State v. Lopez

• Decision Date: 26 April 2023
• Docket Number: 22-722
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JASON LEE LOPEZ
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

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STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JASON LEE LOPEZ

No. 22-722

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit

April 26, 2023

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 3155-21 HONORABLE KENDRICK J. GUIDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

Stephen C. Dwight District Attorney COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE State of Louisiana

David S. Pipes Assistant District Attorney COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE State of Louisiana

Douglas Lee Harville Louisiana Appellate Project COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Jason Lee Lopez

Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Candyce G. Perret, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY, JUDGE

Defendant Jason Lee Lopez, was convicted of manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31, and racketeering, in violation of La.R.S. 15:1353. He was sentenced to forty years at hard labor for the manslaughter conviction and twenty years at hard labor for the racketeering conviction, to run consecutively and without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentences. He now appeals his convictions, alleging that the trial court erred in several respects, specifically, in that the State failed to prove Defendant would have committed or would have planned to commit any future crimes in Louisiana, thereby not proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of racketeering; that Defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the State asked substantive questions of Boyd Hagood, who invoked his Fifth Amendment rights; and that the trial court's ordering of Defendant to serve the maximum sentence for manslaughter consecutively to a twenty-year racketeering sentence was excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 2, 2017, the body of Dustin Hammons was found. On January 28, 2021, Defendant, Jason Lee Lopez, was charged with second degree murder of Dustin Hammons, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and racketeering, in violation of La.R.S 15:1353.

On February 10, 2022, Defendant proceeded to trial. Through the evidence and testimony, the following facts were adduced. At the time of Hammons' death, Defendant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas ("ABT"). The ABT assigned Defendant (also known as "Kasper") to assist Boyd Hagood (also known as "Lurch") in his methamphetamine operation in and around Houston, Texas. Defendant provided services as an enforcer and debt collector, among other things. The deceased, Hammons, was employed by Hagood as part of the drug distribution network. Hammons was suspected of stealing from Hagood's car.

Ashlyn Brown testified at trial. Brown knew Hagood because she lived with him and Hammons. Brown also knew Defendant, as he would show up to Hagood's house and run errands with him. Brown believed the men went out to pick up money from people, and she admitted to seeing the men together with drugs.

On August 1, 2017, Brown, Defendant, Hagood, and Hammons traveled from Texas to Louisiana to allegedly collect money. Brown testified that tensions escalated on the drive to Louisiana, with Defendant hitting Hammons and taking Hammons' phone from him. At one point, Hammons tried to run away on foot during a stop. He was subdued and put back in the car. Brown stated that after returning to the car, Hammons begged for his life and asked not to be killed. Brown also testified that she saw Defendant make Hammons hold his hand and said, "You're my bitch."

Brown testified that the vehicle stopped in a wooded area, and Hagood and Defendant walked Hammons in the woods. Hammons was forced to remove his shirt and consume drugs before Hagood and Defendant shot him multiple times. Brown heard Hammons screaming out "I'm still alive," followed by a second series of gunshots. Hagood and Defendant returned to the vehicle without Hammons. The deceased body of Hammons was discovered the next day on August 2, 2017, with the autopsy revealing ten gunshot wounds, bruises and scrapes.

Brown testified that she initially did not tell the truth to the police, as she was scared for her life. She stated she sent a letter to Defendant telling him not to worry because she was afraid he might hurt her family.

As to Hammons' phone, which Brown testified had been taken by Defendant, Detective Travis Lavergne testified that Hammons' phone had traveled from Houston into Calcasieu Parish then back to Texas. Lavergne confirmed that the phone ping locations were consistent with a route taken from Houston to the location where the victim's body was found.

In Defendant's statement to the police, Defendant said that as far as he knew, Hagood killed Hammons. Defendant said he never had a weapon nor did he have any problems with Hammons.

After trial, a jury found Defendant, Jason Lee Lopez, guilty of manslaughter and racketeering, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to forty years imprisonment at hard labor for a manslaughter conviction and twenty years of imprisonment at hard labor for the racketeering conviction. The court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider the sentence. Defendant now appeals, raising three assignments of error.

ANALYSIS

ERRORS PATENT:

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all criminal appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

In Defendant's first assignment of error, he argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of racketeering. In so doing, he raises issues as to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding racketeering. In State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992), the supreme court held:

When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion by the court of the trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot.

On the other hand, when the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines there has been trial error (which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, then the accused must receive a new trial, but is not entitled to an acquittal even though the admissible evidence, considered alone, was insufficient. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988).

This Court in State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p.5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371 reiterated this standard and further explained:

It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, the record must show that the State proved all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The Louisiana Racketeering Act is encompassed in La.R.S. 15:1351-1356. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1353 details the prohibited activities. Under La.R.S. 15:1353(C), "[i]t is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise knowingly to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Under La.R.S. 15:1352(B), an "enterprise" means "any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity, or any unchartered association, or group of individuals associated in fact and includes unlawful as well as lawful enterprises and governmental as well as other entities."

As indicated in State v. Davenport, 16-223 (La.App 4 Cir. 10/18/17), 316 So.3d 888, writ denied, 17-1950 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 792, and writ denied, 171947 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So.3d 797, Louisiana appellate courts have looked to federal jurisprudence interpreting the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) since Louisiana racketeering laws were modeled after RICO. Referencing the United States Supreme Court, the fourth circuit explained that an association-in-fact enterprise must have a structure with at least three features: a purpose, relationships among the associates, and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose.

Under La.R.S. 15:1352(A), "racketeering activity" means "committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit or soliciting,...