State v. Lowder

Decision Date16 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. 930412,930412
Citation889 P.2d 412
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jason Alan LOWDER, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Carol Clawson, J. Kevin Murphy, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Loni F. DeLand, Vernal, for defendant.

DURHAM, Justice:

This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1. It raises the following issues: 1. Did the trial court err in convicting defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child where there was no finding of intent "to arouse or gratify sexual ... desire?" 2. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to arrest judgment on the basis of the court's findings on the indecent liberties element of the offense? 3. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to enter a conviction of the lesser offense of misdemeanor child abuse? Finding no error, we affirm.

While in the sole care of defendant, the victim, who was less than two years old, suffered twelve specific injuries, eight of them to her genital area and buttocks. The trial court found that defendant had touched the victim's buttocks and genitalia, that he "took extreme indecent liberties" with her with the intent to cause her substantial bodily pain, and that he caused her bodily injury. The court further found that there was no intent to cause emotional pain and no intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The dispositive question is therefore whether the child sexual abuse statute requires any sexual intent or motivation by the perpetrator as an essential element of the crime. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).

Section 76-5-404.1 reads in pertinent part:

(1) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if ... the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of any child ... or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child ... with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain ... or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person....

Defendant argues that the "touching" prohibited by the statute must be "sexual touching" and that there inheres in the phrase "otherwise takes indecent liberties" a legislative requirement that only sexually motivated conduct is prohibited. The plain language of the statute does not establish such a requirement.

In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (1994), we considered a related but inverse argument, namely, that the "indecent liberties" language required a touching. We held that the touching clause and the indecent liberties clause were disjunctive. Id. at 482. In describing the purpose of the sexual abuse statute, as distinguished from the sexual exploitation statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(1)(a), we said, "[T]he sexual abuse statute proscribes conduct involving the touching of children and the taking of indecent liberties with children." Id. at 480. We confirm that reading of the statute: Its plain language prohibits either the touching of a child's anus, buttocks or genitalia or the taking of indecent liberties with a child, if done with the intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain.

Defendant argues that the legislature could not have intended to label and punish "merely" assaultive behavior with no sexual intent, as child sexual abuse. This argument is unpersuasive in light of the plain language of the statute, which appears to do precisely that when the assault is directed to the sexual parts of a child's body. The State's brief refers to the "legislature's evident choice to penalize persons who injure the 'private parts' of children's bodies more severely than it does those who otherwise injure children.... That choice seems fundamentally reasonable." We are constrained to agree that such a choice is within the proper province of legislative policy making.

In light of the foregoing conclusion about the meaning of the statute, we need not treat defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings regarding indecent liberties. Defendant's conviction may be sustained solely on the trial court's findings, entirely supported by the record, that he touched the victim's buttocks and genitalia with the intent to cause substantial bodily pain and did cause bodily injury. Likewise, defendant's argument that he should have been convicted of the lesser offense of child abuse is without merit. Utah's child abuse statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-109 (Supp.1994), requires only general physical injury to a child's body (some forms of the offense do not even require touching, such as subsection 76-5-109(1)(c)(vii), (x), which refers to any conduct resulting in...

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17 cases
  • Young, In re
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 22, 1999
    ...is because the specific provision, article VIII, section 13, governs over the general one, article VI, section 6. See State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994).8 In Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 379 (1970), we held that article VII, section 10 reserved to the Governo......
  • Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 7, 2000
    ... ... See World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994) ; State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982) ; Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) ... For ... ...
  • Carlie v. Morgan
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1996
    ...Following our long-standing rule of statutory construction that "[s]pecific statutes control over more general ones," State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994), we hold that plaintiffs may not resort to the UCSPA under the facts alleged. 3 Although plaintiffs might have been entitled t......
  • State v. Hale, 2006 UT App 434 (Utah App. 10/19/2006)
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 19, 2006
    ...burglary statute, and it therefore governs his conduct. Although "[s]pecific statutes control over more general ones," State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994), [i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty whi......
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