State v. Louis

Decision Date09 February 2016
Docket NumberNo. 35703.,35703.
Citation134 A.3d 648,163 Conn.App. 55
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. Jacques LOUIS.

Alan Jay Black, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Adam E. Mattei, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Joseph P. Harry, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

LAVINE, KELLER and PELLEGRINO, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Jacques Louis, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 (a)1 and 53a–134 (a)(2)2 and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a–48and General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a–135 (a)(1).3 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motions for judgment of acquittal and (2) charged the jury with respect to conspiracy in violation of State v. Pond, 315 Conn. 451, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015), and that (3) the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by arguing facts not in evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On December 28, 2011, at approximately 8:15 p.m., the defendant, Jean Barjon, Tinesse Tilus, and Guailletemps Jean–Philippe (conspirators) together entered the Caribbean–American Market (market) on Wood Avenue in Bridgeport. They called for the owner, Rene Adolph, who was in the kitchen cooking, to come out. Adolph recognized Tilus and Barjon, but not the defendant and Jean–Philippe, who stood on either side of him. The conspirators demanded money from Adolph, and Jean–Philippe displayed a firearm. Adolph, fearing for his life, ran from the market to the laundry next door and called out for help. The defendant, Barjon, and Tilus chased Adolph, who held the door to the laundry closed as the defendant attempted to open it. Margarita Avcolt, a laundry employee, observed the activity, and telephoned the police. She saw one man trying to open the door and two others standing a "meter" away.

Meanwhile, Jean–Philippe, who had remained in the market, walked into the walled-in area occupied by the cashier, Ramon Tavares. Jean–Philippe displayed his gun and ordered Tavares to give him money. Jean–Philippe took the money Tavares gave him, as well as his phone.

Back at the laundry, Adolph saw a police cruiser passing by so he ran out and flagged down Officer Elizabeth Santoro. The three conspirators, who had followed Adolph to the laundry, ran and got into a car. Adolph pointed to the three conspirators in the car, who were getting ready to "take off." Adolph told Santoro that the men had tried to rob him. He also pointed to Jean–Philippe who by that time was running away from the market on Wood Avenue. Adolph saw him "toss the gun." Santoro was able to detain Jean–Philippe, and told Barjon, the driver of the car not to move. Tilus and the defendant were passengers in the car. According to Santoro, all of the conspirators were dressed in suits as if they were going somewhere.

Officer Christopher Martin arrived on the scene as backup for Santoro. Martin seized $635 from Jean–Philippe and found a loaded, operable firearm that Jean–Philippe had discarded near a trash receptacle. A firearms expert, Marshall Robinson, examined the gun that Martin recovered and the casings it ejected when fired. As part of his investigation, Robinson learned that the gun had been used to fire cartridges in an incident in New Jersey. Both the defendant and Jean–Philippe were from New Jersey.

The defendant and Barjon were each charged with robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree and stood trial together. The defendant's theory of defense was that he was "merely present" at the time of the robbery and that Adolph's testimony was not believable. Barjon also claimed that he merely was present at the time of the robbery, that Adolph was not credible, and that Jean–Philippe acted alone in order to collect an unpaid debt from Adolph, who allegedly ran an illegal lottery from the market.4

The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the charges of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree against the defendant,5 but the jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first and second degree. At sentencing, the court merged the conspiracy convictions and sentenced the defendant to twelve years in prison, suspended after six years, and five years of probation.

I

The defendant claims that the court violated his right to due process by denying his (1) motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case and (2) motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the jury's verdict. He claims that there is no evidence that he was present in the market where the robbery occurred, and therefore, the court should not have permitted the case to go to the jury. He also argues that there is no evidence that he agreed to rob Adolph and that he intended to commit robbery in either the first or second degree, specifically to display or threaten the use of a deadly weapon in the case of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree.6 We do not agree.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to the defendant's claim. After the state rested, the defense counsel, Charles Kurmay, moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was present when Jean–Philippe took money from Tavares and no evidence that the defendant agreed to commit a robbery. The court denied the motion stating that Adolph's testimony alone was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty.7 The defendant elected not to present any evidence.

The jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first and in the second degree. Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a "motion for judgment of acquittal after mistrial" on the charge of robbery in the first degree on the ground of insufficient evidence. He also sought a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The court denied the motion.8

"The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution protects a criminal defendant from conviction absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each fact necessary to constitute the elements of the crime.... Because a jury may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant is entitled to challenge his conviction on that basis with a motion for a judgment of acquittal." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Watts, 71 Conn.App. 27, 31, 800 A.2d 619 (2002).

"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether on the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martin, 285 Conn. 135, 147, 939 A.2d 524, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 859, 129 S.Ct. 133, 172 L.Ed.2d 101, after remand, 110 Conn.App. 171, 954 A.2d 256 (2008), appeal dismissed, 295 Conn. 192, 989 A.2d 1072 (2010).

"[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence ... established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Watts, supra, 71 Conn.App. at 31, 800 A.2d 619. In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Delarosa, 16 Conn.App. 18, 33, 547 A.2d 47 (1988).

The defendant argues that no one ever identified him as having been present at the scene of the robbery in the market. Adolph, however, testified that four men entered the market. He knew Barjon and Tilus, and he identified Jean–Philippe as the man with the gun. He also testified that there was a fourth man, whom he did not know, who stood beside him in the market and that this unknown person chased him to the laundry and tried to pull open the door. When he stopped Santoro, Adolph pointed to Jean–Philippe, who was walking away from the market, and told the officer that he had a gun and had just robbed him. He also told her that the men in the white car in front of the market also had robbed him. Santoro saw three men in the white car. The defendant was a passenger in the car; Barjon was the driver. On appeal, he claims that it is not clear whether he sat in the car during the robbery or got into the car sometime later. He argues that the jury, therefore, had to resort to speculation.

We disagree that no one identified the defendant as a participant in the robbery. According to Adolph, four men entered the market. He recognized two of them, but did not recognize the two men who stood next to him. One of those men had a gun. Barjon and the unknown man without a gun chased him as he ran from the market. At Adolph's direction, Santoro arrested the four men...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • State v. Turner
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 2018
    ...finding that defendant agreed that gun would be used during robbery when he stood by silently when gun was displayed); State v. Louis , 163 Conn. App. 55, 68, 134 A.3d 648 (sufficient evidence to support finding that defendant agreed to commit robbery when he entered store with coconspirato......
  • Washington v. Dewey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • January 10, 2020
    ...first degree, specifically the subsection of the first degree robbery statute which requires "a deadly weapon")'; State v. Louis, 163 Conn.App. 55, 134 A.3d 648, 657 (2016) (same).5 In his 56(a)(2) statement, Washington states that "as Wiggins and Gaston finished their conversation in the s......
  • Tilus v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • August 8, 2017
    ...appeal of the petitioner's codefendant Jacques Louis, however, the robbery victim is identified as Rene Adolph. See State v. Louis, 163 Conn.App. 55, 134 A.3d 648, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 929, 133 A.3d 461 (2016). For consistency with respect to the petitioner's criminal trial, direct appea......
  • State v. Barjon
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 2018
    ...We affirm the judgment of the trial court.The defendant and his codefendant, Jacques Louis, were tried together. In State v. Louis , 163 Conn. App. 55, 58–60, 134 A.3d 648, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 929, 133 A.3d 461 (2016), this court held that a jury reasonably could have found the followin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT