State v. Lujan
| Decision Date | 19 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 12540,12540 |
| Citation | 1980 NMSC 36,94 N.M. 232,608 P.2d 1114 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noe D. LUJAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of Lujan for the first-degree murder of his former wife, Cecilia Lujan, and an acquaintance, Joey Trujillo. Lujan was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.
The issues raised on appeal follow.
I. Whether the trial court properly disallowed the testimony of two witnesses concerning statements made by Lujan's former wife concerning her infidelity?
II. Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on diminished capacity?
III. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter?
IV. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity?
We affirm the conviction of the defendant.
The facts of the case are relatively simple. The defendant, after being taunted by his ex-wife, Cecilia, an hour earlier in the evening, returned to the location where he had last seen her and shot and killed her. Nearly an hour later, defendant appeared at the home of Joey Trujillo, a long-time acquaintance, and shot and killed him. Lujan later surrendered to the police.
At trial, testimony was introduced to the effect that Lujan was suffering from a slight frontal cortical atrophy, and that he had difficulty controlling his emotions. There was conflicting evidence on whether Lujan could control himself or his emotions on the night of the crime.
The defense theory of the case was that the defendant's mental condition, coupled with a build-up of stress over a period of time, resulted in his inability to stop himself from committing the acts of killing Cecilia and Joey. The build-up of stress was said to be caused by the discovery of his wife's infidelity, a divorce and worries about his children.
At one point, the defense called Ramona Santillanes, who in a tender of proof offered testimony that Cecilia had admitted to her, while still married to defendant, that she had become involved in an adulterous affair with Joey, and that the defendant knew about it. The court ruled that the testimony was irrelevant and was hearsay. Another witness, Rose Chavez, who was a health worker, offered testimony that Cecilia had contracted a venereal disease from someone other than defendant. The court ruled this testimony irrelevant.
I. The defendant argues that the proffered testimony was relevant because it tended to establish Cecilia's infidelity to defendant, making the existence of his emotional stress more probable. He further argues that the Santillanes tender falls within the Rule 804(b)(4) hearsay exception as a statement against interest. N.M.R.Evid. 804(b)(4), N.M.S.A.1978.
The determination of relevancy is a discretionary ruling by the district court which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43 (Ct.App.1976). Here, there was no abuse of discretion because the testimony of both witnesses was merely cumulative of evidence of defendant's emotional stress and its causes already presented by other witnesses. See State v. Lovato, 91 N.M. 712, 580 P.2d 138 (Ct.App.1978), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978). As such, it was not prejudicial and does not require reversal. State v. Wright, 84 N.M. 3, 498 P.2d 695 (Ct.App.1972). We therefore do not reach the question of whether the Santillanes tender was within the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule.
II. The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in refusing to give a diminished capacity instruction based on an inability to form a deliberate intent. The Uniform Jury Instruction on insanity includes an optional sentence which states: "(e)ven if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane, you must still determine if he had the ability to form the deliberate intention to take away the life of another." N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.00, N.M.S.A.1978. The optional sentence is to be used when the defendant is charged with willful and deliberate first-degree murder and the evidence will support a finding of inability to form intent. N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.00 Use Note 3.
There is evidence in the record that the defendant was able to form a deliberate intention, with no evidence to the contrary. There was some expert testimony that the defendant was unable to control his...
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State v. Wilson
...Defendant and Complainant. Therefore, the trial court could properly exclude the evidence as cumulative. See State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 233, 608 P.2d 1114, 1115 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982). Further, determining whether the prejudi......
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