State v. Lopez

Decision Date31 October 2017
Docket NumberAC 37912
Citation173 A.3d 485,177 Conn.App. 651
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. Juan C. LOPEZ

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Ani A. Desilets, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Mark R. Durso, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Prescott and Harper, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The defendant, Juan C. Lopez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes § 14–227a(a)(1) and operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of General Statutes § 14–215. On appeal, the defendant claims, among other things, that the trial court improperly (1) restricted his cross-examination of the state's expert witness and (2) admitted an "incomplete and altered" dashboard camera video taken from the arresting officer's patrol car. With respect to the first claim, we agree with the defendant that the court improperly restricted his cross-examination of the expert witness and that impropriety was harmful.1 We thus reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In the early morning of March 3, 2013, state police Trooper Colin Richter was driving northbound on Interstate 95 in Fairfield at a rate of speed of seventy-five miles per hour, patrolling a portion of the highway for motor vehicle violations. At approximately 1:50 a.m., he observed the defendant's vehicle in his rearview mirror "coming up on [him] very quick." The defendant's vehicle passed Richter and "began to swerve from the left lane to the center lane." At that point, having estimated that the defendant was driving above the speed limit, Richter activated his vehicle's red lights and conducted a motor vehicle stop. The defendant pulled over onto the right shoulder of the highway.

Richter approached the defendant's vehicle and, upon speaking with him, noticed that the defendant was slurring his speech and had glassy, bloodshot eyes. Richter also detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath. When asked for his license and registration, the defendant could not produce a license. At that point, Richter asked the defendant where he had come from and whether he had been drinking beforehand. The defendant replied that he was coming from Stamford and had not been drinking.

After his initial contact with the defendant, Richter went back to his cruiser and looked up the defendant by his name and date of birth. Upon running the defendant's information in the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) database, Richter learned that the defendant's license had been suspended. Richter then called into dispatch, stating that he would be performing tests on the defendant to determine whether the defendant was intoxicated. He then administered the following three field sobriety tests:2 (1) the horizontal gaze nystagmus test

,3 (2) the walk and turn test,4 and (3) the one leg stand test.5

The defendant failed all three tests. On the basis of these results, Richter determined that the defendant could not safely operate a motor vehicle and placed him under arrest. Richter then transported the defendant to the police barracks, where he read the defendant his constitutional rights and asked if the defendant was injured or suffered from any medical conditions, to which the defendant replied in the negative.6 Richter also asked the defendant, for a second time, whether he had anything to drink the night of March 2, 2013, into the early morning of March 3, 2013. The defendant responded that he had two mojitos between 7:30 and 9:30 p.m. at a restaurant in New York City, and then had stopped at his grandmother's residence in Stamford on his way home to Bridgeport. After this admission, Richter asked the defendant to submit to a Breathalyzer test to measure his blood alcohol content, but he refused.

On November 17, 2014, a jury trial commenced against the defendant. The state called three witnesses to testify on its behalf: Richter; Dr. Robert H. Powers, a forensic toxicologist; and department analyst Brian Clarke. After the state rested, the defendant did not present any additional evidence. Subsequently, the defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 14–227a(a)(1) and operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended in violation of § 14–215. Thereafter, he pleaded guilty to a part B information charging him as a third time offender pursuant to § 14–227a(g)(3).7

The court sentenced the defendant to three years of incarceration, execution suspended after two years, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court unduly restricted his cross-examination of Dr. Powers on the subject of his opinion testimony regarding the blood alcohol level of a person exhibiting the same behaviors as the state alleged the defendant exhibited in this case. More specifically, the defendant argues that once Dr. Powers testified on direct examination that an individual who performed in a certain way on each of the field sobriety tests had an extrapolated blood alcohol content of 0.12 or higher, the court should not have foreclosed the defendant from later cross-examining him about this central, relevant issue. We agree with the defendant that the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion and conclude that the impropriety was not harmless.

The following facts are relevant to the defendant's claim. At trial, the state's witness, Dr. Powers, was permitted to testify as an expert in the field of forensic toxicology without objection. He testified that nystagmus exhibited during a horizontal gaze nystagmus test is caused by the presence of a central nervous system depressant, such as alcohol, in the operator's system. The state then asked Dr. Powers several hypothetical questions comprised of facts mirroring those present in the case.

In its first hypothetical, the state described a man who exhibited an odor of alcohol on his breath, bloodshot/glassy eyes, and who failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test

by exhibiting the same signs the defendant had—a lack of smooth pursuit in each eye, a distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation, and the onset of nystagmus prior to forty-five degrees. The second hypothetical went on to posit that the man described in the first hypothetical had also failed the walk and turn test in the same way the defendant had. The third hypothetical described the same man failing the one leg stand test in the way the defendant had.

After each hypothetical, the state asked Dr. Powers whether he could opine to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether the man described was under the influence of a central nervous system depressant such as alcohol. In each instance, Dr. Powers responded that he could and answered in the affirmative that he would expect the individual in question to have been affected by a central nervous system active agent.

The state then asked Dr. Powers what he would expect the hypothetical man's blood alcohol level to be on the basis of the behavior he exhibited and his performance on each of the three field sobriety tests. The defendant objected to the question on the ground that there was not an appropriate foundation laid as to "how much alcohol" was ingested. The court overruled his objection. Dr. Powers then responded that he would be looking for "blood alcohol concentration of a 0.12 or higher. How much higher, that's very hard to say. But I'd be looking for at least a 0.12. Below a 0.12, we tend not to see complete failures on the standardized field sobriety tests.... [O]ur research actually [that] we've done recently shows that when basically all the clues in the ... standardized field sobriety tests are being generated, that individuals tend to have a concentration above 0.12 or 0.15 or even higher.... [T]he ability to operate motor vehicles diminishes with increased blood alcohol concentration, or with an increase in the concentration of any central nervous system depressant."

Subsequently, during cross-examination, the following colloquy took place between Dr. Powers, defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the court:

"[Defense Counsel]: So, if you recall the question that [the prosecutor] had asked you regarding a—let me withdraw that question. If a person has driven from Stamford, Connecticut, to Fairfield, Connecticut, was not involved in any accidents, was pulled over by a trooper, the trooper only saw the car swerve once, the operator then pulled over three lanes from the left lane to the middle lane to the right lane to the shoulder, parked the car properly, did not hit any other objects, did not hit a guardrail; and would those set of facts change your opinion as to the level of intoxication somebody may have?

"[Dr. Powers]: Probably not; but I recognize that that level of control and behavior seems inconsistent with the level of alcohol that I opined on earlier, assuming this is all referring to the same individual.

"[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, it is—so, assume that it's the same individual and—but you just testified that it doesn't—it doesn't indicate the person that you just opined to. So, would that—so, would that level of intoxication be lower, then, if they had that much control over a vehicle?

"[Dr. Powers]: I'm just saying that—that the—that the behavior you described seems inconsistent to me with the behavior described in the performance of the standardized field sobriety tests. And I...

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10 cases
  • State v. King
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • February 28, 2023
    ...cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910, 211 A.3d 71, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 540, 205 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2019) ; State v. Lopez , 177 Conn. App. 651, 668–69, 173 A.3d 485, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017).In reaching these holdings, the Appellate Court relied in large part ......
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    ...troubled by the state's introduction of Lockwood's 280 A.3d 619 testimony regarding blood alcohol content. In State v. Lopez , 177 Conn. App. 651, 669–70, 173 A.3d 485, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017), we made it clear that evidence pertaining to the expected BAC of a hypot......
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    • February 28, 2023
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2 books & journal articles
  • A Survey of Criminal Law Opinions
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 91, 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...739 (1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 (1998). [500] see Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). [501] 177 Conn.App. 651, 173 A.3d 485, cert. Denied, 327 Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017). [502] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a. [503] Lopez, 177 Conn.App. at 665-66. ......
  • A Servey of Criminal Law Opinion
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 91, 2018
    • Invalid date
    ...739 (1997) (en banc), cert, denied. 523 U.S. 1058 (1998). [500] See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). [501] 177 Conn. App. 651, 173 A.3d 485, cert, denied, 327 Conn. 989, 175 A.3d 563 (2017). [502] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a. [503] Lopez, 177 Conn. App. at 665-66......

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