State v. Lukins
| Decision Date | 16 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–2221.,12–2221. |
| Citation | 846 N.W.2d 902 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tony Gene LUKINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David R. Johnson of Brinton, Bordwell & Johnson, Clarion, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, and Micah J. Schreurs, County Attorney, for appellee.
Tony Lukins was arrested for operating while intoxicated. After registering a .207 on a breath test at the O'Brien County jail, Lukins made several statements to the arresting officer indicating his desire to retake the breath test. After a great deal of discussion, the officer denied Lukins's request. Prior to trial, Lukins moved to suppress the breath-test result arguing suppression was required because he had been denied his statutory right to an independent chemical test. The district court denied Lukins's motion, and after a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, it convicted Lukins of operating while intoxicated, second offense. Lukins appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, holding the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The State sought further review, which we granted. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.
Around 1:40 a.m. on February 9, 2012, Chief of Police Timothy Rohrbaugh witnessed a black pickup truck run a stop sign in Sutherland, Iowa. After following the truck a short distance, Rohrbaugh turned on his police cruiser's flashing lights. The truck did not stop. Rohrbaugh pursued the truck onto a highway, where the truck reached speeds of more than eighty miles per hour. At one point, the truck was jerked back onto the pavement after veering into a ditch. After the truck was straightened, it travelled a short distance and came to a stop.
Rohrbaugh went to the truck and immediately suspected the driver had been drinking. He smelled alcohol and noticed the driver had slurred speech and a bloody chin. The driver, Tony Lukins, stated he “had a few of beers at the bar.”
After being requested by Rohrbaugh to perform field sobriety tests, Lukins agreed to do so. After completing three of the four field sobriety tests, Rohrbaugh asked Lukins to get into his squad car. While Rohrbaugh removed items from off the front passenger seat, Lukins stumbled and fell down into the ditch beside the road. After Lukins got into the squad car, Rohrbaugh conducted a preliminary breath test. After confirming the preliminary breath test indicated Lukins's blood alcohol content was above the legal limit, Rohrbaugh arrested him for operating while intoxicated and transported him to the county jail in Primghar, Iowa.
At the jail, Rohrbaugh read Lukins the implied consent advisory and requested Lukins consent to a Breathalyzer test. Lukins, who was bleeding from a cut on his chin, consented to the Breathalyzer test. The Datamaster result of the Breathalyzer test was .207, over the legal limit of .08. After Rohrbaugh informed Lukins of this result, the following conversation was captured by the jail's security cameras:
LUKINS (looking at and gesturing toward the Breathalyzer machine): No, can I get a re-check?
ROHRBAUGH (tapping the breath-test machine): A re-check of this?
After Rohrbaugh read Lukins advisories about the revocation of his driver's license, Lukins returned to the issue of the test:
....
No second test or independent chemical test was offered or performed.
On March 5, Lukins was charged by trial information with operating while intoxicated, second offense, under Iowa Code sections 321J.2(1)( a ) and 321J.2(1)( b ).1SeeIowa Code § 321J.2(1)( a ), ( b ) (2011). Prior to trial, Lukins filed a motion to suppress the Breathalyzer results. Lukins argued his statements at the county jail implicated his right to obtain an independent chemical test under Iowa Code section 321J.11.2 According to Lukins, once he implicated the right, officers were required to advise him of his right to obtain an independent chemical test. The officers' failure to do so, Lukins insisted, was a denial of his right to an independent chemical test. Because Lukins was not provided a reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test, he argued the results of the breath test should be suppressed. The State resisted.
After a hearing, the district court issued its ruling on Lukins's motion. The district court found based on the video recording that Lukins's requests could not reasonably be construed as requesting an independent test. The district court instead concluded Lukins requested a second test using the Breathalyzer machine. According to the district court, these statements were inadequate to invoke Lukins's statutory right to an independent chemical test. Therefore, the district court denied Lukins's motion to suppress the Breathalyzer results.
On November 15, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony. The district court found Lukins guilty of operating while intoxicated, second offense. The district court sentenced Lukins the same day.
Lukins appealed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed, holding Lukins had invoked his right to an independent chemical test. The court of appeals reasoned that once Lukins invoked the right, officers were required to inform him of his right to obtain an independent chemical test. Because the officers had not done so, the results of the Breathalyzer test should have been suppressed. The court of appeals remanded for a new trial.
The State sought further review, which we granted.
The district court denied Lukins's motion to suppress based on its interpretation of Iowa Code section 321J.11. We review for correction of errors at law a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on the interpretation of a statute. State v. Madison, 785 N.W.2d 706, 707–08 (Iowa 2010); State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Iowa 2010).
A. Invocation of the Right to an Independent Test.Iowa Code section 321J.11, in relevant part, provides:
The person [whose breath, blood, or urine is being examined to determine blood alcohol concentration] may have an independent chemical test or tests administered at the person's own expense in addition to any administered at the direction of a peace officer.
Iowa Code § 321J.11.
In this case, we address whether Lukins adequately invoked his statutory right to an independent chemical test. The State argues Lukins did not do so. According to the State, Lukins's statements indicate he sought only to take a second test using the Breathalyzer machine, an opportunity to which he was not statutorily entitled. Lukins, on the other hand, contends his statements should have been reasonably construed by officers as a request for an independent chemical test, at which point they should have informed him of his statutory right to an independent chemical test. He argues their failure to do so requires suppression of the Breathalyzer results obtained by Rohrbaugh.
Lukins likens this case to those in which we have interpreted Iowa Code section 804.20. That statute provides a peace officer must permit a person “arrested or restrained of the person's liberty ... to call, consult, and see a member of the person's family or an attorney of the person's choice, or both.” Id. § 804.20. Unlike the statute before us in this case, we have thoroughly delineated under Iowa Code section 804.20 a peace officer's obligation to explain the detainee's rights when a detainee implicates his or her right to make a telephone call and the standard used to determine whether a detainee has adequately invoked that right.
In Didonato v. Iowa Department of Transportation, after his arrest for operating while intoxicated, a detainee asked to call a friend, but the police officer denied him the opportunity to make the telephone call. 456 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Iowa 1990). Despite affirming the detainee's license revocation, we explained that “when a request to make a phone call is made” an officer cannot refuse the request even “if the request is to call a friend.” Id. at 371. If the suspect requests to call a friend, “the statute is implicated and the officer should then advise for what purpose a phone call is permitted under” Iowa Code section 804.20. Id. We later reaffirmed this rule. See State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 2009) (...
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