State v. Lott

Decision Date15 March 2012
Docket NumberDocket No. 36390
PartiesSTATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DANIELLE LOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 403

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,

Bannock County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney

General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Danielle Lott appeals from her judgment of conviction entered upon her conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine. Specifically, she appeals from the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. We affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On September 9, 2008, Officer Tyler Teuscher of the Chubbuck Police Department responded to a report of a suspected theft from a store in the Pine Ridge Mall. The store clerk told Officer Teuscher she believed two individuals, who she knew as "Teddy Hamann" and "Danielle Ruiz,"1 stole a pair of shorts from the store. The clerk also provided a description ofthe vehicle the pair left in. As Officer Teuscher left the mall, he spotted a vehicle matching the description and executed a traffic stop. The driver identified himself as Roman Hamann and the passenger stated she was Danielle Lott. Lott admitted she had been in the store in question, but showed Officer Teuscher receipts indicating she had made purchases from the store.

Upon investigating further, Officer Teuscher learned the driver was actually Theodore Hamann and he had an active warrant for his arrest. After he was informed he would be arrested, Hamann fled from the car into the mall. Officer Teuscher pursued Hamann, while another officer stayed with Lott, who continued to sit in the passenger seat. After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Officer Teuscher found Hamann in a store in the mall, hiding under a clothing rack, approximately 200 yards away from the vehicle. The officer also found a glass pipe used for ingesting methamphetamine in the immediate vicinity and found the allegedly stolen shorts on Hamann's person.2 Hamann was escorted back to the vicinity of the vehicle and secured in an officer's patrol car. Officer Teuscher then instructed Lott to exit the vehicle, and once Lott was standing near the rear of the car, he informed her that he intended to search the vehicle incident to Hamann's arrest. Lott objected and told the officer she wanted to retrieve her purse, which she had left on the back seat.3 Officer Teuscher denied the request and as she moved toward the car, grabbed her wrists to prevent her from accessing the purse.

Officer Teuscher searched the vehicle, including the purse, and found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the purse. Lott was charged with possession of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). She filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from her purse, contending the search was not a valid search incident to Hamann's arrest. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Lott entered a conditional guilty plea, retaining the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. Lott now appeals.

II.ANALYSIS

Lott contends the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, she argues the district court erred in finding this was a proper search incident to arrest because Hamann was not arrested near the vehicle.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995); State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198; Newman, 149 Idaho at 599, 237 P.3d at 1225.

One such established exception is a search incident to arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000). Until recently, it was well settled that pursuant to this exception, when a police officer made a lawful custodial arrest of a vehicle occupant, he could, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,search the passenger compartment of that vehicle, as well as examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); State v. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 652-53, 962 P.2d 1033, 103-37 (1998). However, in Gant, issued after the search at issue in this case, the United States Supreme Court clarified this exception, holding that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. Rather, an automobile search incident to a recent occupant's arrest is constitutional only (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. Id. at 351.

Most recently, in Davis v. United States, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), the Supreme Court examined whether Gant's clarification of Belton applies retroactively to searches conducted prior to Gant's issuance. The Davis Court concluded, given the rationale behind the exclusionary rule, application of the rule was not appropriate to invalidate a search officers conducted in compliance with Belton prior to Gant's issuance. Davis, _ U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2419. Specifically, the Court held that for this exception to apply, the State must prove (1) objectively reasonable reliance on prior case law on the part of the officer conducting the search, and (2) that the precedent relied upon was binding and provides clear legal sanction for the search at the time it was conducted. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.

In denying the motion to suppress, the district court, without the benefit of either Gant or Davis, found the search of the vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest pursuant to Belton.4 The district court first addressed the constitutionality of the search of the vehicle in general, later reaching the issue of the search of the purse specifically. As to the former, the court addressed Lott's argument that because Hamann's arrest occurred in the mall, and not within the immediate vicinity of the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was not incident to arrest. The court rejected this contention, noting that Officer Teuscher "was placing" Hamann under arrest as soon as Hamann exited the vehicle and it was Hamann's action of fleeing the scene that resulted in the arrest not actually being completed until several minutes later inside the mall. Even though Hamann fled while Officer Teuscher was attempting to make the arrest, the continued efforts to effect the arrest were still incident to the original traffic stop; therefore, it would be unreasonable, the district court surmised, to conclude that individuals facing arrest could avoid searches of their vehicle by fleeing the scene and being arrested away from the vehicle some time later.

Lott argues on appeal that the search of the vehicle was unlawful in light of the recent clarification of Belton in Gant regarding the proper scope of vehicle searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle. In the alternative, she contends that even under Belton, the search was not a permissible search incident to arrest because Hamann was not a "recent" occupant of the vehicle and was arrested in the mall, and therefore, the good faith exception in Davis does not apply.

Here, even assuming the search of the vehicle itself would be impermissible under Gant, we conclude application of the exclusionary rule is not appropriate pursuant to Davis. As we noted above, the Davis Court held the good faith exception may apply to preclude exclusion of otherwise illegally obtained evidence if the State proves (1) objectively reasonable reliance on prior case law on the part of the officer conducting the search, and (2) that the precedent relied upon was binding and provides clear legal sanction for the search at the time it was conducted. Davis, _ U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.

After examining Idaho case law in effect at the time of the search, we agree with the district court that the search in this instance was permissible under Belton. The crux of Lott'sargument is that the temporal and spatial distance between Hamann and the vehicle when he was apprehended in the mall precludes application of the Belton rule allowing search incident to arrest. However, Idaho appellate court holdings predating Gant indicate otherwise.5 In State v....

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