State v. Luther

• Decision Date: 09 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 29027.,29027.
• Citation: 114 Conn.App. 799,971 A.2d 781
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jason LUTHER.

971 A.2d 781

114 Conn.App. 799

STATE of Connecticut v. Jason LUTHER.

No. 29027.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 12, 2009.

Decided June 9, 2009.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Donald S. MacCalmon, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPENTIMA, GRUENDEL and SCHALLER, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The defendant, Jason Luther, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35(a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his federal and state constitutional rights¹ to a fair trial were violated when a state's witness testified in violation of the trial court's ruling that granted the defendant's motion in limine to preclude certain testimony, (2) his federal and state constitutional rights² to a fair trial were violated due to prosecutorial impropriety,³ and (3) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding consciousness of guilt. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the night of January 22, 2006, the New Haven police department received a complaint that the defendant had used a gun to threaten an individual. On the basis of this complaint, Officers Daniel Hartnet and Ronald Pressley of the New Haven police, along with two other officers, decided to search for the defendant at the home of his former girlfriend, Natasha Jones, and their two children at 255 Newhall Street, New Haven. Hartnet and two other officers approached the front door of Jones' third floor apartment while Pressley secured the back door in the event that the defendant attempted to escape.

The three officers knocked on the front door, and Jones answered. She informed the officers that the defendant was not there and that she did not know where he was. She allowed them to search her apartment.

At substantially the same time, the defendant appeared in front of the railing of the steps leading from the back door of 255 Newhall Street. Pressley, who was positioned behind the neighboring house at 253 Newhall Street, immediately identified himself as a police officer and told the defendant to "freeze." When the defendant did not comply, Pressley advanced toward him and ordered him to put his hands where Pressley could see them. Again, the defendant did not comply. Instead, the defendant took small steps in the opposite direction and turned his body so that one side of it was not in view. Pressley issued his third order for the defendant to stop, drew his weapon and continued advancing toward the defendant. The defendant bent to his side and slowly removed an object from his pocket. Pressley, for the fourth time, yelled at the defendant to show his hands.

The defendant dropped the object to his side, turned around and surrendered. At this time, Pressley was unable to identify the object that the defendant had removed from his pocket, and he did not hear anything hit the ground.

Pressley then called the three officers who were still inside the apartment. He informed them of the location of the defendant, and they immediately came to assist in his apprehension. After the defendant had been placed in police custody, Pressley went back to the area where he had observed the defendant drop an object and located a loaded and operable .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol.

The jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm.⁴ The court sentenced the defendant to four and one-half years incarceration and six years of special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that his right to a fair trial was violated when a state's witness testified in violation of the court's ruling on the motion in limine. He argues that the denial of his subsequent motion for a mistrial deprived him of his right to a fair trial and that the curative instruction given by the court did not cure the prejudice resulting from the violation. We disagree.

At trial, the defendant filed, and the court granted, a motion in limine precluding the state from introducing evidence regarding any events that transpired prior to the officers' arrival at 255 Newhall Street and any testimony from the defendant's father that he allegedly witnessed the defendant in possession of a gun earlier that day. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed, however, that the state's witnesses could testify that the police decided to search for the defendant as the result of a prior investigation. During direct examination of Pressley, the prosecutor asked why the police had decided to search for the defendant. That question initiated the following colloquy, which forms the basis of the defendant's claim on appeal:

"[The Witness]: The nature of the call [was] a gun call, allegedly he had pulled out a gun—

"[The Prosecutor]: Okay.

"[The Witness]:—on his father."

The defendant objected, and the court excused the jury. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that Pressley's statement violated the ruling on the motion in limine. He claimed that the violation was unduly prejudicial because "there [is] a certain connotation with a father making these allegations against a son." The state responded that the violation was inadvertent and that any prejudice could be remedied by a curative instruction. The court found that the violation was an isolated incident, was not done in bad faith and merely referenced a complaint and not a threat. It further found that the violation caused no irreparable prejudice. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial and immediately provided the jury with a curative instruction.⁵

During deliberations, the jury requested a playback of Pressley's entire testimony. Consequently, the jury heard the curative instruction a second time.⁶ Additionally, the court's charge to the jury at the beginning and the end of the trial included instructions to disregard any and all stricken evidence.

The defendant claims that the denial of his motion for a mistrial deprived him of his right to a fair trial. At the outset, we note that "[w]hile the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial ... and the whole proceedings are vitiated.... If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coltherst, 87 Conn.App. 93, 99, 864 A.2d 869, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 919, 871 A.2d 371 (2005).

"On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that there was irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case such that it denied him a fair trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taveras, 49 Conn.App. 639, 652, 716 A.2d 120, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 917, 722 A.2d 809 (1998). In determining whether the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial, "[e]very reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the trial court's ruling ... because the trial court, which has a firsthand impression of the jury, is in the best position to evaluate the critical question of whether the juror's or jurors' exposure has prejudiced a defendant. ... It is only when an abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done that a reversal will result from the trial court's exercise of discretion.... A reviewing court gives great weight to curative instructions in assessing error." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vitale, 76 Conn. App. 1, 13, 818 A.2d 134, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 906, 826 A.2d 178 (2003).

In State v. Henderson, 47 Conn.App. 542, 706 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829 (1998), this court held that the denial of a motion for a mistrial in a similar situation was not an abuse of discretion. In Henderson, the trial court granted a motion in limine precluding the state from introducing evidence tending to show that the defendant sold stolen goods on the day prior to his arrest. Id., at 555 n. 8, 706 A.2d 480. The state elicited testimony, however, from a store detective that on the previous day he had witnessed the defendant purchasing several "high ticket" items that easily could be resold on the street. Id., at 556, 706 A.2d 480. The court sustained the defendant's objection and issued a curative instruction but denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Id., at 556-57, 706 A.2d 480. On appeal, this court determined that the denial of the motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion because the improper testimony was not "of such a magnitude and character that as a result, [the defendant] did not receive a fair trial." Id., at 557, 706 A.2d 480.

Likewise, the improper testimony in the present case did not rise to the level such that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Both defense counsel and the state had agreed that the state's witnesses could testify that the police decided to search for the defendant as the result of a prior investigation. Prior to Pressley's testimony, Hartnet testified, without objection, that they decided to search for the defendant on the basis of a prior weapons complaint. Therefore, the only new information the jury learned from Pressley's improper testimony was the identity of the complainant. The key issue at trial was whether the gun found at 255 Newhall Street belonged to the defendant. The identity of the complainant had no bearing on whether the...