State v. Luke

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KIDWELL, Justice.
• Citation: State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 1 P.3d 795 (Idaho 2000)
• Decision Date: 26 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24465.,24465.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Henry William LUKE, Defendant-Appellant.

1 P.3d 795

134 Idaho 294

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Henry William LUKE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24465.

Supreme Court of Idaho. Coeur d'Alene, October 1999 Term.

April 26, 2000.

John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. J. Bradford Chapman argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Alison A. Stieglitz argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of conviction for attempted second degree murder and for burglary. The appellant claims that the jury verdict was the result of errors committed by the prosecutor and the district court. We affirm the conviction for burglary and vacate the conviction for attempted murder.

I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On December 3, 1996, Dorothy Kjera's son-in-law found Kjera in her home severely beaten and covered in blood. A pair of work gloves were found in the house in which the word "Luke" was handwritten inside each glove. The police investigated the case as a burglary and attempted murder.

On December 4, 1996, Henry William Luke was taken to the police station and questioned regarding the incident. Prior to questioning, Luke was given Miranda¹ warnings and acknowledged he understood. He signed a waiver of Miranda rights prior to being questioned about the burglary and attempted murder. During the questioning, Luke made incriminating statements. On December 5, 1996, the State charged Luke, by criminal complaint, with attempted murder in the second degree, burglary, and failure to register under the sex offender registration act.

An information was filed on January 10, 1997, charging Luke with attempted first degree murder. The information stated "without premeditation" and alleged torture, burglary and failure to register under the sex offender registration act. Luke entered a not guilty plea to all of the charges.

On May 12, 1997, Luke moved to suppress the statements he made to police at the station and to sever the failure to register charge from the other two charges. The motion to suppress alleged that the statements given to police were not made freely and voluntarily and violated Luke's rights under both the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions.

Ruling from the bench on October 20, 1997, the district court granted Luke's motion to sever. However, the court denied Luke's motion to suppress statements made during the police interrogation.

On November 18, 1997, the prosecuting attorney filed an amended information, again charging Luke with attempted murder in the first degree and burglary.

Also on November 18, 1997, the jury trial of Luke began. Following the seating and swearing-in of the jurors, Luke told his attorney that juror number twelve was one of the guards at the jail. The court allowed voir dire to be reopened and the juror was questioned by counsel for both sides as well as by the court. Following the questions, and upon objection, the court allowed juror number twelve to remain on the jury.

Following the presentation of both sides' cases, proposed jury instructions were discussed. Over the objection of Luke's counsel, the proposed instructions were adopted and submitted to the jury.

The jury returned its verdict on November 26, 1997, finding Luke guilty of burglary and of attempted murder in the second degree. The court sentenced him to a fixed fifteen-year term for the attempted murder, and a one-year fixed term for the burglary. Luke now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Luke Voluntarily, Knowingly, And Intelligently Waived His Miranda Rights.

Luke argues that since the police did not inform him of the exact reason for the interrogation, his waiver of Miranda was ineffective. Additionally, Luke argues that because he has limited mental skills, the waiver of his Miranda rights was not intelligently or knowingly given.

When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). When statements made by a defendant during the course of an in-custody interrogation are offered at trial, the State "must establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the suspect's rights." State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1983). The trial court's conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 498, 660 P.2d at 1341.

It is undisputed that Luke signed a waiver of his Miranda rights prior to being questioned by the police. An express written statement, waving Miranda rights, is strong, but not conclusive, proof of voluntary waiver. Id. at 497, 660 P.2d at 1340. However, Luke argues that the waiver was not voluntary because he was not informed of the specific allegation of attempted murder when he waived his rights.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled conclusively on the issue. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that when a suspect has been given Miranda warnings, it "conveys to a suspect the nature of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of abandoning it." Id at 577, 107 S.Ct. at 859, 93 L.Ed.2d at 968. The Court concluded that "a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.

In addition, this Court has determined that when a waiver is obtained, "it is not essential that a suspect be informed of the charges against her before being interrogated." Mitchell, 104 Idaho at 497, 660 P.2d at 1340. Therefore, considering both Idaho and federal law we hold that Luke's Miranda waiver was sufficient.

Next, Luke argues that even if the waiver was valid, the statements were not voluntary because the tactics used by the police overcame Luke's will due to his low mental ability. However, this argument is undercut by statements made by both his attorney² and his expert witness. At the suppression hearing, Luke's trial attorney admitted that the expert's testimony "was that if the Mirandas were read, [to] Mr. Luke, which they were, he could comprehend, so we're not making that an issue."

Additional evidence of Luke's mental ability is found in statements he made to the investigators during questioning. While his statements were generally responsive and cooperative, he did make comments that show he was mentally alert enough to understand the investigators' tactics. Twice he suggested that the investigators were trying to put words in his mouth. He explained that "you say that I did and I don't remember ever working for her." Then again "you guys said I went walking around the house looking for money." It is reasonable to conclude that Luke was able to recognize the interrogation tactics of the police during the investigation. It follows that if he recognized the interrogation techniques he was certainly keen enough not to be tricked or misled into giving an involuntary waiver.

Luke next argues that the investigators' promise of leniency was sufficient to overcome his will when the officer told him that "[i]f your cooperation is given to the prosecutor, he can pass it on to the judge and that can be in your favor or they may dismiss it."

When considering whether the statements given by a suspect were the product of coercion by police misconduct, this Court examines the totality of the circumstances to determine if the statement was the product of a rational intellect and of a free will. Mitchell, 104 Idaho at 499, 660 P.2d at 1342. Promises of leniency, in and of themselves, do not necessarily render a confession involuntary. State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 680, 603 P.2d 1009, 1014 (1979).

In Alger, this Court considered whether a promise of leniency should be enough to find that a confession was not voluntary. Id. at 679, 603 P.2d at 1013. While this Court ultimately determined that there was not enough evidence to determine whether the promises had, in fact, been made, it did provide some guidance. In noting that cooperation would be brought to the attention of the judge, the Court explained that "[i]ndications of cooperation are routinely brought to the attention of a sentencing judge and cases before this Court are replete with examples of such statements." Id.

The district court found that the interview was conducted properly, and, in fact, in a "rather gentle manner." The district court acknowledged that police tactics were employed, but that "[t]here was no deception here. Nothing the officers did was untruthful." While considering the promise of leniency, the district court found that "there's nothing here where I can find that there was anything in the way of a promise made by the officers to the defendant to do anything other than to encourage him by various means."

We conclude that there was substantial evidence in the record upon which the district court based its decision to deny the motion to suppress. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress Luke's statements to police.

B. The District Court Did Not Deny Luke A Fair Trial By Allowing Juror Number Twelve To Remain On The Jury.

Luke argues that the district court erred when it allowed one of the jurors, Mr. Gregg, to sit on the jury when Gregg was a jailor at the jail in which Luke was held. Luke contends that the two prongs of Idaho Code § 19-2020 dealing with juror challenge for cause have been met, and therefore the district court should not have allowed Gregg to serve on the jury.

The determination of whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997). On appeal, this...