State v. Love
| Decision Date | 18 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2016-192,2016-192 |
| Citation | 2017 VT 75 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of Vermont v. Kimberly Love |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
On Appeal from Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division
Heather J. Brochu, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Matthew Valerio, Defender General, Joshua O'Hara, Appellate Defender, and Melissa Zajicek, Law Clerk (On the Brief), for Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
¶ 1. The resolution of this appeal requires this Court to interpret 23 V.S.A. § 1205, the statute governing the procedures for civil suspensions of drivers' licenses. Specifically, the question is whether the statutory language requiring the final hearing to be held within twenty-one days of the preliminary hearing is mandatory for second or subsequent offenses and whether, as a result, defendant's civil suspension should be dismissed because her final hearing was scheduled more than twenty-one days after her preliminary hearing. The trial court concluded that the twenty-one-day requirement was not mandatory and upheld defendant's civil suspension. We reverse.
¶ 2. Section 1205 of Title 23 sets forth the procedure for suspending the license of a person who violated 23 V.S.A. § 1201—that is, a person who operated a vehicle under the influence or who refused to submit to an evidentiary blood-alcohol test. Under § 1205(c), a violator must first be given notice of the State's intent to suspend the violator's license. A first-time violator's license will be suspended within eleven days of the violator receiving notice, unless the violator requests a suspension hearing. Id. § 1205(e)(1). If a suspension hearing is requested, a first-time violator's license will not be suspended unless the court orders a suspension after the hearing. Id. By contrast, a second or subsequent violator's license is automatically suspended within eleven days of notice, regardless of whether the second time violator requests a suspension hearing. Id. § 1205(e)(2).
¶ 3. The suspension hearing is divided into two parts: a preliminary hearing and a final hearing on the merits. The preliminary hearing "shall be held within 21 days of the alleged offense." Id. § 1205(g). The final hearing on the merits shall be scheduled Id. § 1205(h). At least for a first violation, the time limits set forth for the preliminary and final hearings "are directive only, and shall not be interpreted by the court to be mandatory or jurisdictional." Id. § 1205(t). As described above, we must determine whether these time limits are mandatory for a second or subsequent violation.
¶ 4. The facts that produced this question are not in dispute. On April 24, 2016, the police stopped defendant after a disturbance at a gas station. As a result of this stop, the police issued defendant a notice of intention to automatically suspend her driver's license by May 5, 2016. The notice stated that defendant either committed a second or subsequent violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 or refused to submit to a breath or blood test. Defendant promptly requested a hearing under 23 V.S.A. § 1205, and the preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 2, 2016.
¶ 5. At the preliminary hearing, defendant requested that the court stay the automatic suspension of her license so that defendant could drive to work and transport her daughter to school. A day later, the court denied defendant's request on the record, stating that the court did not have the authority to stay the automatic suspension.
¶ 6. A final hearing was scheduled for June 6, 2016. On May 23, 2016—twenty-one days after the preliminary hearing but before the final hearing date—defendant moved for dismissal of the civil suspension hearing because twenty-one days had passed since the preliminary hearing. According to defendant, this timeline violated 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1), which required the final hearing to be held within twenty-one days of the preliminary hearing. The State opposed defendant's motion, arguing that the controlling time frame under § 1205(h)(1) was forty-two days from the date of the alleged offense. Because the June 6, 2016 date was within this forty-two-day timeline—although the forty-second day was June 5, 2016, the applicable rules extend the last day of the period to the first day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, which in this case was Monday, June 6, 2016—the final hearing was properly within the time allotted by the statute.
¶ 7. The trial court concluded that the twenty-one-day rule was not jurisdictional and denied defendant's motion to dismiss. In doing so, the court noted that the part of the sentence containing the twenty-one-day rule did not state any remedy for failing to comply with the deadline, but that the portion containing the forty-two-day rule had been interpreted by this Court to be jurisdictional in part because it contained a remedy. Further, the court pointed to the phrase "in no event" in the statute referencing the forty-two-day rule, which suggested that the forty-two-day rule defined the outer limits of the timeframe and that the twenty-one-day rule was not controlling. And finally, the court relied on State v. McQuillan, where this Court concluded that the forty-two-day requirement was not violated. 2003 VT 25, ¶ 4, 175 Vt. 173, 825 A.2d 804. The court acknowledged that the defendant in McQuillan did not specifically raise the twenty-one-day rule on appeal, but noted that the facts were analogous because, like McQuillan, the final suspension hearing was held within forty-two days of the offense, but more than twenty-one days from the preliminary hearing. Because of the factual similarities, the trial court concluded that McQuillan supported denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
¶ 8. Defendant now appeals and reiterates her contention that the internal twenty-one-day rules are mandatory and jurisdictional for second or subsequent offenses. In support, shepoints to the overall structure of 23 V.S.A. § 1205, which she claims evinces a clear distinction between first-time offenses and second or subsequent offenses. Further, she argues that the statute's plain language makes the twenty-one-day rule mandatory and, if we held otherwise, the twenty-one-day rule would be mere surplusage. The State opposes this position, arguing that the Legislature did not provide a specific consequence for failing to abide by the twenty-one-day rule and that, if the twenty-one-day rule is mandatory, the forty-two-day rule is superfluous.
¶ 9. Our interpretation of a statute is de novo. State v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, ¶ 9, 191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129. "When construing a statute, our paramount goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 174, 807 A.2d 454, 458 (2002). We look first to the statutory language's plain meaning and, if this language clearly expresses the legislative intent, we will enforce the statute without relying on statutory construction. Id. at 175-76, 807 A.2d at 458. If the statutory language provides "insufficient guidance to ascertain legislative intent, we look beyond the language of a particular section standing alone to the whole statute, the subject matter, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law." Id. at 175, 807 A.2d at 458. In doing so, we may rely on maxims of statutory construction if they help achieve our primary objective of giving effect to the Legislature's intent. Id.
¶ 10. Here, along with the statutory language of § 1205, we may rely on the Legislature's response to our prior caselaw, for this is not the first time that we have interpreted the time limits present in 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1). In State v. Singer, we concluded that the forty-two-day rule was jurisdictional for all violations of 23 V.S.A. § 1201 and, as a result, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a civil license proceeding that did not comply with the forty-two-day rule. 170 Vt. 346, 749 A.2d 614 (2000). In Singer, the defendant was charged with a first offense of driving while intoxicated under 23 V.S.A. § 1201. Id. at 347, 749 A.2d at 615. The preliminary hearing to suspend his license was held on December 24, 1998; because the final hearing could not be held within forty-two days of this preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the civil suspension hearing based on 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h). Id. As in this case, the State argued on appeal that the timelimits were directive, not mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. at 348, 749 A.2d at 615. We disagreed, relying in part on the clear consequence spelled out by the Legislature in § 1205(h)(1); that is, we determined that the phrase "in no event may a final hearing occur more than 42 days after the date of the alleged offense" indicated that failure to comply with the time limits meant that no hearing could be held on the matter. Id. at 348-49, 749 A.2d at 616. We also reasoned that, if the Legislature meant the time limits to be directive and not mandatory, it would not have provided several methods for the State to justify a delay. Id. at 351, 749 A.2d at 617-18 ().
¶ 11. A few months later, on the heels of Singer, the Legislature amended §...
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