State v. Lynaugh, 86-208

Decision Date08 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-208,86-208
Citation530 A.2d 555,148 Vt. 124
PartiesSTATE of Vermont v. Bernard H. LYNAUGH.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Robert M. Butterfield, Caledonia County Deputy State's Atty., St. Johnsbury, for plaintiff-appellee.

Richard A. Axelrod and Steven A. Adler of Gensburg & Axelrod, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-appellant.

Before ALLEN, C.J., PECK, J., BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.), COSTELLO, District Judge (Ret.) and MARTIN, Superior Judge, Specially Assigned.

BARNEY, Chief Justice (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

The Caledonia Circuit of the district court held a hearing under 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a) to determine whether the defendant had refused to submit to an evidentiary test designed to determine his blood alcohol content in connection with a charge of driving while intoxicated. The district court took testimony and received exhibits, made findings of fact and determined that there had been a refusal. The matter was referred to the Caledonia Superior Court for review. That court heard oral argument and reviewed the record, but heard no testimony. It, in turn, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law which validated the decision of the district court. The matter was brought here by notice of appeal. We affirm.

The defendant raises two issues: The first is that the proceedings in superior court should have taken the form of a de novo hearing. The second is that because the defendant ultimately offered to take a test, he should have been allowed to, and therefore there was no refusal at law.

The defendant was observed driving erratically in St. Johnsbury by two local police officers at about 8:40 p.m. When the officers stopped the pick-up involved, the defendant exited the driver's side and fell against the body of the truck. There were no defects in the road surface. He was asked for his license, but had difficulty in finding it. When he went to look in the cab, he completely lost his balance and stumbled. The officers testified, and the court found, that there was a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his speech was slurred, he swayed and his eyes were bloodshot and watery. The defendant was then asked by the officers to perform some field sobriety tests and he said, "I can't pass them. You've got me."

He was then taken to the station for processing. By this time it was about nine o'clock. The defendant was given the Miranda warnings and then the arresting officer read to him the rather extended form by which his rights under the implied consent law are spelled out and his response to a test request is recorded. Both officers were certified to operate breath testing equipment.

The defendant indicated that he did not understand the Miranda warnings. The officer read them to him, but got no acknowledgement. The defendant also indicated he did not understand his rights relative to the breath test when they were read to him. The arresting officer then read the form sentence by sentence, inquiring at the end of each sentence as to whether the defendant understood. With each affirmative answer the officer moved on to the next sentence. At the end of the form, when the officer asked him if he understood what the officer had read to him, the defendant said he did not.

The officer then asked the defendant if he would like to speak to an attorney. The defendant said, "No." The officer asked him if he would consent to a breath test. The defendant said, "No." At that point, in spite of the defendant's earlier rejection of an offer to get him counsel, the arresting officer, acting on his own, made arrangements for the defendant to confer privately with a lawyer. By this time it was 9:15 p.m.

The defendant did speak with the attorney for some four or five minutes. After that consultation the officer again read the refusal form to the defendant and asked him if he would take the test. The defendant remarked that the officer did not ask him to take the test "the first time" and therefore the officer "blew it." The officer repeated the request and the defendant again refused to take the test. That refusal was minuted at 9:26 p.m. The officer then proceeded to fill out an arrest report and the defendant refused to answer any questions.

During the time the defendant was being processed he was told not to smoke. It was argued that smoking could cast doubt on any breath test, but this does not appear in the findings. He was also preemptorily ordered to stay seated when he attempted to get up. It is conceded that the defendant was difficult to process. The officer's report shows defendant as both difficult and arrogant. The reviewing court commented that the officers exhibited patience throughout.

The second officer had little or nothing to do with the processing, but in assembling the crimper device for possible use in testing, he fumbled with the filter and almost dropped it. The defendant expressed concern about this. This officer was also certified to give tests by the Criminal Justice Training Council.

After the arresting officer had told the defendant that processing was complete and he was free to go, and he had been given a...

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6 cases
  • Suazo, Matter of
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1994
    ...that appellant's request to take the breath test, after twice refusing to do so ... was unreasonable."); Vermont, State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 530 A.2d 555, 558 (1987) (stating that after "prolonged interchange" with driver, and after repeated refusals to take test, driver's decision to t......
  • State v. Bonvie
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • August 24, 2007
    ...to respond to good faith and timely changes of mind" with respect to a request to take a breathalyzer test in State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 127, 530 A.2d 555, 558 (1987). There, the defendant expressly refused to take the test twice, was described as "difficult and arrogant" during his pro......
  • State v. Strong, 91-058
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • January 10, 1992
    ...for criminal offenses" does not apply, and preponderance of the evidence is adequate standard of proof); State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 126-27, 530 A.2d 555, 557 (1987) (since license suspension for failure to take breath test occurs in a civil administrative proceeding, party seeking revie......
  • Shaw v. Vermont Dist. Court, Unit No. 3, Franklin Circuit
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1989
    ...grounds to believe that plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Lynaugh, 148 Vt. 124, 126-27, 530 A.2d 555, 557 (1987). The record clearly supports the district court's determination that reasonable grounds to believe plaintiff was the oper......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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