State v. Lyman

Decision Date08 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 07-1999.,07-1999.
Citation776 N.W.2d 865
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. June Betty LYMAN, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

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Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Terry C. Ganzel, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

The defendant appeals from her conviction for second-degree murder alleging that the district court erred in holding she was competent to stand trial and by failing to instruct the jury that murder in the second degree is a specific intent crime. She also claims her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to redact and/or object to the introduction of evidence depicting the defendant's repeated invocations of her right to remain silent as well as failing to object to prosecution references to these statements during closing arguments. In this appeal, we find the district court correctly determined the defendant was competent to stand trial and that she was not entitled to a specific intent instruction. We also find the record inadequate to decide her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

June Lyman dropped out of high school and married Bob Auen when she was fifteen years old. She had three daughters and one son during the course of the marriage. A court dissolved her marriage after seven or eight years. In 1967 June married Leo Lyman, Sr. Their relationship was rocky. During the marriage, Leo allegedly sexually assaulted June's three daughters from her first marriage. In May 1970 Leo was charged with three counts of lascivious acts with a child but the case was later dismissed for lack of prosecution. The couple divorced in July 1979 but later remarried in November. The couple divorced for a second time in 1998; however, they remarried a third time sometime before 2006. In 2004, Sandra, one of June's three daughters, committed suicide causing June to experience increased depression and anxiety.

At approximately 8:14 p.m. on May 15, 2006, June called her daughter-in-law and asked to speak to her son. He was not home, so she hung up. Seven minutes later, an anonymous female called 911, gave an address, requested police assistance, and reported a dead body in the residence. The phone used to make the call was listed under June's name and the address provided was her residence. At 8:31 p.m., June called her daughter-in-law and again asked to speak to her son. At 8:33 p.m., June called her daughter-in-law for a third time, again asked to speak to her son, and then stated, "oh, God, I just shot Dad" and hung up.

Deputy Todd Peterson arrived at June's residence around the time June made the last call to her daughter-in-law. Upon entering the residence, he noticed Leo lying on the floor on his right side, facing the door, with blood coming from his mouth. He also saw a revolver lying on the floor directly behind Leo. The police later identified the revolver as the murder weapon. While Peterson was checking Leo's vitals, June entered the room, stood over Leo, and told Peterson that he deserved what he got, he was a child molester, and she hoped he was dead. June further stated that he should have been dead a long time ago, she had shot him, and her fingerprints were all over the gun.

A volunteer EMT, who was on the scene to administer first aid, confirmed Leo was dead. He had been shot four times, with the lethal shot striking him in the left lower chest. While working on Leo, the EMT heard June say, "yes, I did it. I shot him." At the scene, Peterson observed that June spoke coherently, appeared to understand what was going on, and at one point even asked to make a phone call so that someone could take care of her dog. Peterson smelled alcohol in the residence and on June's breath. He noticed there were numerous beer cans in the kitchen. He also thought June's words were not slurred, but her balance was a little unsteady. June admitted to him that she was intoxicated.

Peterson read June the Miranda warning at approximately 8:37 p.m. Peterson observed that June appeared to understand her rights when he read them to her. A short time thereafter, she requested an attorney. Peterson allowed June to call her daughter-in-law before transporting her to the law enforcement center. During the transport, June voluntarily made numerous incriminating statements that were recorded by the patrol car's video recording system, such as, "I shot the motherfucker," "I've already admitted to you I killed him," and "I shot the fucker. Hey, and I can't deny it. My fingerprints are on the gun." During the transport, June also repeatedly referenced her right to an attorney and her right to remain silent.

Upon arriving at the law enforcement center, Deputy Todd Wieck walked June to an office. June appeared to act normal, seemed to know what was going on, did not slur her words, and did not appear intoxicated. Wieck placed June in an office furnished with videotape equipment. Another deputy informed her that she was being recorded and reread the Miranda warning. After hearing the Miranda warning for a second time, June again stated, "I want an attorney." Due to her request, the officers did not question her. However, rather than remaining silent, June continued to voluntarily make incriminating statements such as, "I shot the gun," "I never thought it was that easy to die or I would have done it a long time ago," and "well, it's not self-defense actually. I wasn't threatened, but I had a reasonable reason." At the same time, June continued to request an attorney and state that she probably should not be saying anything.

While at the law enforcement center, investigators performed a blood-alcohol-content test on June. A deputy administered a breath test at approximately 12:32 a.m. to determine June's blood-alcohol content. June admitted to drinking ten beers and stated she felt buzzed at the time the test was administered. The test's final reading confirmed that June's blood-alcohol content was 0.133. Using a standard absorption rate, June's blood-alcohol content was approximately 0.213 at the time she called 911. Moreover, June also had prescriptions for the drugs Lipitor, Wellbutrin XL, Alprazolam, Naproxen, Daltiazem, Premarin, and Triamterene at the time of the shooting.

The State charged June with murder in the first degree. June filed a motion requesting the district court determine whether she was competent to stand trial. She claimed an inability to remember and recall facts surrounding the shooting, making her unable to assist her attorneys in preparing her defense and rendering her incompetent pursuant to Iowa Code section 812.3 (2005).1

After hearing testimony from experts on both sides, the district court concluded June had failed to carry her burden of proof to show her incompetence. Therefore, the presumption of June's competency prevailed. Accordingly, the court denied the motion and set the matter for trial.

June then filed a motion for the adjudication of a law point, seeking a determination from the court regarding whether second-degree murder, under Iowa Code section 707.3, is a specific intent crime. The district court stated its preliminary observation and research indicated second-degree murder was not a specific intent crime. However, the court deferred action on the motion to the time and place June made her record on the jury instructions.

At trial, the State played the full video recordings of June's transport to the law enforcement center as well as her later detention in an office located within the center. At no point during the presentation of this evidence did her attorneys object or ask to redact any portion of the videos.

At the conclusion of the evidence, June renewed her argument that because assault, a specific intent crime, is a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, the specific intent required for an assault must be proven to establish second-degree murder. Therefore, June argued that to establish second-degree murder the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the specific intent to commit an assault even though the State need not establish a specific intent to kill. The district court denied June's motion and found that second-degree murder is a general intent crime.

During the State's closing argument, the prosecuting attorney referred three times to June's invocation of her right to remain silent by requesting an attorney. June's counsel did not object to these references. The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding June guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree. June appeals.

II. Issues.

In this appeal, June raises three issues. First, we must determine whether the district court's determination that June was competent to stand trial was correct. Next, we must decide whether the district court properly instructed the jury with regard to the elements of murder in the second degree. Finally, we must consider whether June's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to redact and/or object to the introduction of the video evidence depicting June's repeated invocations of her right to remain silent by requesting an attorney and for failing to object to references concerning these invocations made in the prosecutor's closing argument.

III. Competence to Stand Trial.

A. Standard of Review. June claims the standard of review is de novo. The State claims the standard of review is for correction of errors at law and that we are bound by the district court's finding of competency, if it is supported by substantial evidence. June and the State cite Iowa authority for their respective positions. Accordingly, to determine the proper...

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