State v. Luckett

• Decision Date: 01 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 56289,56289
• Citation: State v. Luckett, 327 So.2d 365 (La. 1975)
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LUCKETT.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 365

327 So.2d 365

STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LUCKETT.

No. 56289.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 1, 1975.

Dissenting Opinion Nov. 21, 1975.

On Rehearing Feb. 23, 1976.

Leo A. Miller, Jr., McIntosh, Fox & Miller, Lake Providence, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thompson L. Clarke, Dist. Atty., C. R. Brackin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

CALOGERO, Justice.

Defendant, Eddie Luckett, was charged by bill of information with simple robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:65. He was convicted after trial by jury and was sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections.

On appeal, defendant presents six assignments of error for our review. We find merit in defendant's assignment of error no. 3 and accordingly reverse the conviction and sentence.

In abbreviated form the facts are that the accused, a friend of his by the name of Diane Phenix, and one Quitman Wayne Ainsworth were riding along Louisiana Highway No. 134 on the evening of February 25, 1975 in a vehicle driven by the defendant, when the defendant stopped his automobile. After Ainsworth got out to check for a low tire, an altercation outside of the car took place between Ainsworth and the defendant. Defendant purportedly beat Ainsworth with his fists and allegedly during the beating took various items, including a blue Cricket cigarette lighter, a wallet containing about $3.00, and a pocket knife, from Ainsworth.

At trial defendant admitted fighting with Ainsworth, explaining that he had bought a tape player from Ainsworth two weeks prior to the incident and was actually seeking to get his money back because the tape player did not work. He denied taking anything from Ainsworth although at the time of the arrest, he was in possession of a blue Cricket cigarette lighter allegedly belonging to Ainsworth. His explanation was that he had found the lighter in the back seat of his car where Ainsworth had earlier been seated.

The reversible error which we find occurred took place during the state's cross-examination of defendant. ¹ In this nonnarcotic offense of simple robbery, without any evidence that the defendant had ever been convicted of the crime of possession of marijuana, the district attorney quizzed defendant on whether he had, on the night in question, any marijuana in the back seat of his car and whether he had been smoking marijuana that night. While the court originally sustained an objection to the original question concerning marijuana in the back seat of the car, the court nonetheless changed its ruling upon the state's pointing out that defendant was under cross-examination and that his credibility was at issue. Following the court's overruling of the objection, the state succeeded in eliciting from the defendant the incriminating response that he had not been smoking marijuana 'that night,' with the obvious inference that he had perhaps smoked marijuana on other occasions. Indicative that the prosecutor's objective was to obtain an oral admission of an incriminating nature from the irrelevant and prejudicial questioning, and that the prosecutor had no evidence that the defendant had any prior conviction(s), is the fact that after securing the incriminating statement he turned his questioning to other matters.

Defendant's credibility was at issue inasmuch as he had taken the stand in his own defense, but under our law defendant's credibility may be attacked only by having him admit or deny whether he had been convicted of a crime, and only if he denied a previous conviction could the state produce evidence that he had indeed been so convicted. See R.S. 15:495. That statute is also express in mandating that only convictions may be used to impeach a witness' credibility; the state may not even inquire into arrests or indictments. The pertinent questions here were obviously not permissible under that statute.

Evidence of the commission of prior crimes was likewise not admissible to prove the defendant's bad moral character, as the state may introduce testimony of the bad character of the accused only to rebut evidence introduced by him to show good character, and even then such rebuttal evidence as limited to general reputation in the community. La.R.S. 15:481, State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So.2d 847 (1971); State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 873, 116 So. 374 (1928). Defendant here had not put his character in issue.

Evidence of other crimes is admissible only under the provisions of R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, where it is introduced to establish knowledge, system or intent where such knowledge, system or intent is relevant. Even then such evidence of other crimes is permissible only if the state has followed the requisite guidelines outlined in State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973). Furthermore, compliance with the statute and the Prieur guidelines is necessary regardless of the stage of the trial at which other crimes evidence is offered, including cross-examination of the defendant. State v. Ghoram, 290 So.2d 850 (La.1974). In this case, the state does not even argue the admissibility of the other crimes evidence on the basis of R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, much less compliance with the notice required by Prieur.

The state in brief points to State v. White, 301 So.2d 321 (La.1974) for the proposition that evidence of prior crimes is admissible to question defendant's credibility when he chooses to testify in his own behalf. Unlike the case at hand, State v. White involved interrogation of a defendant relative to convictions of several crimes, ² and the evidence was therefore admissible under R.S. 15:495.

We find that the court's ruling which allowed the state to have defendant inferentially admit that he smoked marijuana on another occasion than the night in question was both a substantial violation of a statutory right and was extremely prejudicial to the accused, as a consequence of which we have no alternative but to reverse this conviction. See Art. 921, La.C.Cr.P.

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the defendant are reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.

Reversed.

SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.

DIXON and MARCUS, JJ., dissented.

SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).

Defendant took the stand on his own behalf. He was questioned by defense counsel concerning where he obtained the lighter which the State claimed he took from Ainsworth. He replied he found it in the back seat of the car. At that point defense counsel asked him, 'What in the world were you doing in the back seat of your car? How did you manage to find the lighter, in the back seat of your car?' He replied that he was getting paper there to wipe mud off his pants.

It is my view that the State's attorney was permitted to cross-examine him concerning what he was doing in the back seat and what else was there. By this questioning the State apparently sought to show that there were other things in the back seat which induced defendant to be there besides the paper to wipe mud off his pants. This was legitimate cross-examination to contradict the defendant's testimony on a fact which was testified to by the defendant on direct examination. As such it was within the scope of legitimate cross-examination.

Section 462 of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes provides that 'When a person accused, or a husband and wife becomes a witness, such witness shall be subject to all the rules that apply to other witnesses, and may be cross-examined upon the whole case.'

Not only may an accused who takes the stand be cross-examined on the whole case, the cross-examination is not limited to matters covered on direct examination. State v. Sears, 298 So.2d 814 (La.1974); State v. Collins, 283 So.2d 744 (La.1973); State v. St. Amand, 274 So.2d 179 (La.1973). It should be noted also, that at the time of the objection defense counsel gives no reason for objecting except to say that the questioning was inflammatory. This is not the basis for the reversal. State v. George, 312 So.2d 860 (La.1975).

None of the authorities cited in the majority opinion relate to a case where the accused has taken the stand and waived his right to incriminate himself.

In my view the cross-examination in this case was proper.

I respectfully dissent.

ON REHEARING

MARCUS, Justice.

Eddie Luckett was charged by bill of information with simple robbery of Quitman Wayne Ainsworth in violation of La.R.S. 14:65. After trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged and was subsequently sentenced to serve five years with the department of corrections. Defendant appealed to this court, relying on six assignments of error. ¹ On original hearing, this court found merit in Assignment of Error No. 3. The conviction and sentence were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Upon application of the state, we granted a rehearing. After reconsideration, we find no merit in Assignment of Error No. 3. Our examination of the other assigned errors leads to the conclusion that they likewise are without substance. Accordingly, we vacate our original decree and affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

About eleven-thirty on the night of February 23, 1975, Quitman Wayne Ainsworth was walking down La. Hwy. 134. He was given a ride by Eddie Luckett who was accompanied by Diane Phenix. Luckett stopped the vehicle on the pretext of looking at a flat tire. Both Luckett and Ainsworth alighted from the car, and, while Ainsworth was looking at the tire, he was struck by Luckett. Luckett hit, kicked and stomped Ainsworth. During the beating, Luckett allegedly removed a wallet containing $3.00 and a pocket knife from Ainsworth's pants and a blue Cricket lighter and cigarettes from his shirt pocket. Ainsworth also claimed that a nickel was missing from his pants pocket after the incident. Diane Phenix got out of the car and was successful in getting Luckett to stop beating Ainsworth....