State v. Lyles

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: OXNER, A. J.:
• Citation: State v. Lyles, 210 S.C. 87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (S.C. 1947)
• Decision Date: 28 February 1947
• Docket Number: 15920.
• Parties: STATE v. LYLES.

41 S.E.2d 625

210 S.C. 87

STATE v. LYLES.

No. 15920.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 28, 1947

C. T. Graydon and J. Bratton Davis, both of Columbia, for appellant.

T. Pou Taylor, of Columbia, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

Upon an indictment charging the offense of assault and battery with intent to kill, appellant was tried and found guilty of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The trial Judge imposed a sentence of two years. The alleged assault occurred in the City of Columbia at about 9 p.m. on July 31, 1946.

The first three exceptions impute error on the part of the trial Judge in permitting the solicitor to propound certain questions which appellant contends were leading. Although these exceptions are not referred to in appellant's brief, they were orally argued. It is well settled that where an objection is made to a question on the ground that it is leading, a wide discretion is vested in the trial Judge and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of discretion. State v. Marchbanks, 61 S.C 17, 39 S.E. 187; State v. Williams, 76 S.C. 135, 56 S.E. 783; State v. Hester et al., 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; State v. Cook, 204 S.C. 295, 28 S.E.2d 842. We find no abuse of discretion in the instant case.

Exception 8 grows out of the cross-examination of the only character witness offered by appellant. This witness testified on direct examination that she had known appellant for approximately fifteen years and that his reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was good. On cross-examination by the solicitor, she was asked whether she knew that appellant had been tried for murder in the Court of General Sessions for Richland County. Appellant's counsel then stated that the murder charge resulted in an acquittal by direction of the Court and objected to any further reference to that offense. The objection was overruled and the witness stated that she remembered the trial. The murder charge was not again referred to until after the witness was cross-examined as to her opportunity for knowing appellant's reputation. She was then asked if she was present when appellant was tried for murder. Appellant's counsel objected. The objection was sustained and the Court ruled that the solicitor could not again refer to this charge. Thereupon appellant's counsel procured the record in that case and introduced same which disclosed that the murder charge against appellant resulted in a verdict of 'not guilty by direction of the Court'.

Appellant contends that the Court erred in permitting the solicitor to interrogate this witness as to the murder charge because (1) the State could not rebut evidence of good character by showing that appellant had been previously charged with some particular crime, and (2) it was improper in any event to inquire into a charge upon which appellant had been tried and acquitted.

While there are some cases to the contrary, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that a character witness testifying to the good reputation of the accused, may be asked on cross-examination with respect to rumors or reports of particular crimes or acts imputed to the accused involving traits of character which the accused has put in issue, not for the purpose of establishing the truth of such charges but to test the witness's credibility and to enable the jury to ascertain the weight to be given to his testimony. See annotation in 71 A.L.R., page 1504. An extensive review of the cases, as well as the views of various text-writers will also be found in the well considered case of Spalitto v. U.S., 8 Cir., 39 F.2d 782. The decisions of this Court have been in harmony with the general rule. State v. Merriman, 34 S.C. 16, 12 S.E. 619; State v. Dill, 48 S.C. 249, 26 S.E. 567. In State v. Merriman, supra [34 S.C. 16, 12 S.E. 627] the Court said: 'There can be no doubt that when a witness is put upon the stand to attack or defend character he can only be asked, on the examination in chief, as to the general character of the person whose character is in question, and he will not be permitted to testify to particular facts, either favorable or unfavorable, to such person; but when the witness is subjected to cross-examination he may then be asked, with a view to test the value of his testimony, as to particular facts. In the eye of the law the character of a person is to be ascertained by an inquiry as to what is generally said and thought of him in the community where he resides. Hence, when a witness has testified on his examination in chief that the person as to whose character the inquiry is instituted bears a good character, his opinion and the value of it may be tested by asking the witness on his cross-examination whether he has ever heard that the person whose character is in question has been accused of doing acts wholly inconsistent with the character which he has attributed to him.'

Such cross-examination is subject to the discretionary control of the trial Judge who should restrain its abuse. The cross-examiner must be fair and act in good faith. The matters inquired about should not be merely chimerical, or drawn from the vivid imagination of opposing counsel, but the inquiry should be directed only to those matters concerning which the cross-examiner has information warranting a reasonable belief on his part that the fact is as is implied by the question.

It is clear from the foregoing authorities that it was permissible for the solicitor to inquire of this character witness whether she had ever heard of appellant's being charged with murder. It developed during this cross-examination that the charge referred to resulted in an acquittal. This fact only went to the weight of the testimony. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive under these circumstances how appellant could have been prejudiced. State v. Jacobs, 111 S.C. 283, 97 S.E. 835.

Exception 7 has been abandoned. The remaining exceptions (4, 5 and 6) relate to omissions in the charge to the jury.

Under exception 6 it is contended that the trial Judge erred in failing to charge that the jury 'had a right to consider the defendant's good character and reputation and that it was a substantial fact in the case, if proven, and should be considered...