State v. Loscomb

• Decision Date: 13 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 38,38
• Citation: 291 Md. 424,435 A.2d 764
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Michael Lee LOSCOMB.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 424

291 Md. 424

435 A.2d 764

STATE of Maryland v. Michael Lee LOSCOMB.

No. 38.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 13, 1981.

Bonnie A. Travieso, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Broughton M. Earnest, Easton (Goldsborough, Franch & Collett, Easton, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This case concerns the circumstances under which the results of chemical tests for alcohol are admissible in evidence. More particularly, it presents three questions. The first question is whether the exclusionary rule contained in Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which, under certain circumstances, renders the results of chemical tests inadmissible is applicable in a prosecution for violations of Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 388 and Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1980 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 388A. The second question is whether the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 applies if there has been a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Md. Code (1977, 1980 Cum.Supp.) § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. The third question is whether § 16-205.1 requires that the accused affirmatively consent to the administration of a chemical test.

On 17 July 1978, the respondent, Michael Lee Loscomb (accused), was the driver of an automobile that collided with another vehicle. That automobile was occupied by two women who died at the scene of the accident. The accused was taken to a hospital.

A police officer (officer), investigating the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred, found a styrofoam cooler containing a large, damp, glass mug and a half-filled fifth bottle of whiskey in the accused's car. The officer radioed the police department to request that a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of the accused's blood be performed. Such a test was administered. The accused was not told the purpose of the test and did not give his consent before a blood sample was taken. However, he was not physically restrained and did not struggle or fight while his blood was being withdrawn. After the blood sample was taken, he was asked to sign a consent form, but he refused.

Insofar as here relevant, the accused was charged under Art. 27, § 388 with manslaughter by automobile and under Art. 27, § 388A with homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated. In the Circuit Court for Talbot County, the trial court denied the accused's pretrial motion to suppress the results of the chemical test. At trial, the results of that test, which indicated that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the accident, were introduced over objection. Thereafter, the accused was found guilty of violations of both Art. 27, § 388 and § 388A.

The accused appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which reversed. Loscomb v. State, 45 Md.App. 598, 416 A.2d 1276 (1980). The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari that we granted. We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

I

This case initially presents the question whether the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which, under certain circumstances, renders the results of chemical tests inadmissible is applicable in a prosecution for violations of Art. 27, § 388 ¹ and § 388A. ² The relevant statutory provisions include the following:

Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol., 1980 Supp.) § 10-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, effective 1 January 1974, provides:

"Chemical test for intoxication Admissibility by analysis.

In a prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 21-902 ³ of the Transportation Article, a chemical test of his breath or blood may be administered to the person for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood." (Emphasis added.)

Section 10-309(a) provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Test not compulsory. A person may not be compelled to submit to a chemical analysis provided for in this subtitle. Evidence of chemical analysis is not admissible if obtained contrary to its provisions." (Emphasis added.)

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980). The primary source from which to determine this intent is the language of the statute itself. When statutory language is ambiguous, a court may consider a statute's legislative history and must consider its purpose. Department of State Planning v. Mayor of Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 14, 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980).

Here the language of § 10-302 is ambiguous. The legislative history of § 10-302 through § 10-309 shows that these sections were preceded by Md. Code (1957, 1959 Repl.Vol.), Art. 35, § 100 of the Evidence Title, effective 1 June 1959. Article 35, § 100 embodied the Legislature's initial decision that certain chemical tests used to determine the amount of alcohol in an accused's blood were reliable and, therefore, that the results of such tests could, under certain circumstances, be admitted into evidence. Article 35, § 100(a) provided that, under appropriate circumstances, the results of such tests were admissible in any criminal prosecution for a violation of any State law concerning a person accused of driving while intoxicated or impaired. ⁴ Section 100(c) provided that such test results were inadmissible if obtained contrary to the procedural requirements set forth in the Act. ⁵ Thus, Art. 35, § 100 had the broad purpose of establishing a rule of evidence applicable in prosecutions for the violation of any law concerning a person accused of driving while intoxicated or impaired.

In 1973, Art. 35, § 100 was revised and reenacted as § 10-302 through § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The express statement contained in Art. 35, § 100(a) that chemical tests might be administered to persons charged with violating "any" law if such persons were accused of driving while intoxicated or impaired does not appear in § 10-302. Instead, § 10-302 utilizes the ambiguous language that a chemical test may be administered "in a prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article."

While the Revisor's Notes are not law and may not be considered to have been enacted as part of the Act, ch. 2, § 19, 1973 Laws of Md. Spec. Sess., they are entitled to weight. See Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 286 Md. 104, 109, 405 A.2d 744, 748 (1979). The Revisor's Note accompanying § 10-302 states:

"This section is new language derived from Art. 35, § 100(a). This is the first sentence in that section. Style is changed, and the language is shortened." (Emphasis added.)

This Note establishes that the language revisions in § 10-302 were not intended to produce substantive changes in the law or its purpose.

We conclude that the legislative history here establishes that the Legislature intended the requirements of § 10-302 through § 10-309 to apply in prosecutions for the violation of any law concerning a person accused of driving while intoxicated or impaired. Such an interpretation is consonant with the original broad purpose of Art. 35, § 100. Accordingly, § 10-309, which provides that evidence of a chemical test is not admissible if obtained contrary to the requirements of the subtitle, applies to prosecutions for violations of Art. 27, § 388 and § 388A.

II

The second question presented is whether the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 applies if there has been a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. ⁶

Section 16-205.1(c), effective 1 July 1977, provides in pertinent part:

"(c) ... If a police officer stops or detains any individual who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while his driving ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol, the police officer shall:

(1) Detain the individual;

(2) Request that the individual permit a chemical test to be taken of his blood or breath to determine the alcoholic content of his blood;

(3) Advise the individual of the administrative penalties that may be imposed for refusal to take the test;

(5) If the individual refuses to take the test, file with the Administration, within 48 hours after detention, a sworn report that:

(i) The officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the individual had been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State while intoxicated or while his driving ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol; and

(ii) The individual refused to take the chemical test for alcohol when requested by the police officer and after being informed of the administrative penalties that may be imposed for refusal." (Emphasis added.)

It is a general rule of statutory construction that statutes that deal with the same subject matter, share a common purpose, and form part of the same general system are in pari materia and must be construed harmoniously in order to give full effect to each enactment. Moore v. Town of Fairmount Heights, 285 Md. 578, 585, 403 A.2d 1252, 1256 (1979); Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7, 217 A.2d 555, 559 (1966); Applestein v. Mayor of Baltimore, 156 Md. 40, 54-55, 143 A. 666, 672 (1928). This rule is particularly applicable when the statutes are enacted on the same day. State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 207, 328 A.2d 737, 744 (1974); County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v....