State v. Luckett, 84-1589
Decision Date | 21 May 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 84-1589,84-1589 |
Citation | 387 N.W.2d 298 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lewis LUCKETT, a/k/a Lewis Branch, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and John P. Messina, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Rebecca L. Claypool, Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Davis, Co. Atty., and Douglas Wells, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellee.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS, CARTER, WOLLE, and LAVORATO, JJ.
Two questions are presented in this appeal following defendant's conviction of attempted murder. See Iowa Code § 707.11 (1983). We reject defendant's contention that aggravated assault and simple assault should have been submitted as lesser included offenses, but we agree it was error to impose a mandatory sentence.
Evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. The victim, Wade Dawson, had formerly been married to Sandra Arrington who became romantically involved with defendant. A great deal of animosity developed over Dawson's visitation rights to Dawson's and Sandra's child. On the day of the shooting Sandra, defendant, and another man confronted Julie Dawson, the victim's second wife, and made a threat against Dawson. This threat was just one in a long series.
On the evening in question Dawson left home and drove around Davenport looking for his wife Julie. He noticed Sandra's car following him and when he returned home the other car pulled in front of him. Defendant jumped out, approached Dawson's car and fired a shot into the windshield at a range of six or seven feet. Police testimony disclosed that Dawson would have been struck had the bullet passed through his windshield. Defendant was tried before a jury which found him guilty of attempted murder.
I. The trial court refused defendant's request for submission of verdicts for the lesser included offenses of assault and assault with intent to inflict serious injury. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal and on further review of this assignment we agree.
Pursuant to Iowa rule of criminal procedure 6(3), the trial court must instruct the jury on the charged offense and all lesser included offenses. Rule 21(3) provides that "[i]n all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which the defendant is charged." A defendant may be convicted only of the highest offense which the jury finds established. See Iowa Code § 701.9 (1983); Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(2). We have prescribed a two-part test to determine whether a lesser offense falls under a charged offense:
The legal or element test requires the lesser offense to be composed solely of some but not all of the elements of the greater offenses. Thus the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense if the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. Conversely, if the lesser offense contains an element that is not part of the greater offense, the lesser cannot be included in the greater.
The factual test requires the court to determine whether there is a sufficient factual basis in the record for submitting the included offense.
State v. Lampman, 345 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Iowa 1984) (citations omitted); see also State v. Mateer, 383 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 1986). Both tests must be satisfied before the defendant is entitled to an instruction on each lesser included offense. Mateer, 383 N.W.2d at 536.
In State v. Powers, we held that assault as defined in Iowa Code section 708.1 is a lesser included offense of the crime of attempt to commit murder. 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979). The legal test is therefore satisfied. The only issue concerns the factual test.
In State v. Morgan, we provided a formula for determining whether the factual test has been met:
In the included offense setting the courts apply a principle that when the major offense consists of elements A, B, and C, the lesser offense consists of elements B and C, and the record does not contain substantial evidence from some quarter controverting element A, the State's case stands or falls on the major offense.
322 N.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Iowa 1982) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 716 (Iowa 1983); State v. Harlow, 325 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Iowa 1982). In the present case a specific intent to kill, because it raises assault to attempted murder, is the element A mentioned in Morgan. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1, 707.11. Our task then is to examine the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence controverting the intent to kill.
Defendant took the position at trial that he was never there and offered no evidence to suggest the victim was merely threatened. In refusing to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses, the trial court noted that defendant's alibi defense created an "all or nothing" case on the issue of whether defendant committed attempted murder. The trial court said There is no evidence ... from which a jury could find that a dangerous weapon or a firearm was pointed at the victim without anything more. The evidence is either that a weapon was fired or it never happened.
In Morgan the prosecuting witness testified that the defendant and another person attacked him and took his billfold. Although another prosecution witness also identified him, Morgan testified he had never seen the prosecuting witness until trial and did not remember the incident. Morgan's mother offered alibi testimony. The trial court submitted the elements of robbery based on assault but refused Morgan's request to submit assault as an included offense. We affirmed, noting that "[t]he present record does not contain substantial evidence controverting any of the elements which elevate this crime from assault to robbery." 322 N.W.2d at 71.
We have applied the same rationale in a number of other cases. See, e.g., State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42 (Iowa 1983) ( ); Ware, 338 N.W.2d at 716 ( ); Harlow, 325 N.W.2d at 91 ( ).
Defendants in cases where submission of the lesser offenses was required were able to point to evidence which supported a version of facts making up the elements of the included offense. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 328 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa 1983) ( ); State v. Wales, 325 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 1982) ( ); State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 1980) ) .
The evidence here, or more accurately the lack of it, puts this case within the ambit of our holdings in Morgan, Hutchison, and Harlow, and outside the Johnson, Wales, and Sangster holdings. There are only two versions of what happened. Defendant and his witnesses say he was not there. The State's evidence, including that of threats, points only to the major offense. There was simply no evidence controverting defendant's intent to kill. No one, not even defendant, offered testimony even hinting the shot was merely a plan to threaten or frighten Dawson. No evidence supports defendant's present contention that "the jury could rationally reject the State's theory of intent to kill and thereby reject the greater offense of attempted murder in favor of the legally included offense of assault, simple or aggravated." It was not error to refuse to submit the lesser included offenses.
II. We do find merit in defendant's other assignment, a contention that he should not have received a mandatory minimum sentence under Iowa Code section 902.7. That section provides in substance that a person who uses a firearm while participating in a forcible felony will, if convicted, receive a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
Iowa rule of criminal procedure 6(6) provides:
Allegations of use of a firearm. If the offense charged is one for which the defendant, if convicted, will be subject by reason of the Code to a minimum sentence because of use of a firearm, the allegation of such use, if any, shall be contained in the indictment. If use of a firearm is alleged as provided by this rule, and if the allegation is supported by the evidence, the court shall submit to the jury a special interrogatory concerning this matter, as provided in R.Cr.P. 21(2).
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