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm, No. 2018AP1681
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 19 Marzo 2020
    ...[we give] technical or specially-defined words or phrases ... their technical or special definitional meaning.’ Id., ¶45." State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶10, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125. "This court also analyzes the context and structure of a [regulation] to determine its meaning. [Regu......
  • Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan, No. 2018AP2162
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 14 Febrero 2020
    ...N.W.2d 110 ("It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."); see also 938 N.W.2d 518 State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) ("An interpretation based on what the legislature intended a sta......
  • State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, Appeal Nos. 2019AP2397
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • 28 Febrero 2020
    ...see State v. Dorsey , 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, and possibly even if there is no ambiguity, see State v. Lopez , 2019 WI 101, ¶¶27-28, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Ziegler, J., lead). Although we perceive no ambiguity in these statutes, we note that Plaintiffs’ a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7 cases
  • Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Company, No. 2017AP2361
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 9 Enero 2020
    ...called "legislative intent."6 "An interpretation based on what the legislature intended a statute to mean is improper." State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 Wis.2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). Aside from the impossibility of assigning a collective "intent" ......
  • Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm, No. 2018AP1681
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 19 Marzo 2020
    ...[we give] technical or specially-defined words or phrases ... their technical or special definitional meaning.’ Id., ¶45." State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶10, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125. "This court also analyzes the context and structure of a [regulation] to determine its meaning. [Regu......
  • Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan, No. 2018AP2162
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 14 Febrero 2020
    ...N.W.2d 110 ("It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public."); see also 938 N.W.2d 518 State v. Lopez, 2019 WI 101, ¶39, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) ("An interpretation based on what the legislature intended a sta......
  • State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, Appeal Nos. 2019AP2397
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • 28 Febrero 2020
    ...see State v. Dorsey , 2018 WI 10, ¶30, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, and possibly even if there is no ambiguity, see State v. Lopez , 2019 WI 101, ¶¶27-28, 389 Wis. 2d 156, 936 N.W.2d 125 (Ziegler, J., lead). Although we perceive no ambiguity in these statutes, we note that Plaintiffs’ a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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