State v. Lopez
Citation | 271 Conn. 724,859 A.2d 898 |
Decision Date | 09 November 2004 |
Docket Number | (SC 17123). |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LUIS FERNANDO LOPEZ. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and Zarella, Js.
John A. East III, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, James Turcotte, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Jason Germain, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
William M. Bloss, for the appellee (defendant).
The defendant, Luis Fernando Lopez, appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21 (2).1 Following the decision of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of conviction and remanding the case for a new trial; State v. Lopez, 80 Conn. App. 386, 835 A.2d 126 (2003); we granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court's inquiry into a possible conflict of interest between the defendant and defense counsel was inadequate and, if so, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was entitled to a reversal of his conviction in the absence of a specific showing of harm?" State v. Lopez, 267 Conn. 912, 840 A.2d 1174 (2004). We conclude that the trial court's denial of the defendant's constitutional right to be present during the inquiry in question constituted a structural error warranting the automatic reversal of his conviction without a specific showing of harm or prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The underlying facts and procedural history, as set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion, are as follows. "In March, 1999, the victim2 and her mother moved into the defendant's home. The defendant and the victim's mother were romantically involved at that time. The defendant and the victim's mother shared one bedroom while the victim slept in a separate bedroom. The defendant used the victim's bedroom as his business office and kept his computer there.
State v. Lopez, supra, 80 Conn. App. 388-89.
The defendant, with the assistance of new counsel, filed a motion for a new trial, alleging for the first time, inter alia, that he had been deprived of conflict-free representation at trial because his trial counsel had put himself in the position of being a material witness and that the court's inquiry into the matter should have been on the record. The defendant's motion was based on the following facts. "The victim made certain statements that were inculpatory as to the defendant and that were the basis for the state's bringing the charges of which he was convicted. Prior to trial, however, the victim wrote and signed a statement recanting her previous accusations against the defendant. The victim testified that she [had done] so at the insistence of her mother and the defendant. She further testified that the defendant [had] dictated the statement to her and that she [had been] angry that she was forced to write the statement because it was untrue.
The trial court's memorandum of decision denying the defendant's motion for a new trial memorializes the following additional events forming the basis of his claim. At some point during the trial, 5
In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that no conflict existed because Boylan did not intend to testify. The court reasoned Thereafter, the trial court also denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, raising claims that, inter alia:6 (1) the trial court should have conducted an inquiry on the record and in the defendant's presence into whether a conflict of interest had existed between him and Boylan; and (2) the trial court improperly failed to conclude that Boylan had been burdened by an actual conflict of interest.7
The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. In reaching its conclusion that reversal was mandated, the court first noted that, although sixth amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally should be asserted by way of habeas corpus rather than direct appeal, because of the need to develop an evidentiary record, this case was distinguishable. Id., 390. It concluded that here, the trial court's actions, which were evident from the record, were at issue, not the actions of defense counsel. Id.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Appellate Court concluded that, because the possibility of a conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent, the trial court had a duty to inquire about the conflict. Id., 392. The trial court's actions failed to satisfy that duty, however, because, in determining that Boylan was not going to testify, it had addressed only how the potential conflict would be handled and had failed to inquire into the actual nature of the conflict itself. Id., 393. The Appellate Court further noted that, because the defendant had not been present during the inquiry, it could not determine whether the defendant had consented to or waived any conflict. Id., 393-94. Finally, the Appellate Court was persuaded that the circumstances of the case clearly had presented an actual conflict of interest that gave rise to a presumption of prejudice requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id., 394. Because this conclusion was dispositive of the appeal, it did not reach the defendant's remaining claims. This certified appeal followed.
The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the trial court's in-chambers inquiry into the potential conflict of interest had been inadequate; (2) there had been an actual conflict of interest; and (3) no specific showing of harm was required. The state further claims that the defendant cannot show the requisite harm, namely, that his representation was affected adversely. In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court's inquiry, conducted off the record and in the defendant's absence, had been inadequate because of its failure to ascertain the nature or effect of the conflict of interest. We agree with the Appellate Court's ultimate conclusion, albeit for reasons other than those cited by that court. We...
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