State v. Lujan

• Decision Date: 11 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20150840,20150840
• Citation: 459 P.3d 992
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Petitioner, v. Manuel ANTONIO LUJAN, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

459 P.3d 992

STATE of Utah, Petitioner,

v.Manuel ANTONIO LUJAN, Respondent.

No. 20150840

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard December 12, 2016

Reheard September 18, 2019

Filed February 11, 2020

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Kris C. Leonard, Asst. Solic. Gen., Clint T. Heiner, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Nathalie S. Skibine, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for respondent

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Himonas, Justice Petersen, and Judge Brown joined.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Manuel Antonio Lujan was convicted of aggravated robbery based on eyewitness identification testimony and other evidence admitted at trial. The court of appeals reversed the conviction under the "reliability" factors set forth in State v. Ramirez , 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). State v. Lujan , 2015 UT App 199, 357 P.3d 20. Ramirez identified five factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability (and hence admissibility) of eyewitness identification testimony under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution: (1) the "opportunity" of the eyewitness to view the suspect; (2) the degree of attention paid to the suspect; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event; (4) the degree of "spontane[it]y" and "consisten[cy]" of the eyewitness testimony; and (5) "the nature of the event being observed." 817 P.2d at 781 (citation omitted). Applying these factors, the court of appeals concluded that the testimony in question was "legally insufficient ... to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility." Lujan , 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 15, 357 P.3d 20 (quoting Ramirez , 817 P.2d at 784 ). And it reversed on the ground that the State had not carried its burden of establishing that "the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . ¶ 16.

¶2 In so doing, however, the court of appeals also raised concerns about the viability of the standard set forth in Ramirez . In light of developments in "scientific and legal research regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification[ ]" testimony since our decision in Ramirez , the majority indicated that it had "every reason to believe" that the Ramirez framework "must be revisited" by this court. Id. ¶ 10 n.1. Then-Judge Pearce dissented but echoed the view "that the time may have arrived for the Utah Supreme Court to revisit its holding" in Ramirez . Id. ¶ 21 (Pearce, J., dissenting).

¶3 We granted certiorari in light of the court of appeals’ open call for our reconsideration of Ramirez . And in the course of our consideration of this case a number of developments have ensued. We asked for supplemental briefing on the question of whether and to what extent the Ramirez factors set a freestanding guarantee of evidentiary reliability rooted in the Utah Constitution. We then reheard the case after a member of the court retired while the matter was under advisement. And in the meantime our court considered and promulgated a new rule of evidence governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. See UTAH R. EVID. 617 (effective November 1, 2019).

¶4 These developments have informed our consideration of the important questions presented in this case. In light of them we now take up the court of appeals’ request that we revisit the factors set forth in our decision in Ramirez . And we do so first by specifying the "order of operations" in assessing the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. We clarify that the threshold step in this assessment is a matter for our rules of evidence. We hold that those rules, including (in cases going forward) new rule 617 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, prescribe the factors that trial courts should consider in judging the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. And we note that our established rulemaking process lends itself nicely to adaptation over time in response to developments in scientific and legal scholarship in this important field.

¶5 We also contrast our adaptive rulemaking process with our settled method of constitutional interpretation. Our recent cases have clarified our carefully circumscribed role in interpreting the constitution. We have emphasized that the provisions of this charter document are not a license for common-law policymaking¹ but instead a fixed set of limits on the operation of our government. Such limits are interpreted in accordance with the public understanding of the constitution when it was originally established.² And these premises highlight a key limitation on the factors set forth in our Ramirez decision—the fact that the Ramirez court spoke vaguely of advancing constitutional "due process" interests but nowhere rooted the factors we adopted in the text or original understanding of the Utah Constitution. There is some tension and confusion in our case law on the question whether the Ramirez factors are mandated as a matter of state constitutional law.³ But it is clear that we have never identified a basis for these factors in the interpretive methodology that governs our approach to questions of state constitutional law—the original public meaning of the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. And that shortcoming is sufficient for us now to reinforce a point we alluded to in our decision in State v. Hubbard , which is that the Ramirez factors themselves are not rooted in constitutional soil. See 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27, 48 P.3d 953 (the Ramirez factors "provide guidance" but are not "exhaustive or exclusive" considerations in determining whether identifications are "violative of due process").

¶6 We revisit and clarify Ramirez on this basis. We endorse the need for revising and updating the factors set forth in that opinion. But we emphasize that the revising and updating is done as a matter of our revisions to the Utah Rules of Evidence, and not by treating the Utah Constitution as a vessel for judicial policymaking.

¶7 This is not to say that there is no role for the due process clause in a case like this one. Our decisions in Ramirez and Hubbard also reinforced a premise established under the federal Due Process Clause in binding precedent of the United States Supreme Court. That premise is that eyewitness identification evidence may be excluded if it is produced as a result of suggestive police activity and the taint of suggestive police procedures creates a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 201, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) ; see also Ramirez , 817 P.2d at 784 (considering reliability in the context of a "blatant[ly] suggestive[ ]" showup); Hubbard , 2002 UT 45, ¶¶ 23, 26, 48 P.3d 953 (examining whether "procedural actions taken by [police]" are so "impermissibly suggestive" as to create a "substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" under both the federal and state due process clauses). We endorse and reaffirm that principle here, which controls as a matter of stare decisis . But we clarify that in the face of suggestive police activity the due process standard is still only a constitutional backstop to the threshold inquiry into reliability and admissibility under our rules of evidence. And we emphasize that that threshold inquiry under our rules may render the constitutional inquiry unnecessary in many cases.

¶8 We thus reverse the court of appeals on the ground that the legal framework it established (and, indeed, the one it invited us to reconsider) is no longer viable. Because we have substantially reformed the law in this field, we might, in an ordinary case, be inclined to remand to the district court to allow it to apply our new standards to the facts of this case in the first instance. We see no need to do so here, however. Instead we reinstate the jury verdict on an alternative basis advanced by the State—on the ground that any arguable error in admitting the eyewitness identification evidence in this case was harmless in light of the other evidence in the record establishing Manuel Lujan’s guilt.

I

¶9 Early in the morning before sunrise on November 25, 2012, a man went out to get his car ready for an upcoming annual inspection. When he sat down in the driver’s seat he noticed that the car’s dome light was on and that someone had opened the rear driver’s side door. Then he saw a man who was later identified as Manuel Lujan, who closed the rear door and opened the driver’s door. Lujan squatted next to the driver’s seat with his face about eight to nine inches from the man’s face and asked, "why you following me?" Lujan then stood up, opened his jacket, and reached near his waist for what the man thought was a knife or gun. The man decided to retreat to the house, fearing he might be stabbed or shot.

¶10 At that point the man stood up, placing himself at eye level with Lujan and within such close proximity that the men were "almost touching." The man then slowly moved towards the house, maintaining visual contact with Lujan the entire time. Lujan followed the man, moving into the light of the car’s headlights. Once inside, the man turned on the floodlights, locked his door, and woke up his younger brother. The two stepped outside the house in time to see Lujan drive the car off the property. And the man’s brother quickly called the police, who responded shortly thereafter.

¶11 The man’s encounter with Lujan occurred before sunrise. But there were streetlights on across the street, the man’s porch light was on, and the car’s headlights and dome light remained on throughout the encounter.

¶12 When the police arrived at the man’s house, the man gave a description of the robber. He stated that the robber was about 5’10", 180 pounds, "Spanish," wearing a black jacket, and had " ‘longish hair’ [that] poked out of [a] beanie to ‘mid-ear length.’ " While the man was giving his statement, the...