State v. Lopez

Decision Date05 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 900484-CA,900484-CA
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Gerard Cotero J. LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee.

Before BILLINGS, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.

AMENDED OPINION UPON REHEARING 1

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an order granting defendant Gerard Lopez's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police traffic stop and subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle. On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in: (1) Determining the police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was driving without a license, and (2) determining the stop was a pretext stop. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS

The question of whether a warrantless police traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we review the underlying facts of this case in detail. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App.1988), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The arresting officer was the only witness called during the suppression hearing, and the facts are therefore largely based upon his testimony.

At 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 1990, Officer Hamner was patrolling in his police car. Officer Hamner saw defendant's vehicle traveling southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City, and recognized the vehicle as one he had seen on several occasions near two local bars known for criminal activity, including illegal drug use. Officer Hamner believed the vehicle belonged to Jose Cruz, and after observing the driver of the car, believed the driver was Cruz. Officer Hamner recognized Cruz from his undercover operations in the area approximately nine months earlier. During this period, individuals had pointed out Cruz to Officer Hamner and indicated Cruz was a drug dealer. The individual believed to be Cruz had also introduced himself to Officer Hamner. Further, Officer Hamner had seen photographs of Cruz during his work with the Metro Narcotics Strike Force.

Because Cruz did not have a valid driver's license nine months earlier, Officer Hamner called police dispatch to see if Cruz had a license. The radio operator informed Officer Hamner that there was no record of Jose Cruz having a driver's license. Officer Hamner then observed defendant turn onto 700 South without signaling. Officer Hamner pulled defendant over and asked to see his driver's license. Although Officer Hamner admitted he suspected defendant had been involved with drugs, he testified that he stopped defendant for driving without a license and failing to signal. Defendant was unable to produce a driver's license but did give Officer Hamner an identification card indicating he was "Geraldo Lopez." Officer Hamner then did a warrants check on defendant under the name of Lopez which revealed three outstanding warrants. Officer Hamner placed defendant under arrest and cited defendant for driving without a license and failing to signal before turning. Officer Hamner impounded defendant's car and during an inventory search, he and another officer discovered several bags of cocaine.

Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp.1990). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his car. Relying on this court's opinion in Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, the trial court concluded Officer Hamner's stop of defendant was an unconstitutional "pretext" stop, and ordered the evidence seized by Officer Hamner suppressed. Following the trial court's

suppression ruling, the State petitioned for interlocutory review of the trial court's ruling, which we granted
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS

In considering a motion to suppress, we review a trial court's underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV. 2

The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); see State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah App.1991). "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated ... because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the highway. See id. at 654-56, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-98. Among the situations that courts have identified where a police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle are: (1) When the officer observes the driver commit a traffic violation; e.g., State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 882-83; Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1095-96 (Fla.1988); (2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license; e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135; State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App.1988); and (3) when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs; e.g., United States v. Lyles, 946 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir.1991); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975.

The issues presented at the suppression hearing and now on appeal pertain to the first two categories outlined above. The State contends Officer Hamner was justified in stopping defendant because defendant had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal before turning, and the officer had reason to believe defendant was driving without a license. Alternatively, the State argues the case should be remanded because of insufficient findings under both these issues and because the trial court incorrectly applied the pretext doctrine. We agree with the State that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when holding Officer Hamner's traffic stop was a pretext stop. We also agree that the court's findings of fact were inadequate with regard to both the pretext stop and whether Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without a license. We therefore reverse and

remand. 3 Because we reverse and remand for a fresh analysis of the legality of the traffic stop, we do not reach the issue of the legality of the subsequent detention
III. PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOP
A. When the Pretext Doctrine Applies

In recent years, this court has joined other courts in construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment 4 by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext doctrine." See, e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135-37; State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.1986); sources cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court determines the stop was not made because of the traffic violation but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal course of action expected of a reasonable officer. 5 Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a "reasonable ... officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the unconstitutional motivation. Id.

Whether a traffic stop was an unconstitutional "pretext" stop requires a legal conclusion--thus we review it for "correctness." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215; State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App.1990), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 6

This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the facts demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic violation. 7 Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979. The second situation is where the driver committed a minor traffic violation or the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883; Kehoe, 521 So.2d at 1097. Because defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal before turning in violation of Utah law, we address the second variation of the pretext doctrine, i.e., where a traffic violation has...

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16 cases
  • State v. Lopez
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Utah
    • April 25, 1994
    ...had misapplied the pretext stop doctrine and had failed to enter adequate findings of fact on reasonable suspicion. State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct.App.1992). The court refused the State's invitation to abandon the pretext stop doctrine. We granted both the State's petition and defen......
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