State v. Loye

• Decision Date: 08 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-1456.,01-1456.
• Citation: 670 N.W.2d 141
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Theresa Lynne LOYE, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

670 N.W.2d 141

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v.Theresa Lynne LOYE, Appellant.

No. 01-1456.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 8, 2003.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia A. Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Crowl, County Attorney, and Martha A. Heinicke, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

TERNUS, Justice.

The defendant, Theresa Loye, pled guilty to possession of marijuana, two counts of possession of burglar's tools, ongoing criminal conduct, and seven counts of third-degree burglary.After an unsuccessful effort in drug court, she was sent to prison on consecutive sentences totaling more than sixty-four years.Loye appealed, claiming her guilty plea was invalid and her sentences were illegal.The court of appeals dismissed Loye's appeal, agreeing with the State that Loye had waived her right to appeal.

On further review, we conclude Loye did not waive her right to appeal.Proceeding to the merits, we hold that Loye's guilty plea was invalid and, therefore, we vacate her guilty plea, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 13, 2000, Loye was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5)(1999).A few months later she and another woman were caught breaking into a moneybox inside a washing machine in the laundry room of an apartment complex.Not far from where they were apprehended, the police discovered a bag containing a pair of bolt cutters, a drill, drill bits, and other tools.A subsequent investigation revealed that moneyboxes in six additional laundry rooms at the same apartment complex had been opened by drilling the locks.Loye was charged with third-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code section 713.6A(2001) and possession of burglar's tools in violation of Iowa Code section 713.7.Another trial information subsequently filed charged Loye with six additional counts of third-degree burglary, another count of possession of burglar's tools, and a count of ongoing criminal conduct in violation of Iowa Code sections 706A.1,706A.2(4), and706A.4.

On June 21, 2001, Loye submitted a guilty plea to all charges and was accepted into drug court.The district court informed Loye that if she successfully completed the drug court program, "all of these charges will be dismissed"; if she failed, the court would "stack the penalties."In addition, the court told Loye that her agreement to be transferred to drug court meant that she waived her right to appeal.The court also engaged the defendant in a colloquy for the ostensible purpose of establishing a factual basis for Loye's guilty plea, informing the defendant of the constitutional rights she would be giving up by pleading guilty, and informing Loye of the charges to which she was pleading and the punishment for those charges.After accepting Loye's guilty plea, the court transferred her case from the criminal district court to drug court for future supervision.

Loye was not successful in the drug court program and was brought before the district court again on August 30, 2001.At that time, the court imposed consecutive sentences on all charges, for a total term of imprisonment of sixty-four and one-half years.Loye filed this appeal.

II.Issues on Appeal.

Loye raises several complaints concerning her conviction and sentencing.We address only one, as we find it dispositive.The defendant claims her guilty plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently because the court did not fully inform her of the nature of the charges to which she was pleading guilty and the potential penalties.As our subsequent discussion will explain, we find merit in this contention.Because this conclusion requires that Loye's guilty plea be set aside, we need not address her other claims of error concerning her guilty plea nor the alleged illegality of her sentencing.¹

While denying the defendant's plea was uninformed, the State asserts preliminarily that this court does not have jurisdiction of Loye's appeal.The State contends a final judgment was entered on June 21, 2001, and Loye was required to appeal within thirty days from that date.Because Loye's notice of appeal was filed beyond this thirty-day period, her appeal, claims the State, is untimely.In addition, the State claims Loye affirmatively waived her right to appeal at the June hearing.Finally the State contends Loye did not preserve her right to challenge the adequacy of her guilty plea on appeal because she did not challenge her plea in the district court.We first address the issues affecting Loye's right to maintain this appeal, and then discuss the validity of her guilty plea.

III.Timeliness of Appeal.

The timeliness of Loye's appeal depends on whether final judgment was imposed at the hearing on June 21, 2001, when Loye entered her guilty plea, or on August 30, 2001, when Loye was before the court after being expelled from the drug court program.The State contends the court imposed a suspended sentence at the June hearing and consequently that order constituted a final judgment from which Loye was required to appeal within thirty days.²SeeIowa R.App. P. 6.5(1)(stating notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of court's order).The August proceeding, asserts the State, was held simply to revoke Loye's probation and execute the previously determined sentence, a ruling that is subject to challenge in a postconviction relief action.SeeState v. Rheuport,225 N.W.2d 122, 123(Iowa1975)(holding postconviction procedures are the exclusive remedy for defendant's challenge to revocation of probation).

The defendant disagrees with the State's characterization of the June hearing.She alleges the court entered a deferred judgment at that time, which is not a final order.SeeState v. Stessman,460 N.W.2d 461, 462(Iowa1990)("An order deferring judgment is interlocutory and cannot meet the final judgment requirement.").Final judgment, she asserts, was rendered at the August hearing when the court imposed sentence.

"Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence.The judgment is final for the purpose of appeal when it terminates the litigation."State v. Coughlin,200 N.W.2d 525, 526(Iowa1972).We recently noted the distinctions between the various sentencing options available to the court in a criminal matter:

Following a plea or verdict of guilt, a court may, subject to exceptions, defer judgment, defer sentence, or suspend sentence.When judgment is deferred, the defendant is placed on probation without entry of a judgment.If the probation is successfully completed, the defendant is discharged and no judgment is entered.If probation fails, the judgment is entered and the court is permitted to impose any authorized sentence.This option allows a defendant to avoid a record of a conviction.When the sentence is deferred, a defendant is placed on probation at or after pronouncement of judgment, but without any sentence imposed.The court enters an adjudication of guilty, but the sentence is deferred to a later time.This delay allows the court to consider sentencing in the future after the court has had an opportunity to view a defendant's conduct on probation.The court retains the power to impose "any sentence it originally could have imposed."Finally, when a sentence is suspended, a defendant is placed on probation following the pronouncement of the sentence.The sentence is imposed, but execution of the sentence is suspended.This option allows a defendant to avoid a known sentence of incarceration or other punishment based on successful completion of probation.Any revocation of the suspended sentence results in the execution of the sentence previously pronounced.

State v. Thomas,659 N.W.2d 217, 221(Iowa2003)(citations omitted).To determine whether entry of a judgment of conviction, imposition of sentence, or execution of sentence was delayed pending Loye's successful completion of probation, namely, the drug court program, we turn to an examination of the record.

At the June hearing, the court specifically told the defendant that upon successful completion of the drug court program, the charges against her would be dismissed.Similarly, the court informed her she had an opportunity to "expunge all of the criminal history" by completing the program.The court also advised Loye that if she decided within two weeks that she did not want to remain in drug court, she would "be transported back to district court and [would be] prosecuted through to completion."These statements indicate the defendant was receiving a deferred judgment, certainly not a suspended sentence.

In the actual order entered by the court after this hearing, the court noted the "[d]efendant ... entered guilty pleas" and "[t]he [c]ourt accept[ed]defendant's guilty pleas."The court did not state what, if any, sentence had been imposed.Although this order seems to document an adjudication of guilt and a deferral of sentencing, rather than a deferred judgment, it clearly does not support the State's contention that the court imposed a suspended sentence.

The State points out that the court"exonerated" Loye's appearance bond at the June hearing, transferred the case to drug court, and relieved trial counsel"from further representation."The State argues these actions indicate the court considered its involvement to be at an end, signifying a final adjudication.Regardless of these actions, however, the fact remains that the court did not impose a sentence in June, which is the determinative fact in assessing the finality of a criminal proceeding.

The record from the August hearing also supports a conclusion that Loye was sentenced in August, not June.In commencing his colloquy with Loye at the August proceeding, the court stated, "First, we'll...