State v. Lucas

• Decision Date: 03 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 11306,11306
• Citation: 1990 NMCA 56,794 P.2d 1201,110 N.M. 272
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl LUCAS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 1201

794 P.2d 1201

110 N.M. 272

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl LUCAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11306.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 3, 1990.

Certiorari Denied June 19, 1990.

[110 NM 273] Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Margaret B. Alcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender and Peter Rames, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

ALARID, Judge.

Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered on his guilty plea of two counts of attempted criminal sexual penetration. On appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges under SCRA 1986, 5-604, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the court's determination that defendant was competent to stand trial, plead guilty, and be sentenced. We affirm.

Defendant was arraigned on November 2, 1987. On December 2, 1987, counsel for the defense moved for a mental evaluation to assess defendant's competency to stand trial and aid his attorney in his defense. The trial court issued an order for a mental evaluation on December 8, 1987, and an order on February 29, 1988, vacating the trial set for that same day because the forensic evaluation had not been completed.

A hearing was held on March 31, 1988, where the trial court questioned defendant concerning his guilty plea. The plea agreement had been signed by defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor on March 31, 1988. At the hearing, the court also questioned defendant and his counsel concerning defendant's competency. Defendant asserted he had no mental problems and he was not taking any medication that would affect his understanding or judgment. Defense counsel stated that things needed to be explained slowly to defendant, but he believed defendant understood the consequences of his plea. Defense counsel also stated the mental evaluations received indicated defendant was competent to enter into the plea.

On June 1, 1988, defendant moved to dismiss the charges under Rule 5-604, and on June 29, 1988, he moved to withdraw his plea based on his incompetency. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order for a sixty-day psychiatric evaluation in July 1988. Further hearings were held on defendant's competency in December 1988, and the court determined defendant was competent. On December 21, 1988, the Repeat Offender Plea and Disposition Agreement was filed with the signatures of defendant, his counsel, counsel for the state, and the court.

RULE 5-604

Under Rule 5-604(B)(7), the trial of a criminal case must commence within six months of the latest of several events. At issue here is the seventh occurrence, "the date the court allows the withdrawal of a plea or the rejection of a plea." Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court cautioned that Rule 5-604 should not be technically applied to effect dismissals and emphasized the rule is to be applied with common sense. State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 774 P.2d 440 (1989). In Mendoza, the court determined that when a court has suspended proceedings to assess a defendant's competency, six-month period recommences after competency has been determined.

In State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 785 P.2d 224 (1989), defendant had entered into a plea agreement with the state, which the court ultimately rejected. Defendant asserted the charges should have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 5-604. The court rejected this argument and applied Mendoza, determining the time during which a defendant's plea agreement is being assessed suspends the operation of Rule 5-604. In making this determination, the court noted that defendant was unavailable for trial while the plea agreement was being assessed and the delay was for defendant's benefit. In the present case, by entering into the plea agreement, defendant gave up certain rights: "Unless this plea is rejected or withdrawn, the defendant hereby gives up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert hereafter concerning the Court's entry of judgment against him consistent with this agreement."

Defendant seeks to distinguish Sanchez by asserting that the parties in Sanchez agreed to suspend the proceedings. Our reading of Sanchez, however, clearly indicates that the parties, by the act of entering into the plea agreement, implicitly agreed to suspend the proceedings. The same reasoning would apply in this case.

In Sanchez, the six-month period began from the date of the hearing when the court rejected the plea. State v. Sanchez; R. 5-604(B)(7) (six-month period to commence after rejection of plea). Because the plea agreement was accepted by the trial court in the present case, Sanchez is distinguishable. Nevertheless, we find it instructive. We read Sanchez to hold that the time during which a plea agreement is being assessed suspends the proceedings with regard to Rule 5-604 and the six-month period begins anew after the plea is assessed. When the plea is rejected, the period begins from that date. State v. Sanchez; R. 5-604(B)(7). When the plea is accepted, common sense dictates that Rule 5-604 does not apply because no trial is contemplated. Instead, the procedures in accepting the plea are governed by SCRA 1986, 5-304.

The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the charges under Rule 5-604. State v. Sanchez; State v. Mendoza. We affirm as to this issue.

DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the determination that he was competent to stand trial, plead guilty, and be sentenced. It appears from the record, however, that defendant asserted his incompetency only in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We therefore restrict our consideration to whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea based on his incompetency. See State v. Leyba, 80 N.M. 190, 453 P.2d 211 (Ct.App.1969) (motion to withdraw plea addressed to trial court's discretion).

Defendant has asked this court to redetermine the facts based on what he asserts is the documentary evidence before this court. The trial court held several hearings concerning defendant's competency and approximately nine witnesses testified in person at those hearings. The fact that this live testimony was transcribed into printed form does not render the evidence documentary. Cf. Maestas v. Martinez, 107 N.M. 91, 752 P.2d 1107 (Ct.App.1988) (documentary evidence concerned description in deeds). We will not reweigh this evidence.

Defendant asserts this court should adopt a standard of competency to enter a guilty plea that is higher than the standard of competency to stand trial. See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.1973). See also United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1024, 100 S.Ct. 687, 62 L.Ed.2d 658 (1980). The standard to determine competency to stand trial in New Mexico requires an inquiry into the defendant's understanding of the nature and significance of the proceedings, his factual understanding of the charges, and his ability to assist in his defense. State v. Najar, 104 N.M. 540, 724 P.2d 249 (Ct.App.1986). See also SCRA 1986, 14-5104. A defendant must understand the nature of the charges, the potential penalties, and his waiver of constitutional rights before a trial court can accept a guilty plea. See SCRA 1986, 5-303(E) (Cum.Supp.1989). See also Neller v. State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968) (a defendant must know the consequences of his plea). The plea must also be voluntary. R. 5-303(F).

Defendant seems to argue a higher standard is appropriate because a defendant is waiving significant constitutional rights by pleading guilty and the plea must be voluntarily and intelligently made. Insofar as defendant relies on cases determining the voluntariness of confessions, we do not find these cases persuasive. See State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 256, 586 P.2d 1085 (1978) (distinguishing proceedings to determine voluntariness of confessions and guilty pleas based on safeguards available when the defendant appears before impartial magistrate compared to extrajudicial settings in which confessions are usually made). We recognize that a guilty plea must be voluntarily and intelligently made and these considerations bear on a defendant's mental condition. See II C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure Sec. 339 at 229...