State v. Lynch

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: FRITCH, J.S.C.
• Docket Number: 24-12-1941
• Decision Date: 12 February 2026
• Citation: State v. Lynch, 24-12-1941 (N.J. Super. Feb 12, 2026)
• Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff, v. EDWARD LYNCH, JR., Defendant.

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD LYNCH, JR., Defendant.

No. 24-12-1941

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean

February 12, 2026

Shannon Chant-Berry, Assistant Prosecutor, attorney for plaintiff (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney).

Clifford Yannone, attorney for defendant (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally, Cunningham, Turnbach &Yannone, attorneys).

COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS

FRITCH, J.S.C.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

THIS MATTER comes before the court on a motion to challenge an evaluation of the defendant provided by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 on August 8, 2025, which concluded that the defendant was not eligible for sentencing under the purview

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of the New Jersey Sex Offender Act (NJSOA), N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 to -10. The defendant's motion relies upon the recognized due process rights afforded to a defendant in challenging a classification by DOC that they are a persistent and compulsive sexual offender requiring sentencing under the NJSOA. The defendant seeks to apply these rights to challenge a DOC determination declining to make such a classification. The defendant asks this court to sentence him to a term of incarceration to be served at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) for sex offender treatment in the absence of a DOC recommendation that the defendant meets the statutory requirements for such a sentence.

On May 19, 2025, the defendant pled guilty to count one of Indictment 24-12-1941, charging him with Distribution of Child Pornography, first degree, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4B(5)(A)(1). In exchange for the defendant's plea, the State agreed to seek a sentence of ten years New Jersey State Prison, with mandatory ten years parole ineligibility, parole supervision for life, and Megan's Law registration, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. Following the entry of this plea, the court referred the defendant to the DOC for a complete psychological evaluation on May 23, 2025, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1. On August 8, 2025, the DOC submitted the results of this evaluation (the Evaluation). The Evaluation, prepared by Andrew Greenberg, Psy.D., a forensic

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mental health clinician with the ADTC at Avenel, concluded that:

Based on a review of the available record as well as information solicited from [the defendant] during this examination, there is evidence of repetition for statutory purposes as [the defendant] was viewing numerous items of CSEM [(child sexual exploitation material)] over an extended period of time. The element of compulsivity is less clear. [The defendant's] offense behavior appears influenced b[y] a chemically intoxicated state caused by crack cocaine, which he noted smoking habitually for a period of approximately five years, during the period in his life he was engaging in the instant offense behavior. [The defendant] denied any interest in CSEM, sexual or otherwise, prior to his using crack cocaine. When all relevant factors related to this case are considered, there is insufficient evidence to conclude [the defendant's] offense behavior was in response to a compulsion independent of the influence of crack cocaine or other factors. Therefore, he is not eligible for sentencing under the purview of the [N]SOA].

The defendant, through counsel, filed the present motion on October 2, 2025, contending that, despite Dr. Greenberg's assessment in the Evaluation, there "is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior" and that they "must be sentenced to the [ADTC] pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b)." The State declined to file a response and took no position with respect to the defendant's motion. On October 10, 2025, the court heard oral argument from the defendant.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1, the court must order the DOC to complete

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a psychological examination of the offender for all persons convicted of enumerated sexual offenses, including violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4B(5)(A)(1), except where the offender is to be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. The defendant pled guilty to a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4B(5)(A)(1) on May 19, 2025, and the court ordered the appropriate evaluation by the DOC pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 on May 23, 2025. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine if the offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior and, if it was, a determination of the offender's amenability to sex offender treatment and willingness to participate in such treatment.

Where the DOC's evaluation reveals an offender's conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive compulsive behavior and that the offender is amenable to sex offender treatment and willing to participate in such treatment, the relevant statute requires the court to make an independent determination "whether the offender's conduct was so characterized and whether the offender is amenable to sex offender treatment" and record its findings on the judgment of conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a). Upon making such a finding, the court shall, "upon the recommendation of the Department of Corrections" sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration to be served in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections at the ADTC for sex offender

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treatment or place the offender in probation with the requirement that they receive outpatient treatment as prescribed. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b). Where, as here, the DOC's evaluation concludes that the offender's conduct is not characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior or that the offender is not amenable to sex offender treatment, the court "shall impose sentence in accordance with chapters 43, 44, and 45 and not as provided in [N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3]b." N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(d).

The finding that an offender is "characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior" is "an essential prerequisite to sentencing an offender to [ADTC] for a program of specialized treatment." State v. Logan, 244 N.J.Super. 137, 140 (Law Div. 1990) (quoting Sentencing Manual for Judges (1988)). Because an offender's classification as a "repetitive" and "compulsive" sex offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a) requires the offender to be sent to ADTC for a "program of specialized treatment for his mental condition," this classification has been found to "inflict a greater stigma" than that resulting from the conviction for a sexual offense. State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 129 (1988). Ordinarily, the Due Process Clause does not give prisoners a recognized liberty interest in being assigned to a particular custody level or to have access to rehabilitative programs. Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 346 N.J.Super. 24, 29 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 249 (1987)).

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See also Hluchan v. Fauver, 480 F.Supp. 103, 108 (D.N.J. 1979) (noting that "state prisoners have no right to be assigned to any particular custody level or to have access to rehabilitative programs"). Because of the greater stigma attached to a finding that one is a repetitive and compulsive sex offender, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court has determined that a positive finding and classification as a repetitive and compulsive sex offender implicates the offender's liberty interest, and the making of such a finding requires some level of due process be afforded. Howard, 110 N.J. at 129 (citing N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 208 (1983)). See also State v. Horne, 56 N.J. 372, 375 (1970) (noting defendant has the right to challenge factors relied upon by sentencing court at sentencing). The "attenuated liberty interest implicated by an [ADTC] sentence" requires due process and a finding by the court by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a "repetitive and compulsive sex offender." Howard, 110 N.J. at 131. These constitutional safeguards "enure to the benefit of [a] defendant, due to the parole or liberty ramifications and stigma effect" of a positive finding that they are a repetitive and compulsive offender. Logan, 244 N.J.Super. at 142 (citing Howard, 110 N.J. at 127-30).

To preserve a defendant's due process rights with respect to a possible ADTC sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(a), the court rules require the court to provide a defendant with a copy of this evaluation, advise the defendant

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of their opportunity to be heard on it, and afford the defendant an opportunity for a hearing prior to sentencing based on the evaluation. R. 3:21-3. Where the State intends to rely upon the results of this evaluation for a finding that a defendant is a "compulsive" and "repetitive" offender, and the court is sentencing the defendant pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b), the State bears the burden to support the finding that an offender is compulsive and repetitive and the defendant has...